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ABSTRACT 
The delimitation question of the continental shelf has been a controversial issue 
since the early stages of the continental shelf doctrine. Two sets of rules and principles 
have so far been relevant to the delimitation question. These are, the Conventional 
solution of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf (the 
equidistance/special circumstances formula), and the Customary solution of the 1969 
North Sea Cases (the equitable principles/relevant circumstances formula). Three 
issues appear to have been the main problematic areas of these two solutions, namely, 
the actual stand of both solutions concerning the equidistance principle, and the 
meaning and scope of the special circumstances clause and the relevant circumstances 
clause. The main concern of the present thesis is these three problematic issues. 
The thesis is divided into two parts, which in turn are divided into six chapters. 
Because the said issues, by their very nature, are connected with the problem of the 
legal, geophysical, economic and political bases of the doctrine, Chapter I provides a 
general background aiming at identifying such bases. The Second Chapter examines 
the Conventional and Customary solutions using analytical and comparative 
perspectives. In Part Two a thorough examination of the said two clauses is attempted. 
Chapters III examines the available State practice and the judicial and arbitral cases 
aiming at identifying the meaning and scope of the relevant circumstances clause. 
Chapter IV discusses each individual relevant circumstance in order to determine their 
features and requirements. In chapter V, the special circumstances clause is examined, 
wherein its meaning and scope as well as the features and requirements of each 
individual special circumstance is discussed. Then the last Chapter provides the 
conclusion of this study. 
In the course of examining the said problematic issues, it seemed that any attempt 
to provide relevant clarification would be doomed to failure unless it was based on a 
sound criterion. Accordingly this thesis endeavoured to search for such a criterion, 
which was eventually found to be the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect 
principle. In the light of this principle, the thesis tries to prove that the relevant 
circumstances and the special circumstances clauses, so far, have managed to embrace 
identical categories of circumstances, and hence they have the same meaning and scope; 
and the actual stand of both, the Conventional and Customary solutions, concerning the 
equidistance principle is identical. From this another conclusion followed. That is, the 
Customary and Conventional solutions are so far identical. 
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Several factors signify the importance of the continental shelf boundaries between 
States. International peace and security cannot be settled without clear and dispute-free 
territorial and maritime boundaries. This final aim of International Law has been 
threatened by overlapping claims over submarine areas of the continental shelf, creating 
numerous disputes concerning the delimitation of their respective continental shelf 
boundaries. At least several hundred continental shelf boundaries between states need 
solutions all over the world. Much less than one hundred of these boundaries have 
been settled by agreement between the interested States, and seven cases have been 
solved by judicial decisions. The remaining boundaries are awaiting to face one of 
three solutions: first, to seek an agreement through political and diplomatic channels 
whereby states will face in good faith political pressure and demonstration of power in 
order to achieve meaningful negotiations; second, to seek a judicial decision according 
to which the concerned states will be countered with an unpredictable solution emerging 
out of vague principles and rules of the Conventional and Customary solutions, and the 
statement that each case must be judged on its own merits; third, to resort to an armed 
conflict, though reasonably unlikely. 
If the Truman Proclamation was not the real starting point of the doctrine of the 
continental shelf, it was at least the point from which the seeds of the doctrine were 
sown and in turn flourished. Although its wording was vague and ambiguous, the said 
Proclamation was taken up by the subsequent proclamations of other states as a guide, 
and consequently stamped each of them with similar vagueness. This start of the 
concept and doctrine of the continental shelf coloured all its history with imprecision 
and ambiguity and made all its principles and rules uncertain. State practice has, 
therefore, been unhelpful. This source, which was, in fact, a major source of the 
doctrine. was hindered from the start. 
I 
Another reason concerning the failure of the conceptualization of the principles 
and rules of the continental shelf delimitation was the multi-based legal concept of the 
continental shelf as was adopted by the International Law Commission and the 1958 
Geneva Conference. The location of the continental shelf and its riches as being 
contiguous to the land territory of the coastal States, and its extension into and under 
the sea, involved several factors each of which was alleged to have relevance. Not only 
geographical, geomorphological and geological considerations were invoked, but also 
political ambitions and economic prospects. On this ground and based on selected sets 
of the said factors, States bred numerous diversified approaches of the continental 
shelf. This diversification cancelled any possibility of reaching agreement on an 
acceptable connotation of the continental shelf. Thus, the ILC, and subsequently the 
1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, had to adopt an infinite definition 
using the exploitability criterion, which encapsulated not only the said considerations 
but also any possible factor which would arise in the future. This infinite definition in 
turn rendered the concept of the continental shelf to be based on a multiple-choice 
equation according to which numerous interpretations could be possible. 
A third manifest consideration that magnified the problem was the failure of the 
II. C and the 1958 Conference to produce a dispute-free formula of the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between opposite and adjacent States. That is, instead of 
establishing reliable principles and rules that would be helpful in such a delimitation, 
the resultant Article 6 contained another vague formula based on unknown facts. The 
unexplained "Special Circumstances" term and the vague role of the equidistance 
principle created a problematical confusion as to the meaning and scope of the rules and 
principles of Article 6. This confusion was, the unavoidable consequence of the lack of 
sufficient clarification concerning the meaning and scope of the terminology of Article 
6, and the lack of reliable criteria to help in the interpretation of the said Article, as well 
as of the lack of clearly-defined geophysical, legal, economic and political bases of the 
2 
continental shelf doctrine. 
The fate of the Customary rules and principles of the delimitation of the 
continental shelf was no better than that of the Conventional rules and principles. The 
equitable principles/relevant circumstances formula suffers from vagueness as well as 
uncertainty. The lack of sufficient clarification as to the meaning and scope of the 
"relevant circumstances" term not only resulted in confusing the meaning and scope of 
the Customary rules and principles, but also in confusing the real implication of the 
Customary solution stand concerning the equidistance principle. Yet instead of adding 
more clarification, the other judicial and arbitral cases further complicated the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf. Each of the seven cases, that have, so 
far, been concluded, seems to have avoided any discussion that may give additional 
clarification to the Conventional and Customary solutions. As each of the judicial and 
arbitral decisions adhered, a°clusively, to the facts of the involved case, all these 
decisions hastened to pessimistically declare that one must not overconceptualize the 
application of the rules and principles relating to the continental shelf, each case is 
unique, and each case must be judged on its own merits. Besides, almost all these 
cases insisted that the delimitation process must result in an objective solution; but none 
of them tried to identify a single criterion in the light of which the achievement of this 
goal could be attained. Bearing in mind the said pessimistic declarations concerning the 
k 
uniqueness of each case, the lack of a criterion/criteria to ensure the achievement of 
objectivity, and the lack of clarity concerning the Conventional and Customary 
solutions, it seems that these solutions are empty of any legal credibility unless such a 
criterion/criteria as well as clarity are provided. 
In a nutshell, the continental shelf doctrine suffers from only one defect, namely, 
the vagueness and infinite character of its legal concepts. From this defect three 
problematical issues flow. The only widespread acceptable aspect throughout the 
history of the continental shelf doctrine has been the entitlement of coastal States to 
3 
jurisdiction and control over the shelf they abut on. But, what are the limits and bases 
of such an entitlement ? In fact, there is no clear answer. The outer limit of the 
continental shelf is, therefore, the first problematical issue. Another contentious issue 
is the lack of a clear identification of the geophysical, legal, economic and political 
bases of the continental shelf doctrine. And the third is the delimitation question of the 
continental shelf between opposite and adjacent States. 
This thesis will mainly focus on the problematical issues of the delimitation 
question of the continental shelf between States, namely, the meaning and scope of the 
"special circumstances" and "relevant circumstances" clauses, and the role of the 
equidistance principle in both, the Conventional and Customary solutions, as well as 
the criteria of interpreting the said solutions. However, the problem of the continental 
shelf delimitation and that of the bases of the continental shelf doctrine are 
interconnected and interrelated. In fact, the clearer and better identified the bases of the 
continental shelf doctrine are, the easier and more precise the interpretation of the rules 
and principles relating to the delimitation question will be. The delimitation question 
will, therefore, be discussed in the light of the discussion relating to the problem of the 
bases of the continental shelf doctrine. As for the problem of the outer limit of the 
continental shelf, it will be referred to when and where necessary. The reason for this 
choice is that the problem of the outer limit h. -c now been solved by the UNCLOS III, 
whereas the delimitation question and the problem of the bases of the doctrine are still 
awaiting a proper solution or sufficient clarification to the available solutions. As the 
development of the continental shelf doctrine, especially during the UNCLOS III, has 
proved that it is almost impossible to establish a new solution concerning the 
delimitation question, it appears that any relevant research would be better aimed at 
clarifying the available solutions and providing a sufficient criterion to help in their 
interpretation rather than attempting a new solution. 
Having identified the main areas of concern, the discussion will research these 
4 
areas using historical, analytical and comparative perspectives. In order to meet the 
aims of this research, it has been found appropriate to divide this thesis into six basic 
chapters. The First will attempt a general background of the problem of the bases of 
the continental shelf doctrine. A second chapter will be devoted to examining the main 
two solutions - the Conventional and Customary solutions - of the delimitation 
question, in a comparative study. As the discussion reaches this point, a more 
thorough deliberation will be necessitated. State practice and the judicial and arbitral 
cases relating to the delimitation question will be examined in the Third Chapter. 
"Relevant Circumstances" as has been put forth by Customary International Law, and 
"Special Circumstance" as it is the problematical issue of the Conventional Rules, will 
be dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth Chapters, respectively. Then a conclusion 
analyzing and commenting on the work as a whole will be available in the last chapter, 
Chapter VI. 
5 
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Condusion 
Introdudion 
This Chapter is devoted to two basic purposes. The first is to provide a general 
background based on which the rest of the thesis will be discussed. The second is to 
try to explore the origin and foundations of the continental shelf doctrine in order to 
identify its real legal, geophysical, economic and political bases. On top of that, and as 
a matter of necessity, the final aim of this Chapter is to identify the problem of 
delimitation of the continental shelf, and the various types of solutions that have, so far, 
been used to solve it. 
Thus, this Chapter is going to concentrate on three main areas. In order to clarify 
the historical background, the first Section will deal, very generally, with the history of 
the continental shelf doctrine. It will use an historical perspective depending on certain 
stages of development rather than on the chronological order of events relating to the 
6 
doctrine. The second Section scrutinizes the most effective reason that lay behind the 
failure of development of the concept of the continental shelf, namely, its loose 
definition. This Section will deal with the geoscientific, and legal, definition 
throughout the development of the concept. The third Section will try to identify the 
problem areas of the delimitation of the continental shelf between neighbouring States. 
It also discusses the available solutions to the issue at stake in the international field. A 
final conclusion will sum up the results of this Chapter. 
smad®m a 
Historical, Economic & 
Technological Background 
The Early History 
In his Mare Liberum doctrine, which emphasized the freedom of the high seas, 
Grotius mentioned nothing about the seabed of the ocean floor or of the continental 
shelf. In fact nothing was known about this at the time. 
The Concept of the continental shelf was first discovered by geographers late last 
century. 1 When the term first appeared in the legal literature early this century, it did 
not relate to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf but to the superjacent waters 
thereof. 2 In fact, before Barbosa's remarks, which drew attention to the concept of the 
continental shelf in 1927,3 the continental shelf was referred to only for the purpose of 
fisheries in its superjacent waters. 4 
The failure of the Hague conference in 1930 to bring in any regulations relating to 
the continental shelf, delayed the start of the continental shelf doctrine. As the Gulf of 
Paria treaty was concluded in 1942, it managed to be regarded as the first substantial 
7 
incident relevant to the continental shelf doctrine. The U. K on behalf of Trinidad, and 
Venezuela concluded a treaty relating to the seabed of the Gulf of Paria. As far as the 
Parties to this treaty were concerned, they bisected the seabed of the Gulf between 
themselves for the purpose of exploiting the oil therein. Moreover, the unique feature 
of this treaty was that both parties exchanged a reciprocal commitment so as not to 
claim any sovereignty over its own portion of the sea bed. 5 The doctrine of the 
continental shelf, therefore, was not originated in that treaty. For, at the time, no state 
claimed any right on any part of the seabed beyond the territorial sea. 
Nevertheless, three years later the President of the U. S. A., Harry S. Truman, 
announced that, 
"... the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and 
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the 
United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and 
control. "6 
This explicit claim over Fontinental shelf areas was considered the starting point of the 
history of the continental shelf doctrine.? In fact, in so doing it proved itself to be a 
turning point in the history of the Law of the Sea as well. The Truman Proclamation, 
(as will be seen, ) was followed by several other proclamations, and hence drew the 
attention of the international community, at the time, to pay due regard to the regulation 
of this new concept. 
The History of the Continental Shelf Post 1945 
The development of the continental shelf after the Truman Proclamation of 1945, 
can, in theory, be divided into five phases each of which is concerned with an aspect of 
the doctrine according to its stage of importance. 
8 
The phase of the Legal Basis of the Continental Shelf Concept 
Like every other subject matter of International Law, the continental shelf needs a 
legal ground based on which its connotation is legally conceptualized. A great debate 
was taking place in the literature of the late 1940s and early 1950s concerning this 
issue. Beside the fact that it was a novel issue , the entitlement of a coastal State over 
the continental shelf would contradict the Mare Liberum doctrine, which had been in 
force for a long time. Nevertheless, whereas Green, 8 and Vallat9 were among those 
who suggested an effective occupation as a legal basis, Young10 preferred to base the 
continental shelf entitlement on the theory of appurtenance. The end of the debate, 
however, was in favour of a third opinion advanced by Gid10 1 and Lauterpacht. 12 
-, 
According to this opinion the entitlement over the shelf constituted an inherent right 
vested upon the State concerned. 13 
As the International Law Commission (ILC) started working on the codification 
of, inter alia, the continental shelf, it had no choice but to be involved in the debate of 
the legal ground of the concept. Its prolonged discussion resulted in rejecting the idea 
of occupation, as well as the idea of basing the concept on State practice, 14 and, 
eventually, in adopting the inherency doctrine. 15 This doctrine was substantiated by 
the ILC and was, subsequently, enumerated in its final report in 1956. The ILC says 
that, 
"The rights of coastal States over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. " 16 
The concluded opinion of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea 
was the same when it adopted verbatim the aforesaid wording of the ILC. 17 
In the North Sea Cases, the Court has, firmly, considered, that the most 
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fundamental of all is the rights of the coastal State on the continental shelf, which "... 
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, ... ". 
18 
Nonetheless, the rejection of State practice as a legal basis of the doctrine was 
abandoned by the International Court of Justice whose decision in the 1969 North Sea 
Cases counted Article 2 of the 1958 Convention among those which were "... regarded 
as reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or at least emergent rules of customary 
international law... ". 19 
By the time the UNCLOS III was convened, the vested rights doctrine was so 
credible that no substantial argument was raised against it during the Conference. That 
was why, the Conference adopted the exact wording of Article 2 Paragraph 3 of the 
1958 Convention. 20 
The Phase of The Definition of the Continental Shelf 
Having identified the legal basis of the concept of the continental shelf, there was 
a real need to examine the physical basis, or in other words to determine the subject 
matter of the concept. During the 1940s all the attention was directed to the legal basis. 
However, no sooner had the 1LC begun its examination of the concept of the 
continental shelf, than it realised that a feasible definition was needed. The continental 
shelf is a geophysical structure involving numerous factors such as geological, 
geographical and geomorphological factors. The ILC was in a dilemma as to what 
factors it should take into account for the purpose of definition. Would it adopt or 
adapt the geographers definition? Or would it create an independent legal one? In case 
it adapted the geographers', or even if it created its own legal one, on what 
considerations should it base its definition? Due to the lack of requisite knowledge, the 
ILC had to choose a flexible compromise - the exploitability/depth criterion - which 
created the hottest controversy in the subsequent history of the doctrine 21 Neither the 
1958 Geneva Conference, nor the subsequent State practice, nor even the judicial 
decisions, managed to find a reliable definition or to put forth a better interpretation to 
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the available one. 22 Yet, the UNCLOS III, though it adopted a more prescribed 
definition, could not solve the problematical question of the geophysical, economic and 
political foundations of the continental shelf concept. 23 The failure of identifying these 
foundations of the continental shelf reflected its controversial nature on all the other 
aspects of the concept. The delimitation question between opposite and adjacent States, 
and the features and factors which would be considered in such a delimitation, were the 
ill-fated successors of that failure. 24 
The Phase of the Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf 
The compromise definition that was recommended by the ILC and was adopted 
by the UNCLOS I, was enshrined in article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the 
continental shelf in 1958. The adopted exploitability/depth criterion created a great fear 
that some States might claim a limitless shelf so long as they managed to develop 
technological abilities to exploit further depths. Moreover, the unexplained infinity of 
the exploitability term created the fear that under such a criterion the continental shelf 
concept might embrace the deep seabed and the subsoil thereof. This fear was 
magnified during the 1960s due to the accelerating speed of the technological 
developments of the time. That was why the literature during the 1960s and early 
1970s was devoted mainly to examining the consequences of the said definition. In 
fact, there was a general feeling that the continental shelf should terminate at a certain 
limit, but the problem was, on what grounds should such a limit be based and 
determined. A cry like that of Arvid Pardo's in 1968,25 and a resolution like that of the 
UN General Assembly's, which declared the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the 
ocean floor as a common heritage of mankind, 26 managed to constitute the first step 
towards solving the said problem. The second step was to press towards redefining the 
continental shelf. By the time the UNCLOS III began, the need to redefine the 
continental shelf was at its most critical period. After a prolonged discussion the 
Conference adopted a more reliable definition - distance/geophysical description 
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criterion -, 
27 _erminatinjan 3 ? ossible argument'on the outer limit of the continental 
shelf. Furthermore, it estab], sfied a commission On The Limits Of The Continental 
Shelf to be delegated the responsibility of solving any relating problem. 28 
The Phase of the Continental Shelf Boundaries Between States 
The North Sea Cases, (Germany Vs. Denmark and Netherlands) in 1969, 
opened a new era of dispute over another problematical aspect of the continental shelf. 
The delimitation of the shelfs boundaries between opposite and adjacent States was 
realized as being of a controversial character since the early stages of development of 
the continental shelf. 29 However, it was not until the 1969 Cases, that this problem 
manifested its highly controversial nature. 
Again, the lack of requisite knowledge, and clearly defined foundations of the 
continental shelf, caused the ILC to choose a flexible solution, (the equidistance/special 
circumstances formula), to the delimitation question. 30 The continental shelf 
delimitation could, according to this solution, be effected either by agreement, by a 
boundary justified by special circumstances, or by an equidistant line. Such a vague 
solution, especially its second alternative, (the "Special Circumstances" exception), 
opened the door for an unresolved controversy. "Special Circumstances" clause was 
left without definition or clarification. In fact, the preparatory work of the ILC 
contained only a few instances of such circumstances, which were clearly mentioned, 
only, as mere examples, and did not identify precisely the characteristics of the real 
meaning and scope of this clause, or the role of the equidistance principle. 
The hot debate concerning the delimitation question during the UNCLOS I of 
1958 also ended with the same fate, as it adopted the said ILC's formula, which 
became Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. Article 6 also left the role of the "special 
circumstances" clause and the equidistance principle unexplained, and did not even 
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provide any example of special circumstances. 
The contribution of the International Court to the matter of delimitation in the 
North Sea Cases was also disappointing. It did nothing more than add some more 
vague principles and notions the aftermath of which entangled all the subsequent 
judicial history relating to the delimitation question. Natural prolongation, equitable 
principles, macro-geography and relevant circumstances were some examples of 
principles which were created by the Court and left without sufficient clarification. In 
addition, instead of identifying a precise meaning and scope of the relevant 
circumstances clause, the ICJ provided some examples of the relevant circumstances, 
and commented that, there is no legal limit to the relevant circumstances clause but the 
equity requirements. 31 In fact, the ICJ had the full responsibility of providing more 
complications to the delimitation question especially when it, though in pain, declared 
that "each case must be judged on its own merits", 32 and "no attempt to 
overconceptualize the principles and rules of the continental shelf should be made. "33 
The subsequent judicial and arbitral cases carried on initiating more examples of 
circumstances which, in their opinion, were regarded as having "special" or "relevant" 
character. Each case, therefore, established its own and unique notion of equity, which 
was built, as they claim, on an objective balancing of the various relevant 
considerations. 34 
During the UNCLOS III, further hot debate erupted concerning the delimitation 
question. Consensus proved to be impossible on such a contentious problem. All 
efforts to provide a compromised formula failed but to adopt a final empty one that was 
enshrined in the 1982 Convention. 35 
The Phase of Redefinition of the Continental Shelf 
The unsuccessful thirty years of development of the continental shelf forced the 
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participants to the UNCLOS III to seek a redefinition. Despite the variety of opinions, 
which were caused by world-wide participation, the Conference managed to adopt a 
somewhat reliable definition (the 200 mile distant/outer edge of the continental margin 
formula). 36 One of the advantages of the new definition was that it solved, to a great 
extent, the problem of the outer limit of the shelf. International law was finally 
convinced that the distance criterion was best suited to such a concept. Thus, according 
to the new definition States could choose either 200 nautical miles distance or the outer 
edge of the continental margin as an end to their continental shelf. Nevertheless, 
although the geophysical basis in the new definition was clearer than that of the 
definition of the 1958 Convention, it was entangled by the inclusion of the natural 
prolongation principle. This principle, in fact, was not well identified, nor was there 
any relevant clarification in the 1982 Convention. The question is, is it a geological or 
a geomorphological concept? Does it relate to a geoscientific, or to a legal connotation? 
In case it is a legal notion, what is the legal definition of the natural prolongation 
principle? Unfortunately, the Convention gives no sufficient answer. 37 
The Technological and Economic Background 
This Subsection is going to examine the technological and economic history of the 
continental shelf doctrine. Because the purpose here is to highlight some relating facts 
which might help in providing more clarification to the bases of the continental shelf 
doctrine, a very general idea about the relevant technology and economy during the last 
four and a half decades will be available in this subsection. 
To begin with, off-shore mining from shore was known long before the 
continental shelf was even known by geographers. However, the 1940s and early 
1950s witnessed widespread expectations that a good deal of reserves of oil and gas 
was laying underneath the shelf. 38 These expectations proved to be correct later in 
numerous places such as the Persian Gulf, North Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. 
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Nonetheless, the technological development was not sufficiently advanced during the 
1940s, 39 nor even the 1950s. 40 
The 1960s showed another mode of technological development. What was 
expected in the 1950s proved to be very modest in comparison with the real 
development that took place in the mid 1960s. The development of machinery varied 
from floated platforms on the surface of the sea to submersibles, or units fixed on the 
bottom of the seabed, or self-elevating platforms. 41 Moreover, development occurred 
not only in drilling devices but also in refinery stations which reduces the expenses of 
the drilling process. 42 The ability to exploit the seabed advanced from less than one 
hundred to several hundred meters, and then, astonishingly, to several thousand meters 
isobath. 43 
From that time on, technology ceased to be predictable. The developments that 
occurred during the 1970s turned the dream of mankind to exploit the untold riches of 
the sea into reality. Oil, natural gas and countless number of other heavy minerals were 
discovered laying on, in, and underneath the seabed. ` Technology was made feasible 
to serve mankind, and thus enabling them to exploit whatever they liked 45 Since the 
late 1960s the exploration and exploitation of the seabed, including the continental 
shelf, began and has successfully continued. ' 
However, an objective estimation of the technological development leads to the 
following remarks. First of all, the mode of technology is very changeable and cannot 
be predictable. The only thing which can be anticipated is that technological 
advancement is increasing, but no one could ever guess the direction and speed of such 
an advancement. Secondly, although the technological development made it possible to 
exploit greater depths of the seabed, the expenses of such exploitability mitigated its 
effect in reality. The expenses of exploiting the seabed proved to be very high vis ä vis 
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that of exploiting the land 47 
Ocýak)m 2, 
The Problematic Matter of 
Definition 
Should a definition be a key according and referring to which any problem 
relating to the defined issue is solved, it must be clear and precise. Thus, the clearer 
and more precise the definition is, the easier and more automatic its application will be. 
That is to say, any vagueness or ambiguity will preclude the application of a definition 
and create some problems which cannot be solved unless such a gap is bridged. 
Therefore, every definition must be based on durable and unchangeable facts the 
precise identification of which will constitute the bases of the relevant issue. The 
definition of the continental shelf should be as such. 
The present Section will terrace the problematic matter of definition following its 
development throughout its recent history starting from the Truman Proclamation of 
1945. It will deal with the legal and geoscientific literature during the 1940s and 
1950s, state practice, the ILC work, the 1958 Conference and Convention, and the 
UNCLOS III and the 1982 Convention. The purpose of this Section is to search for 
the legal, geophysical and economic, as well as the political foundations of the 
continental shelf doctrine. 
Literature During the 1940s and 1950s 
The necessity of examining the available definition in the literature during the 
early stages of development of the doctrine derives from the following considerations. 
The first is, to have an idea about the background on which States based their claims, 
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and on which the ILC, and the 1958 Conference, based their work. The second is, 
because the Truman Proclamation did not denote what it meant by the term continental 
shelf, then it either relied on a well known connotation of that term, or left it to be 
clarified by the subsequent literature; so in both cases the literature is important. The 
third is, what has been said about the Truman Proclamation can also be said about the 
subsequent State practice, because all the subsequent claims contained no clarification 
of the continental shelf term. 
The Legal Literature 
Writers during the 1940s and 1950s followed three choices in handling the 
definition matter. They either provide no definition at all; or adopted the geographers 
definition or attempted their own definition. Bingham, 48 and Young in his early 
writings, 49 found it sufficient to comment on the Proclamations without stating any 
definition. Bingham did not even provide any clarification on the matter of definition, 
Whereas Young, while commenting on the Truman Proclamation, said that: 
"... an accompanying press release described it [the continental shelf] as that area adjacent 
to the continent covered by no more than 100 fathoms of water. "50 
Vallat, 51 and Borchard, 52 stated a similar clarification. In fact, Borchard interpreted the 
meaning of the resources of the continental shelf as those which were "... on and under 
the continental shelf up to a water depth of 600 feet ... 
". 53 
In his book, Mouton distinguished between inner, insular, and continental 
shelves. 54 Then he remarked that the legal definition did not need to borrow its 
connotation from the other sciences. 55 However in a later article Mouton himself 
adhered to the geological concept of the continental shelf. Although he commented on 
the verified opinions of geologists, he said that, 
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"All geologists agree that the continental shelf, including the inner shelves, belongs to 
the continental areas and that the body of the continents proper find their real limits on 
the continental edge. "56 
Furthermore, after providing the Geological Nomenclature of the Continental Shelf as 
being "the submarine continuation of the continental area up to about the 100 fathom 
line", he concluded that, 
"This description of the geological or oceanographical concept of the continental shelf 
will suffice for the time being, to make the following question understood: what has the 
continental shelf to do with International Law, what is the legal problem involved? "57 
In his later writing, Young realized that some Proclamations did not contain the 
term continental shelf because their adjacent submarine areas were not considered, 
according to him, by all geologists as being continental shelves. 58 Yet he preferred the 
usage of the term "submarine areas" instead of that of the continental shelf. 59 
Professor Lauterpacht, was also in favour of the preceding view point. He 
differentiated between the terms "submarine areas" and "continental shelf'. Submarine 
areas, as he exclaimed, was a more general concept than the latter. He said, 
"The continental shelf is a submarine area adjacent to the coast of the State. But the 
converse proposition is not necessarily true. "60 
To aid this viewpoint, Professor Lauterpacht invoked the absence of the continental 
shelf term from some Proclamations as evidence of the inapplicability of this term to 
their submarine areas 61 Moreover, he invoked the doctrine, that the continental shelf 
was the gentle slope until the "first substantial fall-off", to deny the existence of such a 
continental shelf in some areas like the English Channel and the North Sea. 62 That was 
why he preferred the usage of the submarine areas term. 63 
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In a nutshell, the Literature circulated around two main viewpoints. The first was 
concerned with the geographers definition, which considered the continental shelf as 
the submarine areas that would slope gently until the sudden change that drops rapidly 
towards the ocean floor. This sudden change would usually occur at depths 
approximately 200 meters. The other viewpoint was that which considered all the 
submarine areas including the shallow waters as being continental shelf. In fact, the 
second viewpoint is not, at all, odd to geologists, geographers, and oceanographers; 
for, some, or may be the majority of them would argue in its favour. The following 
paragraphs are, therefore, going to examine the geoscientific literature to see if the 
foregoing conclusion is correct or not. 
The Geoscientific Literature 
Although scientists knew little about the continental shelf before, and during, the 
1940s they sketched out the principal description of this phenomenon. By and large, 
most of the writings during the first half of the twentieth century concentrated on the 
geomorphological and topographical description, as well as the historical analysis of the 
geological origin and evolution of the continental shelf. Of special interest here is the 
definition of the shelf provided in some of this literature. 
To begin with, in his treatise in 1948, professor Shepard devoted Chapter VI to 
explain the continental shelf issue. Defining the term, he stated that, 
"The shallow marine terraces which border the continents have been appropriately termed 
continental shelves. These shelves are the coastal plains of the ocean and, in fact, are a 
direct continuation in most places of the plains on the adjacent lands. " 
"The term continental shelf is used here only in reference to those terraces that are clearly 
related to the continents. In some cases the term has been applied to an outer plateau or 
irregular area with depths greatly exceeding 100 fathoms, although not nearly as great as 
the deep oceans. For such areas the term continental borderland is suggested. The 
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continental-shelf margin is ordinarily at a depth less than 100 fathoms, but in some areas 
a terrace exceeding out from the land terminates at greater depths. In such cases it seems 
advisable to remain the name continental shelf even if the marginal depth is as great as 
200 or 300 fathoms. The name is applied also to the unusually deep shelves of glaciated 
areas where troughs or basins may extend to depths of 300 or even 400 fathoms, 
although the bulk of the area is much shoaler.,, 64 
This understanding of Professor Shepard indicates his wide view of the 
geological concept of the continental shelf. In his description of the world wide 
continental shelves he dealt with some of the areas which were considered by lawyers 
problematical, such as the Persian Gulf and the North Sea. The submarine areas 
underneath them were unquestionably considered continental shelves by Professor 
Shepard. 65 He also mentioned the so called "insular shelves" as denoting those 
platforms which would surround the oceanic islands. The "insular shelves" term was 
used by Professor Shepard in order to differentiate between the continental shelf around 
the oceanic islands and those shelves "... around the continents and the islands which 
are connected by shallow water to the continents. "66 
An interesting finding in this treatise was the shelves in landlocked bodies of 
waters, such as the Great Lakes, the Caspian Sea, and the Black Sea; 67 some of these 
bodies have shelves and others do not. 68 The question here is, what is the legal status 
of these shelves? And are they recognized by the legal definition of the continental 
shelf? 
In his book written ten years later, Professor Shepard went a further step when he 
stated that, the Continental shelf is 
"... the shallow-water area extending out to a depth of 100 fathoms. This however, is 
purely arbitrary and does not take account that the word shelf refers to a flat area with a 
20 
steep termination. There are such flat areas with rather abrupt edges around most of the 
continents, and it is only rarely that they terminate at or even close to 100 fathoms. "69 
This arbitrary limit of the continental shelf was given the chance of more explanation 
when the writer himself said that, 
"In 1953 the International Committee on the Nomenclature of Ocean Bottom Features 
defined the shelf as the "zone around the continents, extending from low-water line to the 
depths at which there is a marked increase of slope to greater depth. "70 
But this marked increase, which was called the continental slope might have two or 
more breaks, so which break must be considered. 
"A recent UNESCO conference [, he said, ] ... resulted in the suggestion that where there 
are two breaks, the most marked break be used, provided it lies at depths of less than 600 
meters ...... 
7l 
As early as 1942, Professor Daly defined the continental terrace as comprising the 
continental shelf and the continental slope. According to him, the continental shelf is a 
flat belt which borders the continents and slopes gently to a depth ranging from 300 to 
600 feet isobath. At this depth it breaks and slopes down rapidly until it meets the 
seabed of the ocean floor which is at a depth of about 2000-2500 fathoms. This gentle 
slope up to the fall-off, or break-of-slope, is called the continental shelf. 72 
Nevertheless, Umbogrove's opinion has followed another course of discussion. 
After he categorized the shallow platforms of the continents into inner and outer 
shelves, he denied the inner shelves, such as the North Sea and the Sunda Sea, as 
belonging to the marginal zone of the continents. He said, 
"Generally the shallow platforms bordering the continents are classified in two categories, 
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viz. the inner and the outer shelves. The first group comprises such regions as the shelf 
of the North Sea and the Sunda Sea. "73 
the origin and history of the inner shelf regions will be left out of consideration 
here, since they do not belong to the marginal zone proper of the continents. "74 
[Emphasis added] 
Summing up the foregoing discussion of the geologists opinions, the following 
observations can be made: 1- Geologists, during the 1940s and early 1950s, were 
involved in explaining the origin and foundation of the continental shelf rather than in 
its definition. 2- Two reasons were behind their verified ways of defining the 
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continental shelf. On the one hand, when they defined it, each was looking through his 
own viewpoint of the origin of the shelf more than looking at the shelf as a fact. On 
the other hand, they used different terminology to express the same fact. That was why 
the International Committee on the Nomenclature of Ocean Bottom Features tried to 
find the common elements of the available definitions when it defined the shelf in 1953, 
as the "... zone around the continent, extending from low-water line to depths at which 
there is a marked increase of slope to greater depth. "75 
State Practice 
Before examining State practice relevant to the definition of the continental shelf, 
it is necessary to note the following, 1- for the purpose of a wider understanding the 
discussion will be concerned with those proclamations which were issued between the 
Truman Proclamation in 1945 and the beginning of UNCLOS III in 1973; 76 2- State 
Practice, as is referred to here, consists of all those proclamations that have been issued 
by various States, though some States have issued more than one proclamation 
throughout the various stages of the development of the concept, during the said era. 
State practice followed various ways in handling the notion of the continental 
shelf. Each State has its viewpoint on the matter. If we regarded the diversification of 
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the political stand of States, and if we regarded the various economic interests of States, 
we would easily realize why the resultant proclamations bred numerous connotations of 
the continental shelf. Furthermore, the failure of any international effort to establish a 
reliable definition of the shelf, added more complications, or perhaps played a decisive 
role in providing the suitable atmosphere of breeding such variegated claims. Such a 
legal vacuum helped States to announce whatever pleased their political and economic 
interests. 
A -set of 86 proclamations, that were issued between 1945 and 1973, were 
collecteCi Unfortunately, every attempt to classify them into categories, in order to 
analyze them, was doomed to failure. However, examining them carefully, the 
following results could be deduced. 77 First of all, the majority of the proclamations did 
not provide a clear definition of the continental shelf. It was obvious that State practice 
were misled by the alleged confusion of the geological definition of the continental 
shelf. Apart from some Latin American States, 78 the proclamations, that were issued 
between 1945 and 1958, mentioned either the "continental shelf' term, 79 or the "seabed 
and subsoil" term, without any definition. 80 Although, States kept circulating around 
the said two terms between 1958-1973,81 the most popular feature of this period's 
proclamations was the usage of the exploitability criterion which succeeded the silence 
of the previous group of proclamations concerning the continental shelf definition. 82 
Secondly, States practice was, in fact, a reflection of two considerations. First, 
States were affected by the stage of the continental shelf development. That is to say, 
the majority of proclamations in each stage of development of the doctrine were 
stamped with the criterion that was the most popular of that sage. Second, States were, 
also affected by their political and economic interests and ideologies. The vagueness of 
the concept during the 1940s satisfied the political and economic interests of States to 
claim an ambiguous entitlement on an undefined area of the seabed adjacent to their land 
territories. Accordingly, States established their proclamations using infinite 
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terminology without any clarification. 83 Nevertheless, no sooner did the ILC start its 
work on the subject than the contemporaneous proclamations became a reflection of its 
hesitation with regard to the shelf s definition. Apart from the Latin American States 
proclamations, 10 proclamations were issued in the period between 1950-1958. Four 
of them kept silent on the matter of defmition, 84 two chose the exploitability criterion, 85 
three referred to the 200 meters isobath criterion as a definite limit of their entitlement, 86 
and one identified its continental shelf areas by referring to specific co-ordinates. 87 
The adoption of the depth/exploitability combined criterion by the 1958 
Conference reflected on the subsequent history of State practice. This combined 
criterion, which was in fact dominated by the exploitability criterion, was the most 
popular characteristic of the proclamations issued between 1958-1973. A total of 32 
claims out of 44,88 adopted either the exploitability criterion, 89 or the combined 
exploitability/depth criterion, 90 or referred to the definition of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention. 91 
Thirdly, because of the above mentioned reasons, and some other reasons (that 
will be discussed later), State practice could in no way be considered as evidence of 
customary law, vis ä vis the definition of the continental shelf. As for the requirements 
of an issue to become a customary international rule, it is supposed, 1- to "... be of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis 
of a general rule of law. '; 92 2- to enjoy widespread State practice, and "... a very 
widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice of itself, 
provided it included that of States whose interests were specially affected. "; 93 3- not 
only, must State practice be extensive and virtually uniform, but must also be "... in 
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is 
involved. "; 94 4- the passage of time, "short though it might be. "95 
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To begin with, the pressing question is, do the said proclamations produce any 
issue that can be regarded as having a fundamentally norm-creating character? The 
answer is yes, and no. It is yes because all the proclamations agreed on some kind of 
an entitlement in connection with areas of the seabed adjacent to their land territory. 96 
And no, because, apart from some Latin American States, no State identifies the limits 
of those contiguous areas of seabed on which it has such an entitlement. That is to say, 
the limits of the continental shelf concept as was produced by State practice was vague 
and ambiguous. So, would international law accept such a vague issue to consider it as 
having a fundamentally norm-creating character(? )(! ) 
Moreover, as has been seen above, the proclamations satisfy the requirements of 
widespread practice. However, they were never uniform. Even when the largest 
number of proclamations chose the exploitability criterion, they could hardly constitute 
half of the total number. 97 In addition, assuming the exploitability criterion had created 
some kind of uniformity among the said proclamations, this criterion itself would be 
questioned as to whether it enjoyed a fundamentally norm-creating character or not. 
98 
The ILC and UNCLOS I Work 
The novelty of the concept of the continental shelf, and the very fact that 
International Law had not regulated anything quite like it before, created some 
difficulties on the way of the Commission's work concerning the definition of the 
continental shelf. Yet, the lack of the requisite knowledge on the subject, 99 added more 
complications to these difficulties. 
Having realized the necessity to define the continental shelf, the ILC confined 
itself to two restrictions. The first was that its work should not result in a 
discriminatory definition, in the meaning that its definition must rely on facts according 
to which all States would be provided with an equal opportunity in their access to the 
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continental shelf. ' 00 The second is that, bearing in mind the economic, social, and 
juridical importance of the exploitation of the submarine resources for the benefit of 
mankind, the ILC believed that, "[l]egal concepts should not impede this 
development. "101 
In the search for a proper definition, the ILC examined the geoscientific definition 
of the continental shelf and found that not only did scientists differ from each other in 
defining the continental shelf, 102 but also according to some geologist some areas of 
shallow waters were excluded from being a continental shelf. 103 Such a finding caused 
the ILC, in its third Session, to reject geological definitions and to choose a legal 
definition. It provided that, 
"... the term "continental shelf' refers to the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial waters, where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed 
and subsoil. " 
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Some States were dissatisfied with this definition. After hearing the special 
rapporteur on the comments of some governments, the Commission was convinced that 
such a definition was unable "to satisfy the requirements of certainty", and was a fertile 
breeder of controversy. 105 And hence, it should reconsider it. Furthermore, the 
Commission found that it was necessary to re-examine the geophysical facts so as to 
select what was proper to rely on in its new definition. The ILC had three gaps to 
bridge. The first concerned the question of the shallow waters that were less than 200 
meters depth, due to their problematic status. 106 The seabed of the North Sea and the 
Arabian (Persian) Gulf, for instance, were alleged not to be regarded as constituting 
continental shelves. 107 The second related to the problem of islands. 108 The 
submarine areas that bordered some islands were not regarded as a continental shelf as 
far as geologists were concerned. 109 And the third concerned the situation where the 
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continuity of the continental shelf was interrupted by a narrow channel that was deeper 
the 200 metres110 
Consequently, and despite the said gaps, the ILC inclined to, partially, adopt the 
geological definition of the continental shelf, reconunending that, 
"... the term "continental shelf' refers to the sea bed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
contiguous to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of two 
hundred metres. "111 
This definition was said to be partially geological, and partially legal. For, in order to 
bridge the above-said three gaps, the ILC in its comments on this definition provided 
these three gaps as exceptions of the geological definition, and as being taken into 
account by the legal definition. 112 
Nevertheless, a decision like that of the "Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on "Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Oceanic Waters", in 
1956, tempted the Commission to re-examine its viewpoint concerning its last 
definition. 113 The said Conference resulted in adopting a combination of the 
exploitability criterion and 200 meters depth limit. While discussing this combined 
criterion, the ILC split into two groups: one was in favour of the combined criterion 
and the other was against it. However, because the majority were, eventually, in 
favour of this new concept, the Commission adopted the exploitability/200 metres 
depth criterion in its final report in which it stated that, 
"... the term "continental shelf" is used as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth 
of 200 metres (... ), or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas. "' 14 
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In so doing, the ILC betrayed one, if not both of its restrictions. Its final 
definition was discriminatory in the meaning that it did not give every coastal State, 
hypothetically or in reality, equal opportunities of obtaining a continental shelf. Several 
questions remained without a proper answer. With regard to the depth criterion, the 
question is, what about coastal States whose shelf slopes down abruptly towards the 
ocean floor at a short distance from the shore. 115 Is it not discriminatory to grant them 
a small shelf vis ä vis those States whose shelf extends for miles, and some times for 
hundreds of miles, before it slopes down to the ocean floor. Even if we imagined that 
this problem was solved by providing the exploitability criterion, this latter criterion is 
the most fertile breeder of confusion. Such a vague criterion left numerous questions 
without answer. For instance, what is the parameter of the exploitability criterion? 
Whose exploitability is it meant to be? Is it that of the coastal State or of any other 
State? What is the outermost extent of the continental shelf? Can it embrace the ocean 
floor or must it stop at a certain point? Where is this certain point, and how can it be 
identified? Would it not be discriminatory between developed and developing 
countries? Would it not be discriminatory at the expense of those States which did not 
have the sufficient technology to go as far as those which had? 
In sum, the ILC did nothing more than entangle the problem of the definition. 
Objectively speaking, one should not go too far in blaming the ILC for its failure 
especially if one took into account the environment and stage of development of the 
concept during which the ILC was searching for a proper definition. However, its 
failure was that, since the ILC had to choose a proper definition when it did not have 
the requisite knowledge, it would have been best suited if it had, explicitly, chosen an 
interim definition. 
Upon the recommendation of the II. C, the 1958 Geneva Conference adopted the 
exploitability/200 meter depth criterion for the purpose of defining the continental shelf. 
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As the Fourth Committee was in charge of examining the question of the continental 
shelf definition, its final vote on Article 67 resulted in 51 States in favour, 9 against, 
and 10 abstentions. 116 However, there was widespread anxiety concerning the 
vagueness and ambiguity of the exploitability/200 meter depth criterion among the 
conferees. At least twenty four States demonstrated their dissatisfaction with regard to 
the exploitability criterion, eleven of them voted, eventually, in favour of the said 
criterion. 117 
The remaining 13 opposing States belonged to those States which, either voted 
against the Article, or abstained, or did not take part in the vote at all. Out of the 9 
States which voted against Article 67, seven States expressed their opposition to the 
exploitability criterion for various reasons. 118 Italy, Netherlands, and Pakistan 
preferred a definite limit, whereas Argentina wanted it to be a single criterion that would 
manifest a clear geographical notion of the continental shelf. 119 France did not like the 
uncertainty of the criterion and preferred it to have more uniformity and constancy. 120 
Although the F. R. Germany and Japan did not explicitly express their opposition to the 
exploitability criterion, their dissatisfaction could be deduced from their hints now and 
again, and, as Professor Brown commented, it can also be deduced from their 
opposition to the adopted notion of the continental shelf itself. 121 
Three of the abstained States demonstrated their disagreement with the said 
criterion. Having withdrawn its combined proposal with the Netherlands, the UK 
inclined to support an Indian proposal in favour of the depth criterion - up to 550 
metres. 122 Yet it preferred the usage of the term "submarine areas" instead of the 
"continental shelf'. 123 The Turkish disapproval of the said criterion was because the 
continental shelf definition was "so ambiguous that far from avoiding conflicts", 124 
And Greece said that the definition of Article 67 "was extremely flexible", and the term 
"continental shelf"itself "was vague and might prove misleading. " 125 A fourth State in 
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this regard was Monaco which envisaged that the articles relating to the continental 
shelf should be an interim procedure until the time when an international organization 
was established. 126 
The three absent States did not seem to favour the exploitability criterion for 
various reasons. The Lebanese viewpoint agreed with the deletion of the exploitability 
criterion and keeping that of the depth. 127 And while Panama favoured a clear limit of 
the continental terrace - the shelf and the slope -, 
128 Viet Nam inclined to favour the 
depth criterion. 129 
It is worth noting that, the only modification to Article 67 during the Conference 
was carried out according to the Philippines proposal which suggested the inclusion of 
a special provision concerning islands as being able to generate a continental shelf of 
their own. 130 As this suggestion managed to receive the adequate support, it was 
appropriately added to the provisions of Article 67 which became Article 1 of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. 131 Article 1 read, 
"For the purpose of these Articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of 
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; 
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands. " 
The UNCLOS III and the Definition of the Continental Shelf 
Three reasons were behind the need to redefine the continental shelf. First, as the 
technological development accelerated during the 1960s, it highlighted the loose 
character of the exploitability criterion. States, therefore, felt that it was necessary to 
clarify the real limits of the continental shelf in order to distinguish it from the seabed of 
the ocean floor which was on its way towards being declared a common heritage of 
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mankind. Second, the emergence of the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
(EEZ), during the early stage of the UNCLOS III, created an urgent need to distinguish 
between this new concept and that of the continental shelf. And third, the emergence of 
a huge number of States, as a result of the decolonization era, with various beliefs and 
ideologies, created a real need to reconsider numerous international concepts amongst 
which was the continental shelf. 
The establishment of the Seabed Committee, which was a consequence of Arvid 
Pardo's cry of 1967, was the first step towards a Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. The period between 1971 and 1973 was the preparatory stage of the 
Conference during which the Seabed Committee organized itself into three 
Subcommittees and determined the subjects that were entrusted to each of them. 
Subcommittee II was, inter alia, responsible for the question of the continental shelf. 
As the Conference held its first Session in December, 1973,132 it organized itself 
into three committees similar to the already mentioned three Subcommittees. 
Committee 11 was entrusted with, inter alia, the continental shelf question. 
One of the most important Sessions of the Conference was the Second Session 
which was held in Caracas in 1974. During this Session the EEZ concept was brought 
to life. Yet, most of the bases of discussions were originated in this Session. In fact, 
since it was not based on any preparatory work, whether they were prepared by the 
ILC or any international organ, the Conference had to establish its own bases of 
discussion. Relying on various proposals of the participants, the Chairman of 
Committee H arranged a document called "Main Trends", the contents of which were a 
summary of the trends that were provided in the said proposals. 133 
The main achievement of the third Session, which was held in Geneva in 1975, 
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was the preparation of the Informal Single Negotiating Texts (SNT). These Texts were 
prepared according to a proposal originally initiated by the President who requested 
each chairman of the three Committees to prepare such a text. 134 Having relied on, and 
subsequently reviewed, the "Main Trends", each Chairman of the three Committees 
prepared an SNT and circulated it among the Conferees. The revision of the SNT 
appeared in a Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), which was established in the 
Fourth Session of the Conference in 1976. In order to accommodate "... in one 
document the draft articles relating to the entire range of subjects and issues covered by 
parts I, II, III1, and IV2, of the ... "135 RSNT, the President, working together with the 
Chairmen of the three Committees, prepared an Informal Composite Negotiating Text 
(ICNT) in the Sixth Session of the Conference in 1977. Three revisions were made to 
the ICNT. The first revision was in the Eighth Session in 1979, (ICNT/Rev. l); the 
second was in the Ninth Session in April, 1980, (ICNT/Rev. 2); and the third revision, 
which was considered an informal text of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
was carried out in August 1980.136 
The final touches of the Convention towards a formal draft took place in the Tenth 
Session of the Conference in August, 1981.137 And despite the fact that the Conference 
was proceeded by consensus, as was decided in the "Gentleman's Agreement", 138 the 
final Draft was submitted to vote in April 1982.139 This vote resulted in 130 votes in 
favour, 4 against, 17 abstentions, and 13 absentees. 140 
In order for the Convention to become in force, it must receive 60 ratifications. 141 
However, by the beginning of March, 1989,171 States and 3 entities signed the 
Convention, and 40 States and one entity ratified it. 142 
With regard to the question of the continental shelf definition, States, in general, 
were in favour of, either the continental shelf should not exceed 200 nautical miles, or it 
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should embrace the whole continental margin. 143 However, as the Chairman of 
Committee H summarized the various proposals listing the "Main Trends" of the 
proposing States, he devoted Provision 68 and 81, for the purpose of the continental 
shelf definition. According to the provided trends, the continental shelf would be 
defined in accordance with either, 1- a geophysical criterion - the shelf would extend up 
to the outer edge of the continental margin; 144 or 2- a combined geophysical and 
distance criterion - natural prolongation and 200 nautical miles; 145 or 3- again a 
combined geophysical and distance criterion - the outer edge of the continental 
margin/200 nautical miles; 146 or 4- a combined depth and distance criterion - 500 
meters/200 nautical miles; 147 or 5- a distance criterion - up to 200 nautical miles. 
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The first four criteria played, as will be seen, a significant role in directing the 
negotiations of the Conferees, whereas the fifth one was disregarded at the first round 
of negotiations. 
In order to bridge the gap between the above-said trends, it was argued that, since 
every State was entitled to a 200 nautical miles EEZ, and since the EEZ included the 
concept of the seabed and its resources within its meaning, then the continental shelf 
was no longer a problematic issue within the 200 miles EEZ limit. Nonetheless, the 
problem would arise when the shelf extended beyond the said limit. As a result, the 
Conferees paid special attention to the, mentioned-above, second and third formulas as 
containing a possible ground for a reliable solution to the definition matter. This was 
taken up by a proposal advanced by Canada and some other States, in which they 
suggested that the shelf could be defined as up 
"... to a distance of 200 miles from the applicable baselines and throughout the natural 
prolongation of its [the State's] land territory where such natural prolongation extends 
beyond 200 miles. "149 
In order to meet this meaning, the Conference, in its third Session in 1975, envisaged 
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an appropriate formula which stated that 
"The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. " 
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This formula managed to dominate the negotiations of the Conference, for, it succeeded 
in being continually acceptable until it appeared in the final draft of the 1982 
Convention. 151 
The distance criterion did not need to be clarified more than stating the exact 
distance, (which was identified in the case of the continental shelf as 200 nautical 
miles), whereas the outer edge of the continental margin was a flexible term which 
would cause difficulties of interpretation. For this reason, the Conferees endeavoured 
to find a more precise identification of this term. As agreement on a detailed definition 
was difficult, this was later identified as one of the outstanding issues of the 
Conference. 152 During the period between 1978 and 1980, the definition of the 
continental shelf was consolidated by establishing a formula which contained the above 
mentioned paragraph, as well as another nine paragraphs, each concerned with adding 
another piece of detail to this definition. Because Paragraphs 3,4,5, and 6 of this 
formula have a special importance so the discussion will deal, only, with them. 153 
In order to enrich the clarification of the continental margin term, the search 
started with examining a proposal that was called the "Irish Formula". Having accepted 
the formula which was suggested by Hedberg, the Irish Formula proposed two ways 
of delimitation of the outer limit of the continental margin. 154 The first was that, it 
suggested a distance criterion - up to 60 nautical miles measured from the foot of the 
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continental slope; and, the second which was a more complicated suggestion, was that, 
the continental shelf could be extended up to a point where the thickness of the 
sedimentary rocks beneath the seabed constituted at least one per cent of the shortest 
line drawn from the foot of the slope up to that point. 155 
Despite some critiques, the support td the Irish Formula increased as time went 
by, especially, when France, Japan, and F. R. Germany changed their stand to be in its 
favour in 1978.156 The USSR also changed its opinion and was prepared to be in 
favour of the said formula when it, eventually, accepted the extension of the shelf 
beyond the 200 miles-157 In fact, the USSR accepted the Irish formula "..., on the 
understanding, however, that the edge of the continental, shelf shall not under any 
circumstances be fixed at more than 100 miles; beyond the outer limit of the 200-mile 
economic zone. " 158 Yet, working with the UK, the USSR later advanced a 
compromise which was known as the "bisquits formula". Mixing together the Irish 
and the Russian formulas, the combined formula proposed that, in case of applying the 
combined criterion, (distance and depth), the shelf should not exceed 100 nautical miles 
from a 2500 meters depth. And, in case of applying the alternative of sedimentary 
thickness, the shelf should not extend beyond 350 nautical miles from the baselines of 
the territorial sea. 159 
In 1979, it was high time that the Chairman of Committee II suggested the 
addition of the core of the Irish Formula and the bisquits formula to Article 76 of the 
ICNT. 160 Having received widespread approval, this suggestion was appropriately 
implemented in the said Article, Paragraph 4 and 5 of which read, 
"4- (a) For the purpose of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge 
of the continental margin wherever the margin exceeds beyond 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either. 
(i) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 6 by reference to the outermost fixed 
points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the 
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shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or, 
(ii) A line delineated in accordance with paragraph 6 by reference to fixed points not more 
than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope? / 
(b) in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be 
determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
5- The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the 
sea-bed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) (i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall 
not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meters isobath, which is a line connecting 
the depth of 2,500 meters. "161 
These two Paragraphs reappeared again in the ICNT/Rev. 2 and ICNT/Rev. 3, and 
finally in the Final Draft Convention in 1982.162 
As Sri Lanka suggested the consideration of the geological and geomorphological 
conditions of its shelf, Paragraph 4 (a)(ii), mentioned above, was entailed with a 
footnote referring to the need for further discussion in the following Session of the 
Conference. Without going into too much detail, the Sri Lanka suggestion, that the 
shelf of the Bay of Bengal should be excluded from the Irish formula, which was 
enshrined in Paragraph 4 of Article 76, was approved by the Conference on 29 August, 
1980.163 Accordingly, this exception was included in a Statement of Understanding 
which was annexed to the Final Draft Convention in 1982.164 
The 1979 draft of Paragraph 3 of Article 76 stated that, 
"3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the 
coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. 
It does not include the deep ocean floor or the subsoil thereof. 1"165 
This Paragraph was entailed with a footnote relating to the oceanic ridges which was 
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also left for further discussion in the following Session in 1980.166 The Russians were 
afraid of the Irish Formula especially its alternative of sedimentation. However, as the 
Russian delegate was cautious of accepting the extension of the shelf up to 100 nautical 
miles beyond the depth of 2500 meters, especially with regard to the oceanic ridges, he, 
eventually, inclined to accept a compromise relating to distance criterion. That is, the 
shelf can in no way exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines. 167 Thus, the 
Conference approved, with minor changes, Paragraph 3, mentioned above, and 
inserted a new Paragraph, (Paragraph 6), according to which the continental shelf 
definition excluded any submarine ridge located beyond 350 nautical miles from the 
baselines-168 Concerning submarine elevations, however, an exception was provided. 
Paragraph 6 envisages that, 
"6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit 
of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This Paragraph does not apply to submarine 
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, 
rises, caps, banks and spurs. "169 
In a nutshell, after this thorough examination of the definition matter of the 
continental shelf, the UNCLOS III concluded its efforts by adopting Article 76 which 
identified, in detail, the geophysical basis of the definition. Yet in order to eliminate 
any possible future disputes, the Conference managed to -erAW4ioi a Committee of 21 
member-States to be charged with any problematic delimitation of the outer limit of the 
shelf and other relating matters. The provisions of this Committee were annexed to the 
Convention in Annex 1070 
37 
E&naa®m 3 
The Delimitation Question of the Continental Shelf 
Between Opposite and Adjacent States 
This Section is mainly interested in providing a general introduction concerning 
the problem of delimitation of the continental shelf. It basically aims at identifying the 
problematic areas of the delimitation question, for these areas will be the principal 
concern of the following Chapters. 
Being aware of the problems that would arise between the USA and its 
neighbours concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf, the Truman 
Proclamation pointed out that 
"In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared 
with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United States and the 
State concerned in accordance with equitable principles. " 171 
The ILC and UNCLOS I Work 
The ILC realized, from the outset, the difficulties that might arise when a 
continental shelf would be shared by two or more, opposite or adjacent States. 
However, the Commission found it sufficient to note that, 
"..., boundaries should be delimited. It should not be possible for States to penetrate 
into the region attributable to another State for purposes of control and jurisdiction. " 
172 
In its third Session, the ILC went a further step by indicating a solution according 
to which the delimitation of the continental shelf would be effected either by agreement 
or by arbitration in case of the failure of any agreement. 173 Nevertheless, it commented 
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that, 
"... it is not feasible to lay down any general rule which States should follow; and it is 
not unlikely that difficulties may arise. " [Then it went on to say that, ] "It is 
proposed therefore that if agreement cannot be reached and a prompt solution is needed, 
the interested States should be under an obligation to submit to arbitration ex aequo et 
bono. "174. 
Thus, it was evident that the II. C intended to choose an elastic solution that was able to 
be applicable to every possible case that would arise in the future. However, as the 
obligation to resort to arbitration ex aequo et bono had found considerable opposition, 
the Commission decided to reconsider the inclusion of such a clause in its solution and 
to search for another, more acceptable, formula. 175 
The delimitation of the continental shelf between States was a new issue not only 
to the ILC, but also to International Law in general. The lack of any precedent as such 
at the time, (apart from the Paria Treaty between the UK and Venezuela, ) the lack of 
any generally accepted method in international law, and the complexity of the involved 
factors in each case of the continental shelf delimitation caused the ILC to see each case 
from an angle different from that of the other. It considered each case as having a 
unique status, and, therefore, each case must be dealt with according to its own facts. 
As a result, the Commission, after consulting with a Committee of Experts, delivered 
another set of solutions in its Report in 1953. Article 7 states that in default of 
agreement, "... or unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, 
... " the boundary is the median line (in case of opposite States), and according to the 
principle of equidistance (in case of adjacent States). 176 
Inspired by the desire to establish a clear solution of the delimitation question, and 
realising the vagueness of the special circumstances clause, the ILC could not turn a 
blind eye as to the real meaning and scope of the solution of Article 7. The ILC, 
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therefore, commented that, its solution is meant to be of a fairly elastic nature. 177 In 
the light of this elasticity, the equidistance principle was considered a general rule and 
the special circumstances an exception. 178 However, due to the complexity of the 
delimitation question and the lack of requisite knowledge, the ILC could not add any 
more clarification as to the scope of the said clause other than state some examples of 
circumstances that may play a role in deviating the boundary line from the equidistance 
course. These examples were, the exceptional configuration of the coast, the presence 
of islands, and the presence of any navigable channels. 179 
Having found no other alternative, the ILC was, finally, convinced that, the said 
formula contained the proper solution of the delimitation question. Thus, it adopted 
this formula in its final Report in 1956 recommending that, 
"In the absence of agreement and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance .... 
"180 
This solution was flexible enough to encompass any possible interpretation which 
could be made by States. When it was taken up to the 1958 UNCLOS I, the 1LC's 
solution was, despite the dissatisfaction of some States, eventually, approved, with 
some minor amendments. 181 In fact, States were mainly dissatisfied because of the 
inclusion of the special circumstances clause, especially as the meaning and scope of 
this clause was left without a proper clarification. 182 
As some States proposed an amendment to the formula of Article 72,183 the 
successful proposal was a joint one made by the UK and the Netherlands. 184 This 
proposal managed to add two amendments to Article 72. The first was the insertion of 
the words "the nearest points of' after "equidistance form" in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
40 
said Article, 185 whereas, the other was the addition of paragraph 3 to Article 72 which 
after these amendments became Article 6.186 
It is noteworthy to state that the UNCLOS I did not manage to provide any 
clarification concerning the special circumstances clause. Yet it did not mention any 
example of special circumstances as the ILC did in its comments on Article 72. 
The North Sea cases of 1969 were the first of their kind to be taken to the ICJ. 
Because Germany was not a party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental shelf, the 
Court had to search for other applicable rules and principles to this case. However, as 
Denmark and the Netherlands claimed that the principles and rules of Article 6 of the 
said Convention had become customary rules, the Court had to examine them in order 
to see whether they crystallized as customary rules or not. 187 
Having found that Article 6 could in no way establish any customary rules, the 
ICJ turned to Germany's contention. Germany asked the Court to give each party "... 
a just and equitable share. "188 The Court rejected Germany's contention saying that, a 
just and equitable share "... is quite foreign to, and inconsistent with, the basic concept 
of continental shelf entitlement ... 
". 189 
As the ICJ was attracted to the Truman Proclamation of 1945, particularly to the 
principles that were enshrined therein, 190 the Court found that the most appropriate 
solution to the North Sea cases is to effect a solution by agreement in accordance with 
equitable principles. For, these two concepts "..., have underlain all the subsequent 
history of the subject. "191 In so doing, the Court declared the two concepts - mutual 
agreement and equitable principles - as customary rules, and consequently applicable to 
the cases at stake. 
The International Court, on the other hand, realised that certain factors, such as 
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the geographical configuration of the coasts, proportionality, and the presence of 
mineral deposits, might create a distorting effect on the delimitation line; and 
accordingly regard must be given to these circumstances. 192 Moreover, the application 
of the equitable principles/ relevant circumstances rule must be in such a way as to give 
effect to the principle of natural prolongation in the meaning that, each party should be 
given the natural prolongation of its land territories into and under the sea, without 
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the territories of the other party. 193 
Despite these examples of relevant circumstances, the real meaning and scope of 
the relevant circumstances clause was still obscure. The reason for this obscurity was 
that the ICJ mentioned only some examples leaving the door Mot for future examples of 
relevant circumstances to be included therein. In fact, the ICJ stated that, 
"..., there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the 
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures,... "194 
This fact is the major reason that the subsequent cases were left free to add some 
other relevant circumstances without attempting to clarify the real meaning and scope of 
the relevant circumstances clause. 
Unlike the North Sea Cases, the parties to the. Anglo-French Arbitration were 
both parties to the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf. However, because France 
made some reservations to Article 6 of the said Convention, the Tribunal, after 
examining the EngM h objections to these reservations, decided to apply Article 6 
partially to the dispute. 195 In the remaining places, where the French reservations had 
a valid effect, the Tribunal decided to apply customary international law as was 
determined by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases in 1969.196 
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With regard to Article 6, the Tribunal interpreted the relation between the 
equidistance principle and special circumstances as being, not separate rules, but, in 
fact, forming a single combined rule. 197 The Tribunal, then, proceeded to demonstrate 
a significant analysis of the relation between Article 6 and the customary solution. In 
this analysis, the Tribunal brought to light that both Article 6 and customary solution 
had the same object. There is no difference, the Tribunal commented, between, article 
6 and the customary solution; for, both rules would aim at solving the delimitation of 
the continental shelf problem in accordance with equitable principles. 198 
Apart from the North Sea Cases of 1969 and the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977- 
78), five other cases have, so far, been judged. These are, Iceland/Norway (Jan 
Mayen) Conciliation (1981), Tunisia/Libya Case, (1982), The Gulf of Maine Case 
(1984), Libya/Malta Case (1985), and Guinea/ Guinea Bissau Case (1985). None of 
these cases applied the Conventional rules of Article 6. However, applying the 
Customary rules and principles as was enshrined in the North Sea Cases (1969), none 
of the said cases introduced any new principle or rule concerning the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. By and large, the most notable feature of these cases was that all of 
them emphasised one fact; i. e., every case of continental shelf delimitation is unique. 
Therefore, each case was restricted to its own facts, and none of them attempted to 
establish any generalisation concerning the application of the rules and principles 
relating to the continental shelf. In fact, they did nothing more than add, or delete, or 
philosophise some circumstances in order to aid their final decision. 
199 
The UNCLOS III and the Delimitation Question 
As far as the delimitation of the continental shelf was concerned, the UNCLOS 
III, found great difficulties in reconciling the differences between the conferees. Yet, it 
failed but to adopt a final formula the contents of which was very broad and general and 
had a good deal of ambiguity. Such a vague solution was an inevitable outcome for 
two reasons. On the one hand, the Conference was dominated by political thoughts 
43 
which rendered it far from having a true legal atmosphere. These political thought were 
motivated by the different ideological viewpoints and various economic interests of the 
participant States. On the other hand, the failure of the Conference was due to the 
absence of a legal formula that contained reliable rules and principles concerning the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf. 
As was indicated above, two main formulas were prevailing during the years that 
preceded the Conference. The first was concerned with the Conventional rules, as was 
enshrined in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention; and the second was concerned with the 
Customary rules and principles of the 1969 Cases. Equidistance/Special 
Circumstances, and Equitable Principles/Relevant Circumstances, combined together 
with the priority of i greement Solution, were the most notable features of the said two 
formulas. On this ground and with these formulas in mind, States took part in the 
UNCLOS III in 1973. These two formulas, therefore, were the focal point around 
which the majority of the proposals, concerning the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, were circulated at the beginning of the Conference. Nevertheless, the 
development of the debate on the delimitation question proved to have fluctuated from 
favouring one of the two formulas to the other, but then finally choosing none of them. 
Thirteen proposals, concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf were 
presented to the Conference during its preparatory stage, between 1971-1973, and the 
First and Second Sessions in 1973 and 1974.201 Out of these thirteen proposals, three 
proposals envisaged a formula similar to Article 6; 
202 five proposals favoured the 
Customary rules; 203 three proposals preferred the equidistance method; 204 one 
proposal suggested a solution by agreement only; 205 and one proposal inclined to 
favour a combination of the Conventional and the Customary Rules. 206 Nevertheless, 
two principal common features can be drawn from the said thirteen proposals. On the 
one hand, they all alluded to agreement in accordance with equitable principles in the 
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first place of their formulas. On the other hand, most of them felt the need to provide 
some, if not a thorough, explanation as to the scope of the "special circumstances" or 
"relevant circumstances" clauses. Yet most of the emphasis was concentrated on 
circumstances such as the geographical configuration of the coast, the geological and 
geomorphological conditions of the shelf, and the presence of islands and islets 207 
Preparing the Main Trends document in the Second Session of the Conference in 
1974, the Chairman of Committee II examined the above-said thirteen proposals. His 
final finding was embodied in Provision 82 which contained four formulas. These four 
formulas summarized the three basic trends of the proposals, namely, the Conventional 
Rules of Article 6,208 the Customary Solution, 209 and the Equidistance Principle 210 
The Informal Single Negotiating Text (SNT), which was the product of the Third 
Session in 1975, devoted Article 70 for the delimitation solution of the continental 
shelf. It said, 
"1- The delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent and opposite States shall be 
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where 
appropriate, the median or equidistant line, and taking account of all the relevant 
circumstances. 
2- If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned 
shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part ... 
(Settlement of dispute). 
3- Pending agreement, no State is entitled to extend its continental shelf beyond the 
median line or the equidistance line. "211 
Leaving the first two paragraphs of the said Article without any change, the Conference 
managed to modify Paragraph 3 when it revised the SNT in the Fourth Session in 
1976. As embodied in Article 71 of the RSNT, the new Paragraph 3 read, 
"3-Pending agreement or settlement, the States concerned shall make provisional 
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arrangements, taking into account the provisions of Paragraph 1. "212 
The provision of Article 71 of the RSNT had the opportunity to be re-examined 
informally by Negotiating Group No 5 which was established by the Committee II in 
the Fifth Session in 1976. After this re-examination, the Chairman of Committee II 
reported to the Main Committee that the focal point of discussion was about the 
evaluation of 
"... the method involving the median or equidistant line in solving the problems 
connected with the delimitation of these marine areas. "213 
Thereafter, he went on to say that, Paragraph 1 of Article 71, 
"... may well be the solution which could bring about general agreement since it does not 
overlook the method involving the median or equidistant line, but at the same time 
restricts its use to those cases in which it can produce results that are in accordance with 
equity. "214 
Because no "... formula which would narrow the differences between the 
opposing points of view. ", 215 could be reached, the contents of Article 71 of the RSNT 
reappeared again in the ICNT which was prepared and circulated among the conferees 
during the Sixth Session in 1977.216 In his comment on the argument between the 
participant States concerning the contents of Article 74 and 83 of the ICNT, Dr. Jagota 
commented that, 
"The main controversy related to the meaning of the words 'where appropriate' in relation 
to the median or equidistance lige. "217 
For, as he carried on, those States which were in favour of equitable principles would 
interpret these words as to apply the equidistance method when it was in conformity 
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with equitable principles, whereas those States which favoured the equidistance method 
wanted it "... to be recognized as a principle in itself. "218 This divergence of 
viewpoints reflected its controversial nature on the subsequent development of the 
delimitation issue of the continental shelf and caused it to change direction from one 
extreme to another between 1978 and 1980. 
When the Conference determined the seven outstanding issues in its Seventh 
Session in 1978, it entrusted Negotiating Group 7 (NG7) with the question of the 
continental shelf boundary between States. NG7 held numerous meetings, during 
which it revised the SNT, RSNT, and the ICNT. Meanwhile they were arguing their 
points, negotiators split into two groups. The first, which consisted of 22 delegations, 
was the, so called, equidistance group. This group was in favour of regarding the 
equidistance method as a main obligatory principle. The second, which consisted of 29 
delegations, was the equity group as it insisted on the equitable principles to be the 
dominant criterion of the delimitation of the continental shelf. As the negotiations of 
these two groups between 1978-1980 was not fruitful, the formula of Article 83 of the 
ICNT was retained in the ICNT/Rev. 1 in April 1979 without any change. 219 
However, the Chairman of NG7 concluded the Group's intensive efforts by this 
statement: 
"Because of this firm refusal by a notable part of the members of the Group to adopt the 
present formulation of paragraph 1 of article 74 and 83 it is clear that it cannot be 
considered a text which could provide consensus on the issue. "220 
He, therefore, annexed to his report a new proposal which was embodied in the second 
review of the ICNT (ICNT/Rev. 2) in April, 1980.221 The new Article envisaged that 
the continental shelf boundary between States, 
"... shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such an 
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agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or the 
equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances prevailing in 
the area concemed" 
222 
This formula was, in fact, so in favour of the equidistance group, that the equity group 
was not satisfied with it, and resisted its inclusion in the ICNT/Rev. 2. The reason for 
this was that, the equity group was not happy with the shift of the Conference from a 
formula that was in favour of the equity group position to a formula which strengthened 
the position of the equidistance group. For, despite the inclusion of the "where 
appropriate" clause, the provisions of the SNT, RSNT, ICNT, and ICNT/Rev. 1, 
relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf, were more likely to be interpreted in 
favour of the equity group. Thus, the delimitation question of the continental shelf was 
left open to controversy. 
The third revision of the ICNT towards an Informal Draft Convention in 
August, 1980, kept the provisions of Article 83, as they were in the ICNT/Rev. 2 223 
During the resumed Ninth Session between 28 July and 29 August, 1980, NG7 
established a special group which consisted of 10 members from each of the equity and 
equidistance groups. This special group held "face-to-face negotiations" but 
unfortunately could reach no agreement on the issue at stake. 
224 However, since no 
reliable solution could be reached, so a special provision was added entitling States to 
make reservations relating to the continental shelf delimitation formula. Because Article 
309 of the ICNT/Rev. 3 prohibited any reservation or exception "... unless expressly 
permitted by other articles of this Convention. ", a footnote was added to the said 
Article. This footnote read, 
"This Article is based on the assumption that the Convention will be adopted by 
consensus. In addition, it is recognized that the Article can be regarded only as 
provisional pending the conclusion of discussions on outstanding substantive issues such 
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as that relating to the delimitation of maritime zones as between adjacent and opposite 
States..., where the final solution might include provision for reservations. "225 
Despite the intensive negotiations, the controversy between the two groups 
carried on during the Tenth Session of the Conference in March and April, 1981. Yet, 
in the Resumed Tenth Session the controversy could not be mitigated until towards the 
end of the Session when a compromised proposal, which was circulated among the 
conferees on August 27,1981, was proposed by the President. President Tommy Koh 
suggested that the continental shelf boundaries 
"... shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international Law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. "226 
This formula was first generally accepted by the two groups and then it received 
widespread support from the Conference, despite the dissatisfaction of some countries 
such as USA, China, some Arabian Gulf States, Egypt, Libya, Israel, Venezuela and 
Argentina. 227 The said formula was adopted and, eventually, enshrined in the final 
draft of the Convention in 1982. Article 83 Reads 
"1-The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
2- If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States concerned 
shall resort to the procedures provided in Part XV. 
3- Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation. 
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4- Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of that agreement. "228 
Conclusion 
In the course of assessing the definition of the continental shelf, the following 
remarks can be made. First, the lack of the requisite knowledge in the 1950s was 
replaced by the usage of very advanced means of clarification combined with very well 
illustrated maps and reports during the UNCLOS III. These means, maps and reports, 
which were prepared by qualified and professional organs with the help of advanced 
technology, were the main reason of the success of the UNCLOS III in providing such 
a clear definition of the continental shelf. 229 Second, unlike Article 1 of the 1958 
Convention, Article 76 of the 1982 Convention deals thoroughly, and in detail, with the 
definition of the continental shelf. Third, as the UNCLOS III, rejected the 
exploitability/depth criterion due to its infinite character, it managed to reach a more 
decisive criterion using the distance/geological description criterion. This criterion was 
supplemented with two auxiliary parameters, viz, the depth criterion and the thickness 
of sedimentation criterion. Fourth, Article 1 uses vague and ambiguous terms, whereas 
Article 76 uses clear and definite identification of the shelf and its outer limit. Fifth, 
both Article 1 of the 1958 Convention and Article 76 of the 1982 Convention based 
their definition on a multilateral basis of geophysical and legal connotation. However, 
the ambiguity of Article 1 caused difficulties of interpretation, whereas the clear 
description of the shelf by Article 76 could be easily interpreted as an obvious 
indication to the fact that the legal definition of the continental shelf was mainly based 
on geological facts to the detriment of any other geophysical factors. One simple fact 
can be concluded with regard to the geophysical basis of the continental shelf. That is, 
the geological structure of the continental margin is the fundamental, if not the only, 
geophysical basis of the continental shelf doctrine. Sixth, it is according to this 
understanding that any problematic issue of the continental shelf doctrine, including the 
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natural prolongation principle, must be interpreted. 
As for the delimitation question of the continental shelf between States, it has 
been left without a proper solution. As the 1982 Convention refers vaguely to a 
solution effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an 
equitable solution, it does not only leave it open to the already existing principles and 
rules in international law, but also left it open to any probable rules that may emerge in 
the future. 
As for the existing rules and principles in international law, the Conventional 
rules, as are presented by Article 6 of the 1958 Convention, and the Customary rules 
and principles, as are presented by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea Cases, constitute the 
only possible rules and principles in international law at the moment. However, both 
.., ._-, 
rules contain a good deal of vagueness and ambiguity which at the end of the day will 
be added to the broad meaning of Article 83 of the 1982 Convention. 
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Introduction 
Section 1: The Conventional Rules of the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf. 
Section 2: The Customary Rules of the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf. 
Section 3: Conclusion. 
Introduction 
Having had an introduction to the principles and rules available in international 
law, in the first Chapter, it appears that the only two sets of rules and principles are 
those of the Customary and Conventional solutions. This Chapter, is mostly interested 
in providing some clarification to the meaning and scope of the said two sets of rules 
and principles. Furthermore, this Chapter is necessitated by the desire to provide an 
idea about the two solutions in order to highlight the problems they suffer from. It will 
be proceeded by analytical and comparative perspectives aiming at identifying the co- 
relation and interrelation between the two solutions. Thus, the discussion will examine 
the Conventional solution in the First Section, and then, in the Second Section it deals 
with the Customary solution. The Third Section, which is the conclusive one, will be 
concerned with analysing the relation between the two solutions. 
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O(Lnau®m a 
The Conventional Rules 
of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
As has been seen in the first Chapter, the difficulties in finding a proper solution 
for the delimitation of the shelf between opposite and adjacent States, forced the ILC to 
seek a fairly elastic solution that could be a comprehensive guide to cases with a wide 
variety of circumstances. This solution, despite the almost universal dissatisfaction 
with its vagueness and elasticity, was approved by the UNCLOS I in Geneva in 1958. 
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental shelf states that, 
"1- Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States 
whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining 
to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of 
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point of 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 
2- Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, 
the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In 
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest point of the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea of each State is measured. " 
Before going into further discussion, some remarks are called for. First of all, 
Article 6 provides two different solutions for lateral boundaries of the continental shelf, 
viz., the opposite, and the adjacent situations. In case of the former situation Article 6 
envisaged the third alternative as the median line, whereas in the latter it put it as the 
principle of equidistance. However, because of the absence of any material difference 
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between the two principles, the discussion, hereinafter, will refer to them as one 
principle under the title of "equidistance principle". Secondly, since there is no 
substantial difference between the two principles, so the solution introduced in 
Paragraphs 1 and 2 are identical. Paragraph 2 of Article 6, therefore, will be referred to 
as the symbolic text of the three-point solution of Article 6. Thirdly, Based on what 
has been said above, Article 6 presents the following three alternatives: 
1- a boundary line effected by agreement; or 
2- a boundary line justified by special circumstances; or 
3- a boundary line drawn in accordance with the equidistance principle. 
The Features of the Solution Provided for in Article 6 
With reference to the first Chapter, Article 6 enjoys three main features. The first 
remarkable feature is that it is of a fairly elastic nature. This was due to the special 
nature of the legal concept of the continental shelf, as it involved several various 
factors, such as the complexity of the geophysical phenomena of the continental shelf, 
as well as the geopolitical, and legal factors. The second feature is that, the provisions 
of Article 6 contain a good deal of generality. This generality can also be attributed to 
the aforesaid reasons. According to these difficulties, Article 6 had to be of an obvious 
general terminology in order to provide a wide-ranged solution instead of an 
insufficient narrow-ranged one. And the third is, because of the unpredictable character 
of the circumstances that may prevail in every case, the provisions of Article 6 contain 
some vagueness regarding these circumstances. In fact, the inclusion of the "special 
circumstances" clause has been the underlying desire not to deprive those cases that 
may benefit in the future from the consideration of their own "special" circumstances. 
It was impossible to predict all the probable circumstances, so it was thought that the 
special circumstances alternative should be left open-ended. 
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The Legal Nature ofArticle 6 
Since Article 6 is a conventional rule, so it is obligatory only to those States 
which are parties to the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf. From this 
fundamental qualification of Article 6, the following remarks can be made. First of all, 
as the number of ratifications of the said convention has not exceeded 54 ratifications, 
so these ratifications constitute only about 30% of the total number of States in the 
world. The remaining 70% are not under such a conventional obligation which means 
that they are subject to the alternative solutions provided in international law. These 
solutions could be found in the Customary rules and principles as they were envisaged 
by the ICJ in the 1969 North Sea Continental shelf Cases. Secondly, however, the 
aforesaid remark does not mean that the conventional rules lotse more or less of their 
importance. In fact, their importance is still intact especially as they are considered 
conventional obligations. 
Thirdly, regarding the Convention on the Continentalchelf as a whole, Article 6 is 
susceptible to reservations according to Article 12 of the same convention; and, indeed, 
a number of reservations have been provided by some States. 1 The effect of 
reservations is to eliminate, partially or wholly, the applicability of Article 6 in areas 
that fall within the meaning of such reservations. In this regard, one must differentiate 
between two situations. On the one hand, those reservations that identify an alternative 
way of delimitation. In this case, and if it is compatible with international law, the 
identified alternative is applicable unless it receives an objection from the other 
interested States. On the other hand, in case of not identifying an alternative, or if the 
reservations receive an objection from the other interested States, the applicable law is 
the customary international law. 2 
Fourthly, despite the considerable number of ratifications received by the 
Invention, 
Article 6 did not, up to 1969' ^rystallize as customary law. In the course 
of its deliberation, the International Court determined the reasons why this article did 
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not become a customary law at the time. These reasons were as follows: 
1- Article 6 did not satisfy the requirements of being of a fundamentally norm- 
creating character. 3 
2- As for the widespread and representative participation in the Convention 
requirement, "... the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured... 
[was], though respectable, hardly sufficient. "4 
3- Regarding the relevant State practice until 1969, it was not sufficient for 
Article 6 to crystallize into customary rules. 5 Yet it was not expressing that 
those States which followed the equidistance method were doing so on the 
basis of a belief that they were applying an obligatory rule of international 
law, i. e., State practice did not avail the required opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. 
6 
Nevertheless, the foregoing conclusion did not mean, even in the Court's 
regards, that article 6 as a whole, did not crystallize into customary rule. In fact, the 
Court did implicitly consider that the general meaning of Article 6 had underlain the 
history of the concept of the continental shelf. The ICJ said that, 
"In the light of this history ,.... It was, and it really remained to the end, governed 
by 
two beliefs; - namely, first, that no one single method of delimitation was likely to prove 
satisfactory in all circumstances, and that delimitation should, therefore, be carried out by 
agreement (or by reference to arbitration); and secondly, that it should be effected on 
equitable principles. It was in pursuance of the first of these beliefs that in the draft that 
emerged as Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, the Commission gave priority to 
delimitation by agreement, - and in pursuance of the second 
that it introduced the 
7 
exception in favour of "special circumstances". [Emphasis added. ] 
The court's opposition is, therefore, directed towards the equidistance principle 
itself and not towards Article 6 in general. In fact the Court's exaggeration of its 
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opposition to the principle of equidistance was motivated by its fear that this principle 
might produce inequitable results in some cases, as well as by the desire to mitigate the 
degree of emphasis given to this principle in Article 6. That was why it considered the 
U. li 
equidistance principle as a mere method existing in international law. The equidistance 
principle, as it was envisaged in the latter viewpoint, proved to have underlain the 
history of the delimitation question even with respect to the conventional rules. As will 
be seen later, the equidistance principle has been abandoned by numerous States some 
of which were parties to the 1958 Convention. 8 That is to say, the mandatory character 
of the equidistance principle, according to Article 6, has been mitigated to its lowest 
effect so that it became identical to that of the same principle in customary law. 
The Relation Between the Three Aspects of Solution of Article 6 
Article 6 is intended to introduce the said three aspects of solution as alternatives. 
States that wish to determine their boundaries can choose the best suited for 
themselves. However, in case of a dispute, the invocation of any alternative becomes a 
different matter. Article 6 suggested first a solution by agreement, then another 
solution justified by special circumstances, and finally the application of the 
equidistance principle as the last resort. Although it is not hierarchical, the order of the 
said three aspects renders the invocation of the second and third choices to be always 
qualified by the exhaustion of the first one. In this respect the Court provided that, 
"(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving 
at an agreement, and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiations as a sort 
of prior condition for the automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the 
absence of agreement; "9 [Emphasis added. ] 
The invocation of the third choice - the equidistance principle - is also qualified by 
the absence of any special circumstances. Yet the Court i. ' went far beyond 
this meaning when it considered the second two aspects of the solution - equidistance, 
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and special circumstances - as one combined rule. In the Court's view, since the 
equidistance was formalized as a general rule with its exception of special 
circumstances, so it would be a combined single rule. That is, the condition of the 
applicability of the equidistance as a conventional obligation is always under the 
stipulation that there is no special circumstance which justifies any boundary line other 
than the equidistance. 10 
I 
The First Obligation of Article 6: 
To Seek a Boundary Line By Agreement 
Agreement is a well known solution in international law. Article 33 of the United 
Nations Charter introduces agreement as one of the means for peaceful settlement of an 
international dispute. Moreover, the recommendation to resort to Agreement is based 
on the fundamental character of this solution which derives from the "... fact that 
judicial or arbitral settlement is not universally accepted". l1 
Since Agreement is a general conventional and customary obligation, 12 it seems 
that its inclusion as a solution in Article 6 is superfluous. 13 However, a more thorough 
look at the history and development of the continental shelf concept would prove that 
Agreement has a special status with regard to the delimitation question. Agreement, in 
fact, played a substantial role, and yet, it was one of the two concepts that, "... have 
underlain all the subsequent history of the subject. "14 This solution, then, constitutes 
an inherent necessity of the delimitation of the shelf between neighbouring States, for, 
"... no one single method of delimitation was likely to prove satisfactory in all 
circumstances, and that delimitation should, therefore, be carried out by agreement ...... 
15 
Regarding the provisions of Article 6 according to which Agreement has a prior 
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" character vis ä vis the other two solutions, it does not mean 
"... merely to go into formal process of negotiation ... for the automatic application of 
certain method of delimitation in the absence of agreement; ... 
". 16 
On the contrary the parties are 
"... under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, 
which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating any modification of it; ... 
" 17 
It may be necessary to state here that on the basis of agreement much less than 
one hundred agreements have been concluded so far. These agreements followed a 
variety of solutions according to each case's merits. 18 
11 
The Equidistance Principle 
As far as the equidistance principle is concerned, it is not a new method in the 
international field. It has been used for the delimitation of the international rivers and 
other international waterways as an alternative to the middle ^hannel line of thalweg. 19 
However, although the equidistance principle seems .o be the fairest solution to any 
boundary dispute, the peculiarities of the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
lateral States makes this method unacceptable in numerous cases. It was realized from 
the very beginning that the equidistance method would find a luke chance in achieving 
an equitable solution to all cases concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
For, a single island could deviate the line further away causing extreme 
disproportionality at the expense of one of the parties. 20 The irregular configuration of 
some coasts, (in my opinion most of the coasts), 21 also creates disparity among the 
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parties' portions. These technical difficulties are, also, combined with various others. 
For instance, the determination of the baselines, from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured, plays a considerable role in pushing the continental shelf 
boundary further forward, (for the equidistance line will be measured from the same 
baselines). So, in case of opposite States, a modest delimitation of such baselines by 
one State, while an advanced one made by the other State, (which shares the same 
continental shelf), will create some disproportionality between the portions of the 
parties as well. Moreover, the complex character of some coasts renders it difficult, if 
not impossible to use the equidistance method to delimit the continental shelf of all 
cases. 
The equidistance method was recommended by the Committee of Experts who 
were asked, in their personal capacity, to examine, inter alia, the questions of the 
international boundaries between States. The Committee had to choose one of the 
following four methods: 
"A. by continuing the land frontier? 
B. by a perpendicular line on the coast at the intersection of the land frontier and the 
coastline? 
C. by a line drawn vertically on the general direction of the coastline? 
D. by a median line? " 
22 
After a thorough examination, the Committee suggested the equidistance method 
to the delimitation of territorial waters between States. It furthermore, suggested that 
the said method 
"... could also be used for the delimitation of the respective continental shelves of two 
States bordering the same continental shelf. "23 
In addition, it realized that, 
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"2. In a number of cases this may not lead to an equitable solution, which would be then 
"24 arrived at by negotiation. 
Equidistance Principle as a General Rule 
Because of the above-said reasons, the ILC, and later, the 1958 Conference, did 
not rely on a strict, or rigid, application of this method. Rather, they regarded it as an 
alternative solution when neither agreement nor special circumstances existed. In fact 
the equidistance principle was considered as a "general rule", recourse to which should 
always be justified by the absence of any exceptional circumstances that would justify a 
boundary line other than the equidistance. Special circumstances clause, therefore, was 
established as an exception from the said general rule. This meaning was emphasized 
by the ILC when it said, 
"The rule thus proposed is subject to such modifications as may be agreed upon by the 
parties. Moreover, while in the case of both kinds of boundaries the rule of equidistance 
is the general rule, it is subject to modification in cases in which another boundary line is 
justified by special circumstances. °25 
The Combined Character of the Equidistance-Special Circumstances Rule 
The Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Case (1977-78), demonstrated an 
interesting analysis of the relation between the equidistance principle and the "special 
circumstances" clause. As the equidistance principle was considered a general rule, and 
the "special circumstances" clause an exception, they did not form, in the view of the 
Court, two separate rules. Rather these two concepts were combined together to form 
one single rule: equidistance/special circumstances rule. The court said that, 
"Article 6, 
... does not formulate the equidistance principle and "special circumstances" as 
two separate rules. The rule there stated in each of the two cases is a single one, a 
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combined equidistance-special circumstances Wile. " 26 
And, in order to clarify the meaning of this view, the Tribunal, later, went on to say, 
"... the combined character of the equidistance-special circumstances rule means that the 
obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the condition 
"unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, ... 
°. 27 
It seems logical here to assume that the consideration of the equidistance principle 
as a "general rule" and the special circumstances as an exception renders this rule to be 
interpreted strictly according to exceptiones suns strictissimae interpretationis. 28 That 
is to say, the burden of proof is always on those who claim the existence of any special 
circumstances. However this viewpoint was entirely rejected by the Court of 
Arbitration in the Anglo-French case (1977-78). In order to refute the said contention, 
the Tribunal based its argument on the combined character of the equidistance/special 
circumstances rule saying that, 
"The fact that the rule is a single rule means that the question whether "another boundary 
is justified by special circumstances" is an integral part of the rule providing for 
application of the equidistance principle. As such, although involving matters of fact, 
that question is always one of law of which, in case of submission to arbitration, the 
tribunal must itself, proprio motu, take cognisance when applying Article 6. "29 
The Legal Nature of the Equidistance Principle 
The inclusion of the equidistance principle as a general rule in article 6 has 
reduced the amount of emphasis on this method and precluded it from joining the 
corpus of customary international law. When the Netherlands and Denmark contended 
that the equidistance principle had become a customary rule, the International Court 
devoted a prolonged discussion refuting such a contention. In the view of the Court, 
the equidistance principle does not satisfy the requirements of a fundamentally norm- 
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creating character, because 
"In the first place, Article 6 is so formed to put second the obligation to make use of the 
equidistance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation to effect delimitation 
by agreement. "30 
The Court, on the other hand, stated the other two reasons why the equidistance 
principle did not satisfy the requirements of a fundamentally norm-creating character. 
Whereas the second reason was due to the inclusion of the exception of special 
circumstances, which was vague and ambiguous, the third was because Article 6 was 
susceptible to reservations under Article 12 of the same Convention. 31 
As has been noted above, the ICJ found that neither State practice nor the opinio 
juris of States were sufficient for the equidistance principle to become a customary 
international rule. 32 However, because this finding has been restricted to the time of its 
discovery - 1969 -, so an up to date study of State practice seems to be necessary. 
Equidistance Principle and Unilateral State Practice 
Despite the fact that unilateral State practice is of little importance with respect to 
the delimitation question, (for, the delimitation question must rest on mutual 
agreements), the examination of such practice is still important for the purpose of 
evaluating this method as unilaterally viewed by States. Some ninety-one 
proclamations have been collected from the available records. These proclamations 
might well serve the said purpose especially as they represent various parts of the 
world. 
Out of the said 91 Proclamations only six proclamations mentioned explicitly the 
preference of using the equidistance principle. 33 However, another 13 proclamations 
inclined to accept the equidistance principle as it was provided in the 1958 
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Convention. 34 
The above said 19 proclamations were not the only proclamations that stated their 
favourable method of delimitation. In fact another 22 proclamations mentioned some 
other ways of delimitation, namely, in accordance with agreement/equitable 
principles, 35 or on the basis of reciprocity, 36 or in accordance with international law, 37 
or other solutions. 38 
The remaining 50 proclamations mentioned nothing about the method of 
delimitation they preferred. 39 
Accordingly, unilateral State practice was not very helpful with regard to the 
delimitation question. However, it can be said that the equidistance principle was not 
given any substantial weight. In fact, State practice showed that very few States 
declared, voluntarily, their acceptance of the equidistance principle as a method of 
delimitation, whereas the vast majority preferred either to keep silent or to provide 
another method. 
Multilateral State Practice and the Equidistance Principle 
Multilateral State practice is of great importance with regard to the evaluation of 
the legal status of any international issue. In case of the equidistance principle, 
multilateral State practice is also of considerable significance especially because the 
legal status of this principle has been far more debatable than any other issue in 
international law. 
Eighty bilateral and multilateral agreements have been collectea/from the available 
records. 40 These agreements related either to continental shelf boundaries, 41 or to 
Maritime boundaries including that of the continental shelf. 42 In addition, the said 
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agreements were concluded by 60 States representing various parts of the world. 
To begin with, of these 80 agreements, 20 agreements determined their respective 
boundaries by a simple equidistant line. 43 24 States were involved in these 
agreements, of which 16 States were parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf. 44 However, of these 24 States only four countries depended solely on the 
equidistance method in all their agreements, concerning the delimitation of their 
continental shelf and maritime boundaries, (in fact, each of these four States concluded 
only one boundary line). 45 Three of these four States were not parties to the 1958 
Convention, 46 and only one state was a parry 47 The remaining 20 States were, as will 
be seen hereinafter, involved in determining the rest of their boundaries on different 
bases other than the simple equidistance method. 
Thirty-eight agreements used a modified equidistant boundary, or an equidistant 
boundary line modified in some of its parts. These were held between 41 countries. 
Of these 41 States, 19 States were parties to the 1958 Convention, and the rest were 
not. 48 On the other hand, 15 of the said 41 States used an equidistant line in some of 
their boundaries beside using a modified equidistant line in some others 49 
Twenty-two agreements concluded negotiated boundary lines, 5 agreements of 
which followed the parallel of latitude boundary line. The said 22 agreements were 
convened between 26 States, 50 amongst which 14 States were parties to the 1958 
Convention on the Continental shelf. 51 Beside using the negotiated boundary line 
method, 8 States of the said 26 States used a simple equidistant boundary line in some 
of their agreements. 52 
This citation of the relevant multilateral State practice proves that the principle of 
equidistance has not gained much consolidation with regard to the delimitation 
80 
question. With regard to the evaluation of this consolidation, and whether it has 
supported this principle to crystallize, or to approach crystallization, as a customary 
rule, or not, some remarks can be made. As has been seen, only 4 States depended 
solely on the application of a simple equidistant boundary line without any 
modification, whereas the remaining States, including those which used the simple 
equidistance method in some of their agreements, were involved in using one or more 
of the other methods in their other agreements. One of the said four States was a party 
to the 1958 Convention. That is to say, this State was, in some way or another, 
supposed to be inspired by the contractual obligations of Article 6.53 On the other 
hand, the remaining three States were very small in number, vis ä vis, the vast majority 
of the remaining States. 54 Yet, it could, in no way, be said that these States were 
applying the equidistance principle because they felt that they were applying a rule of 
general international law. In fact, regarding the said agreements, the opinio juris could 
hardly be proven in order to substantiate the existence of such feeling. On the contrary, 
it could be said that these States were using the equidistance principle as a matter of 
convenience in the light of reaching an equitable solution. 
Regarding the remaining 56 States, they followed various choices in determining 
their continental shelf and maritime boundaries. These choices can be classified as 
follows: 1- States depended on three methods of delimitation, namely, a simple 
equidistance line, a modified equidistance line, and a negotiated boundary line including 
the parallel of latitude method; 55 2- States followed two methods of delimitation, viz., 
(a) a simple equidistance line, and a modified equidistance line, 56 (b) a simple 
equidistance line, and a negotiated boundary line including the parallel of latitude 
method, 57 (c) a modified equidistance line, and a negotiated boundary line including the 
parallel of latitude method; 58 and 3- States applied only one method of delimitation, 
namely, (a) a negotiated boundary line including the parallel of latitude method, 59 and 
(b) a modified equidistance line. 60 
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It is necessary here, therefore, to emphasise the same conclusion that the ICJ 
reached in 1969 when it declared that the equidistance principle did not crystallize as a 
customary rule. This result, though relatively old, still has to be emphasized due to the 
following considerations: 
1- The ICJ's conclusion was restricted to State practice prior to the 1969 North 
Sea cases. 
2- Since the ICJ stated explicitly that that conclusion was consolidated up to the 
decision's date, 61 so the Court left it to future eventualities to determine 
whether that result would be final or would be superseded by a different one. 
3- This study then is for the sake of ascertaining that even up to the present day 
the equidistance principle has not managed to join the corpus of customary 
international law. 
Yet if one assumed that the rest of the world-wide States applied the equidistance 
principle in determining the remaining continental shelf boundaries, the status of this 
principle, (it seems), will never change. For the said State practice maintains the status 
quo and therefore suppresses any change in the legal status of the equidistance principle 
as it is merely a method existing in international law. It is, therefore, high time to say 
that the above-said State practice has established a customary rule the connotation of 
0 It 
which is that the equidistance principle has become, customarily, a mere method in 
respect of the continental shelf delimitation between States. 62 
The foregoing conclusion is in sharp contrast with the result reached by Dr. 
Jagota. 63 In his opinion 
"... in a large majority of cases States have been satisfied that the median or equidistance 
line leads to an equitable solution or result. hI64 
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In fact, regarding his research, the following comments can be made. To begin with, it 
is not true that a large majority of States were satisfied with the equidistance method. 
Recalling the above cited State practice, only a very small number of States found the 
simple equidistance method appropriate to delimit all their continental shelf and 
maritime boundaries. 65 Besides, Dr. Jagota based his analysis on the delimitation 
question of three different concepts, namely, the territorial sea, the continental shelf, 
and the EEZ. As a matter of fact each of the said concepts has its own facts and 
circumstances which are different from the other. The delimitation of the territorial sea 
can almost always be easily based on the equidistance principle because its width from 
the shore is quite small to produce disparity in the portions of the concerned States 66 
On the contrary, as far as the continental shelf is concerned, 
"... it has been seen in case of concave or convex coastlines that if the equidistance 
method is employed, then the greater the irregularity and the farther from the coastline the 
area to be delimited, the more unreasonable are the results produced. "67 
As for the EEZ its concept is not based on any geophysical basis, though it includes the 
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil. That is to say, although it extends for 200 
miles from the shore its delimitation depends on different criteria other than those of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf. That was why in the Libya/Malta case, (1985), the 
concept of natural prolongation ceased to be applicable in a distance less than 400 miles 
between opposite States. 68 
UNCLOS III and the Equidistance Principle 
As has been seen, the main controversy during the UNCLOS III concerned the 
weight that would be given to the equidistance principle. The division of the 
Conference into equity group and equidistance group was because each group viewed 
the equidistance principle from an angle different from that of the other. The former 
was in favour of considering the equidistance principle as a mere method in 
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international law, whereas the latter insisted on it as a principal rule in the delimitation 
question of the continental shelf and the EEZ. All the compromises to reconcile the 
differences between the two groups were doomed to failure. And because the 
Conference could not solve the problem, it eventually approved a compromised formula 
which avoided any involvement in the controversy concerning the equidistance 
principle (Article 83 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea) 69 
As a matter of fact, Article 83 left the delimitation question to be solved according 
to international law in order to reach an equitable solution. But international law in no 
way considers the equidistance principle to be more than a method that can be utilized 
where appropriate by means of satisfying the equity requirements. So, one may say, 
does that mean that the equidistance group has retreated its position and adopted the 
equidistance principle as a mere international method? The answer to this question 
must surely be negative, because according to the records of the Conference the 
controversy carried on until the last minute of its final Session. When the equidistance 
group eventually accepted the said formula it did so because the wording of the formula 
was very general and broad. In fact the equidistance group was inspired by the 
possibility of the wide variety of interpretations that could be arrived at by the said 
formula. However, since it is high time that International Law should declare, once 
and for all, the customary status of the equidistance principle as a mere international 
method, so any other interpretation is useless. i. e., the equidistance group will find 
itself facing a deadlock especially when Article 83 becomes in force. 
Equidistance and Recent Cases 
In the course of evaluating the legal nature of the equidistance principle, it is 
advisable to examine the stand of the judicial and arbitral cases that took place recently. 
The importance of this examination derives from two considerations. First, it 
enlightens the recent judicial opinion with respect to the legal status of the equidistance 
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principle. Second, judicial decisions do not usually mention only their opinions, but 
they examine the contemporaneous international legal status of the issue at stake as 
well. 
So far, apart from the 1969 Cases and the Anglo-French Arbitration, five other 
cases have been judged, and another case is being proceeded at the time of writing. 70 
The following paragraphs are going to provide a brief account on the said five cases' 
viewpoints concerning the equidistance principle. 
Both Parties to the Tunisia/Libya Case (1982), did not appr, iate the applicability 
of the equidistance principle. 71 However, emphasising again that equidistance did not 
have a mandatory character or privileged status, and because State practice was still in 
favour of this finding, the ICJ found that this would lead 
"... to the conclusion that, equidistance may be applied if it [would lead] to an equitable 
solution; if not, other methods should be employed. "72 
Correspondingly, the Court declared that if it found the applicability of the equidistance 
principle to the present case "... would bring about an equitable solution of the dispute, 
there would be nothing to prevent it from so doing ... ". 
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The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case, (Canada & the USA, ) reemphasised the 
fact that the equidistance principle is a mere practical method for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf boundaries. It says that, 
"... the second sentence of each of paragraphs 1&2 of Article 6 ..., do not, like the first 
sentence, enumerate a principle or rule of international law, but contemplate, inter alia, 
the use of a particular practical method for the actual implementation of the delimitation 
process. "74 [Emphasis added. ] 
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The ICJ went a further step in the Libya/Malta case when it stated that 
"... the Court could hardly ignore the fact that the equidistance method has never been 
regarded, even in a delimitation between opposite coasts, as one to be applied without 
modification whatever the circumstances. " ... 
"It is thus certain that, for the purposes of 
achieving an equitable result in a situation in which the equidistance line is prima facie 
the appropriate method, all relevant circumstances must be examined, ... 
". ý 5 
[Emphasis added] 
The Tribunal in the Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau 
case stressed the fact that the 
equidistance principle is not more than a method among the other methods in 
international law. It provided that, 
"The Tribunal itself considers that the equidistance method is just one among many and 
that there is no obligation to use it or give it priority, even though it is recognized as 
having a certain intrinsic value because of its scientific character and the relative ease with 
which it can be applied. "76 
The Conciliation Commission between Iceland and Norway (Jan Mayen) took a 
more moderate stand in considering the equidistance principle. It said that, 
"In state practice a wide variety of situations have been used in regard to drawing 
boundary lines. Frequently the median line has been chosen as providing an equitable 
solution. In other cases account has been taken of special circumstances leading to a 
great diversity of solutions in order to accommodate the relevant factors of each case. "77 
[Emphasis added. ] 
The above citation of the recent cases viewpoints on the legal Status of the 
equidistance principle proves that there is an almost unanimous opinion according to 
which the said principle is considered as a method among many other methods in 
international law. For, even the most moderate opinion of them - the Conciliation 
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between Iceland and Norway (Jan Mayen) -, had to admit that though the equidistance 
principle produced an equitable solution in some cases, it had to be modified in the 
others where special circumstances existed. 
HI 
Special Circumstances 
When the Committee of Experts suggested the equidistance principle for the 
delimitation of the territorial waters and the continental shelf between neighbouring 
States, it realized that in certain situations the application of the equidistance method 
would produce inequitable solution. And it also realized that some particular 
circumstances should be taken into consideration in the course of the application of the 
said method. These circumstances were called Special Circumstances. 
As the concept of the continental shelf was new in the 1940s and 1950s, very 
little information was available about it at the time. This little knowledge rendered it 
difficult to predict every possible circumstance that may affect the used method in 
certain situations. The establishment of the legal concept of the continental shelf, which 
replaced the geophysical concept, stimulated other various factors, beside the 
geophysical ones, to play a role in this concept. Political as well as economic factors 
were, therefore, involved. These three categories, - the geophysical, political and 
economic factors -, were (and still are) full of a great variety of factors. It follows that, 
if the geophysical factors were predictable, the same would not be true with respect to 
the other two categories. Yet the legal definition of the continental shelf rendered even 
the geophysical considerations to be unpredictable. For, the legal concept has its own 
view of these considerations. This unpredictability of the factors of the three categories 
affected in turn the discussion on the delimitation question by the ILC and the 1958 
Conference. Accordingly, they had to provide a vague and ambiguous term which 
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would be a comprehensive guide to every possible factor of the said three categories, as 
well as any other effective factor whatsoever. 
International efforts on the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
neighbouring States were inspired by the desire to enable every State to reach an 
equitable solution to its boundaries with its neighbours. Nevertheless, the limits and 
scope of such an equitable solution was another difficulty, or rather, an obstacle, in the 
way of those efforts. Would it be equal division of the continental shelf? Or would it 
be subject to some criterion other than giving equal share to each party? As the end of 
the dilemma; was in favour of not giving an equal share to each party, the equidistance 
principle lost its importance in the delimitation question. The question is therefore, 
since it is not an equal division, so under what criterion should such a delimitation be 
carried out? In order to solve the problem it was appreciated that the equidistance 
principle should be regarded as a general rule from which some exceptions would be 
provided. Because it was quite difficult to foresee all the exceptions, the legislators had 
to adopt the "Special Circumstances" clause which had a broad meaning and scope, so 
that it could encompass every possible exception. 
Nevertheless, the instigators of the "Special Circumstances" clause realized the 
need to provide some clarification to it. Some examples were included in the report of 
the Committee of Experts and in the ILC explanation on the said clause. As the special 
circumstances clause is the problematic area of the conventional solution, a thorough 
discussion concerning its meaning and scope is necessary. Such a discussion will be 
provided separately in Chapter V. 
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ocýahm P, 
The Customary Rules of 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf 
General 
International customary law introduces another solution to delimitation of the 
Continental shelf between States. That is, the continental shelf boundary must be 
effected by agreement on the basis of equitable principles taking into account all the 
relevant circumstances. This solution was the product of the history of development of 
the continental shelf concept between 1945 and 1969 when the ICJ declared it as 
customary law. Agreement, equitable principles and relevant circumstances, as they are 
the three aspects of the customary solution, will be the subject of discussion in this 
Section. The discussion will attempt to define and analyse what those aspects mean 
and to what extent they are applicable. Furthermore, although the 1969 North Sea 
Cases are the principal source from which the customary solution has derived, the 
subsequent cases are still of considerable importantQThe analysis, therefore, will 
concentrate on the 1969 cases as well as those subsequent cases. 
The first, and foremost, case, relating to the continental shelf delimitation, was 
the North Sea Cases in 1969. Because Germany was not a party to the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the International Court of Justice had to search 
for another applicable alternative to effect the delimitation of the respective continental 
shelf boundaries. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the equidistance principle 
had become a customary rule which meant its applicability to the dispute 78 Germany 
denied the emergence of such a customary rule. However, Germany added that if the 
equidistance principle was judged to be a customary rule, so the irregular configuration 
of the North Sea coast should be considered as a special circumstance to justify a 
boundary line other than the equidistant. 79 
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Finding that Article 6 was altogether not applicable to the dispute, the Court 
examined those principles and rules, that had underlain the history of the continental 
shelf doctrine, relating to the delimitation question. It eventually declared that, because 
"... no one single method of delimitation was likely to prove satisfactory in all 
circumstances ... ", 
80 the delimitation process should 
"... be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account 
of all relevant circumstances. "81 
In addition, as an alternative solution the court envisaged that, 
"(2) if in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the 
Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, 
failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction, user, or 
exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them; .... 
"82 
With regard to the factors that are to be taken into consideration in the course of 
negotiations, the Court points out that they 
"... are to include: 
(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the presence of any 
special or unusual features; 
(2) 
..., the physical and geological structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf 
areas involved; 
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality; .... 
" 83 
The Relation Between the Three Aspects of Solution Embodied in 
Customary International Law 
The customary solution of the delimitation of the continental shelf between 
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neighbouring States consists of three basic aspects. These are, Agreement, Equitable 
Principles, and Relevant Circumstances. The relation between these three aspects can 
be seen from two different perspectives. 
On the one hand, the customary solution introduces the three aspects as one single 
set of principles. This single set of principles is dominated by the obligation to enter 
into negotiations in order to reach a mutual agreement between the concerned parties. 
However, the function of the latter two aspects - equitable principles and relevant 
circumstances - is to provide the appropriate conditions according to which the 
negotiations -, : proceec' The obligation to seek an agreement, then, is the core 
of the customary solution which is controlled by equitable principles and the 
consideration of all the relevant circumstances. According to this viewpoint the three 
aspects are acting in co-operation and co-ordination between each other. This co- 
operative and co-ordinative relation renders this customary rule to have an interwoven 
character so that reference to each aspect is always qualified, or may be restricted by the 
other two aspects. That is, then, why the customary solution has not been identified by 
a specific set of rules, but, in fact, by a final goal. This goal is to achieve an equitable 
solution. 84 
On the other hand, the illustrated analysis of the preceding paragraph, can be said 
only in respect of the North Sea cases, (for the parties to the said cases asked the Court 
to identify the rules and principles that they should apply in their boundary delimitation, 
but not to identify the boundary line itself). 85 Nevertheless, a thorough examination of 
the subsequent cases leads us to see the customary solution from a different angle. 
The customary solution according to another viewpoint has established two kinds 
of solution. The first is to attempt an agreement between the concerned parties, and the 
second is to seek a judicial award based on equitable principles and relevant 
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circumstances. Subsequently, the parties are, in the first place, "under an obligation to 
enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement". 86 These negotiations 
must be proceeded in the light of equitable principles and the consideration of all the 
relevant circumstances aiming at the achievement of an equitable solution. In the 
second place, in default of agreement a judicial decision can be sought. This judicial 
decision must be established in accordance with equitable principles taking into account 
all the relevant circumstances with a view to achieving an equitable solution. 
I 
The Obligation to Enter into Negotiations 
In Order to Reach an Agreement 
As has already been said, a solution by agreement is a conventional obligation 
according to Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental shelf as well as under 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. 87 Every State party to the 1958 Geneva 
Convention or to the United Nations is under an obligation in the first place to resort to 
negotiations so as to solve any problem or dispute relating to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. However, the agreement obligation has a special status with regard to 
the doctrine of the continental shelf. This special status derives from the fact that, 
"... certain basic legal notions ..., have from the beginning reflected the opinio juris 
in 
the matter of delimitation; those principles being that delimitation must be the object of 
agreement between the States concerned ..... 
"ß8 
In addition, the Court said that the application of equitable principles must be 
"..., in accordance with the idea which have always underlain the development of the legal 
regime of the continental shelf in this field, namely: 
(a) the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving 
at an agreement ... 
"89 
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Agreement, in respect of the delimitation question, then, is not only a 
conventional or contractual obligation but also a customary one. All States are under an 
obligation to exhaust every possible round of negotiation as a first step towards solving 
any problem related to the delimitation of the continental shelf. 
As a customary obligation, agreement is qualified by some conditions. Beside 
being meaningful, 90 negotiations must be in accordance with equitable principles. 
Furthermore, negotiators must consider all the circumstances that are relevant to the 
case concerned. 91 These three conditions render the inclusion of the obligation to enter 
into negotiations to be essential and not superfluous; for, negotiators must take it 
seriously and try their best to arrive at an equitable solution. Accordingly none of the 
concerned parties is supposed to insist "... upon its own position without 
contemplating any modification of it. -92 
11 
Equitable Principles 
General 
The "equitable principles" term was first mentioned in the Truman Proclamation 
and later in some other proclamations, such as those of the Arabian Gulf States. 93 
Nevertheless, the concept of equitable principles did not manage to attract the attention 
of legislators who codified the continental shelf doctrine in the 1950s. Because the 
Truman proclamation was given special status in the 1969 cases, the ICJ was most 
impressed with the "equitable principles" concept which was adopted as a customary 
principle. 
To begin with, in order to explain the meaning and scope of the "equitable 
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principles" concept, one must differentiate between two expressions, namely, 
"equitable principles" and "the equitable principles". The meaning and scope of the 
latter expression is limited by means of language, whereas the former has a limitless 
range and meaning. That is to say, if the ICJ had used the "the equitable principles" 
clause, it would have meant that the ICJ had to identify those principles which it meant. 
On the contrary the Court used the "equitable principles" clause because this concept 
was intended to be flexible to the extent that it would be able to embrace any criterion 
that would be helpful in the delimitation process. 
Reliance on "equitable principles" means that a just and equitable solution must be 
built on equitable considerations from each party to a dispute. If any circumstance, due 
to certain qualifications, was regarded as relevant in favour of one of the parties, so a 
similar circumstance, that contains the same qualifications, must be considered relevant 
in favour of the other party. In other words, the ground based on which a circumstance 
is considered as relevant to one of the parties must at the same time be the ground on 
which any other circumstance relating to the other party is judged. For instance, 
because Scilly Islands (in the Anglo-French Arbitration) ' ias located twice as far as the 
Ushant Island, the Court gave full effect to the latter whereas it gave only half effect to 
the former. 94 The distance criterion, then, was the equitable principle that the Court 
sought when it was considering the said circumstances of both parties. 95 
Correspondingly, "equitable principles" has three basic functions. The first is to 
identify those relevant circumstances that belong to each party. In this process the 
"equitable principles" clause cohtrols the selecting, classifying and judging processes of 
the relevance of the available factors and circumstances that are alleged, by either side, 
to have relevance to the case. The other function is to calculate the degree of effect of 
the accepted relevant circumstances. And the third is to identify the method, or the 
methods, of delimitation that are appropriate to the case concerned. 
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"Equitable principles", therefore, is not a quantitative expression. Rather it is 
qualitative,, ¬ a e. That is to say, the emphasis must always be on the word 
"equitable" more than on the word "principles". For, it is patently obvious that any 
principle, procedure or consideration can be applied in order to secure an equitable 
solution. 
In order to add more clarification to the meaning and scope of the "equitable 
principles" term, another fact must be taken into consideration. A delimitation 
according to equitable principles does not necessarily secure a just and equitable share 
to each party. A just and equitable share might be one of the solutions that are 
examined in the process of balancing of the various considerations relating to the 
concerned case. For, the final, or rather the principal goal is always to achieve an 
equitable solution whether it results in equitable shares or incomparable shares. That 
was why the Court in the 1969 Cases rejected the German demand which asked for a 
just and equitable share. 97 The Court pointed out that, 
"Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same thing as awarding a 
just and equitable share of a previously undelimited area, even though in a number of 
cases the results may be comparable, or even identical. "98 
Despite the above provided explanation, the concept of "equitable principles" still 
sounds vague and ambiguous. This Vagueness does not derive from unexhaustive 
clarification. Rather it derives from the broad meaning of the "equitable principles" 
concept which leaves considerable room for two gaps. On the one hand, the vagueness 
of the concept might lead to a subjective allocation of the principles according to which 
the final delimitation is contrived. On the other hand, the said vagueness might, and is 
very likely to lead to a subjective identification and weighing of the relevance of some, 
if not all the, circumstances. These two gaps jeopardize the possibility of reaching a 
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just and equitable solution which must be built on objective criteria. 
It may, however, be advisable to go into more explanation of the aspects of the 
"equitable principles" concept before delivering the final relevant evaluation. Equity is 
one of the foremost aspects of the said concept in which the discussion in the following 
paragraphs will be interested. 
The Concept of Equity 
The concept of equitable principles had the opportunity for more clarification 
when the ICJ endeavoured to explain the meaning of equity. Although "equity" is a 
well known concept in both Municipal and International Law, it has been cast with a 
unique meaning in respect of the delimitation of the continental shelf between States. 
However, this unique meaning has never been directly explained, which indicates that 
its real meaning has remained obscure. Yet most of the efforts have been directed to 
clarify the restrictions that control this concept more than to clarify the meaning of the 
concept itself. This study, therefore, is going to follow a way of clarification similar to 
the said one, i. e. to clarify the restrictions that controls the concept of equity. 
Nevertheless, an attempt to find a suitable definition will be attempted at the end. 
To begin with, "... equity does not necessarily imply equality. " This principal 
restriction of the equity concept results in the following findings: First, It excludes any 
possible meaning that gives each party an equitable share of the disputable continental 
shelf. 100 For, a just and equitable share 
"... is quite foreign to, and inconsistance with, the basic concept of continental shelf 
entitlement, ... 
", 101 
Second, it excludes the concept of abstract justice. In this respect, the Court 
explains that, 
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"..., it is not a question of applying equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of 
applying a rule of law which itself requires the application of equitable principles, in 
accordance with the ideas which have always underlain the development of the legal 
r6gime of the continental shelf in this field, .... 
"102 
Thus, the unique concept of equity in the field of the delimitation of the continental 
shelf produces its own concept of justice. It is not "simply as a matter of abstract 
justice". It is, in fact, a relative justice, the achievement of which passes through the 
application of equitable principles and the balancing of all the relevant 
circumstances. 103 
Third, according to the said unique concept of equity, 
"[t]here can never be any question of completely refashioning nature. " 104 [Emphasis 
added]. 
The word "completely" means, then, that there could be some room for redressing 
some of the inequalities produced by nature. That was why the Court, in the North Sea 
Cases, did not accept the disparity that would have been produced by the application of 
the equidistance method, although this disparity was originally, produced by a natural 
phenomenon - the concavity of the North Sea case. Equity, therefore, is 
"... not a question of totally refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation 
but, given a geographical situation of quasi-equality as between a number of States, of 
abating the effects of an incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable difference 
of treatment could result. "105 [Emphasis added] ' 
In the same meaning, the Court of 7abitrade. stated that, 
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"Just as it is not the function of equity in the delimitation of the continental shelf 
completely to refashion geography, so it is also not the function of equity to create a 
situation of complete equity where nature and geography have established an 
inequity. "106 [Emphasis added] 
"The function of equity, ..., is not to produce absolute equality of treatment, but an 
appropriate abatement of the inequitable effects of the distorting geographical 
feature. "107 [Emphasis added] 
Fourth, equity, on the same plain, excludes an award in accordance with ex 
aequo et bono. A decision ex aequo et bono cannot be taken unless it is asked for by 
the parties themselves. 108 However, the Court's rejection of such a decision derives, 
beside the said reason, from another fact. That is, 
"... when mention is made of a Court dispensing justice or declaring the law, what is 
net is that the decision finds its objective justification in considerations lying not 
outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of law that calls for the 
application of equitable principles. There is consequently no question in this case of any 
decision ex aequo et bond" 109 
Equity with regard to the continental shelf delimitation, therefore, means an 
objective balancing of all relevant factors and circumstances of a given case in the light 
of equitable principles in order to achieve an equitable solution leaving to each parry all 
those areas that constitute its natural prolongation without encroachment on the natural 
prolongation of the other party. 
If the said definition was compatible with the real meaning of equity in this field, 
the following observations can be made. First of all, as a matter of fact, there has not, 
as yet, been an exhaustive list of the relevant factors or circumstances. That is to say, 
the possibility of including new unforeseen circumstances will leave the door ajar for a 
subjective identification of some circumstances as relevant to the case concerned. This 
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gap sustains quite a good possibility of reaching a subjective decision, since the 
decision is built on a subjective allocation of some circumstances. 
Secondly, the said balancing of the relevant circumstances depends on each case's 
merits. 110 Accordingly, a weight given to a relevant circumstance in a given case does 
not mean that the same circumstance will be given the same weight in another case, (the 
clearest example for the case in point is the position of islands as a relevant 
circumstance). 111 These variegated weights that may be given to the same 
circumstance in various cases create another possibility of a subjective balancing of 
relevant circumstances. 
Thirdly, the identification of the goal of equity as to achieve an equitable solution 
is quite ambiguous. Despite the Court's fundamental reliance on the notion of equitable 
solution as a final goal, it did not volunteer any explanation to it. In fact, the Court's 
reliance on the said notion can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that the Court 
relied on a well known meaning of the equitable solution notion. This interpretation is 
manifestly wrong if one considers the uniqueness of the continental shelf doctrine with 
special indication to the delimitation question. 
The other possibility, which is more likely to be correct, is that the Court has 
relied on the above-said unique meaning of the notion of equity. In this case the 
adjective "equitable" of the notion "equitable solution" can be interpreted according to 
the said meaning of equity. If this contention is correct, It is tantamount to saying that 
"equitable solution" is a relative concept, i. e. it varies from one case to another, ( for, 
as has been seen above, the notion of equity is a relative concept). This leads to two 
observations. Firstly, bearing in mind that "equitable solution" is a relative concept, it 
contains the perils of subjectivity which are said to be attributed to the notion of equity. 
Secondly, when the Court identified the final goal of the delimitation process it was 
inspired by the idea that it should provide more safeguards to secure an objective 
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delimitation of the lateral boundaries of the continental shelf. However, since the 
concept of equity controls the means - "equitable principles" - and the goal - "equitable 
solution" -, then there is no room for any safeguard to guarantee an objective allocation 
of the continental shelf between States. Yet it can be said, what is the need for the 
identification of the goal so long as the means are based on the same concept! 
In conclusion, equity cannot be an objective criterion unless it bridges the above- 
said gaps. That is to say, it must have an exhaustive list of relevant circumstances, a 
clear criterion to weigh those relevant circumstances, and a clear identification of the 
meaning and implication of the notion "equitable solution". 
The Concept of Natural Prolongation 
Like the other aspects of the continental shelf doctrine, the "natural prolongation" 
has been one of the most entangled concepts in international law. Although the concept 
was originated in the Truman Proclamation, it had no significance until it was 
conceptualized in the North Sea Cases in 1969. From that time on the concept of 
natural prolongation has passed through various channels of development. It has 
consequently has become so complicated that its notion has been almost impossible to 
clarify. However, an attempt to expose some of the relating facts will be made here in 
order to enlighten some of the grey areas of the said concept. 
Truman Proclamation and the Concept of Natural Prolongation 
The Truman Proclamation stated that, the continental shelf 
"... may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus 
naturally appurtenent to it, 112 
Since the Truman proclamation was considered the starting point of the history of the 
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continental shelf, so it is of great importance to know what is meant by the concept of 
natural extension of the land-mass. The proclamation did not contain any clarification 
in this respect. However, as was indicated in the first Chapter, the said proclamation 
was inspired by the geological definition of the continental shelf. 113 That is to say, the 
natural prolongation concept was based on a geophysical ground to mean the natural 
geological land continuation into and under the sea. This interpretation could be proven 
by the legal and geoscientific literature that was established during the 1940s and early 
1950s. 
Nevertheless, the work of the ILC and the UNCLOS I (1958), which produced 
the legal concept of the continental shelf, would lead to a different interpretation. The 
natural prolongation concept was not discussed or even mentioned during the ILC work 
or the UNCLOS I. However, the abandonment of the geological definition of the 
continental shelf in favour of the legal definition tempted the interpretation of the natural 
prolongation to vary from the above-said one. According to the legal definition the 
concept of natural prolongation would have a legal connotation instead of a geophysical 
basis. 114 This new interpretation gained considerable support from the ICJ decision in 
1969 when it reshaped the said concept into a legal notion that was alienated, to an 
extent, from its geological notion. 
State Practice and Natural Prolongation. 
In the course of approaching the real interpretation of the natural prolongation 
concept it may be necessary to see whether State practice has any use in this regard. 
Although the natural prolongation concept was mentioned in numerous proclamations, 
none of these proclamations volunteered any explanation concerning its meaning. State 
practice, with respect to the meaning of the natural prolongation concept, is helpless but 
to assert the significance of this concept. Nonetheless, it is very likely that the mention 
of the natural prolongation concept in the said proclamations has been inspired by the 
verified scientific viewpoints of the continental shelf. For instance, both parties to the 
101 
Tunisia/Libya case based their contentions on geoscientific viewpoints; 115 and the UK, 
in the Anglo-French Case, based its contention on a geological connotation of the 
natural prolongation concept when it spoke of the "essential geological continuity" of 
the continental shelf. 116 This idea is likely to prove that State practice, generally 
speaking, has been in favour of the geophysical basis of the natural prolongation 
concept. 
The 1969 Cases and the Concept of Natural Prolongation 
The ICJ in the 1969 cases was the first to conceptualize natural prolongation into 
a basic principle in the continental shelf doctrine. Delimitation of the continental shelf 
in the Court's view is not an apportionment of the respective areas; for, these areas 
already, in principle, have belonged to the coastal State. The Court's rejection of 
giving each party to the said dispute a just and equitable share is founded on that, 
"[d]elimitation is a process which involves establishing the boundaries of an area 
already, in principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determination do novo 
of such an area. " 
117 [Emphasis added] 
This notion, in the Court's view, is the natural continuation of the land into and under 
the sea which is considered the basis of the most fundamental rule of the continental 
shelf doctrine. The Court points out that, 
"... what the Court entertains no doubt is the most fundamental rules of law relating to 
the continental shelf, ..., - namely that the rights of the coastal State in respect of the area 
of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and 
under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, 
and as an extention of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. " 118 
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Has The Natural Prolongation Been The Favourite Son And Then, Later, The 
First Victim Of The ICJ ? 
The natural prolongation concept was the first born of the ICJ when it rationalized 
the basis of the doctrine of the continental shelf. The same concept, however, was the 
first concept of the continental shelf doctrine to be victimised when its concept became 
very complicated and confusing. The Libya/Malta Case, as will be seen, was a turning 
point in the history and development of the natural prolongation concept for, this 
concept was nearly sentenced to death in the said case. 
In 1969 the International Court of Justice was under the impression that the 
foundation of the doctrine of the continental shelf had to be of a concrete basis. So, 
having thoroughly examined the said doctrine, the ICJ realized that the entitlement of 
States over their continental shelf had derived from the fact that, 
"... the submarine areas concerned may be deemed to be actually part of the territory over 
which the coastal State already has dominion, in the sense that, although covered with 
water, they are a prolongation or continuation of that territory, an extension of it under 
the sea. " 119 
In this sense, the natural prolongation concept, in the court's viewpoint, is the 
fundamental basis of the entitlement over the continental shelf which "exist ipso facto 
and ab initio by virtue of" the State's sovereignty over its land. 120 
The concept of natural prolongation, on the other hand, was not only considered a 
fundamental basis of entitlement, but also it was considered to have the same value with 
regard to the delimitation question. The "equitable solution" concept, as it was 
envisaged to be the final goal of the customary solution, was fundamentally based on 
the concept of natural prolongation. The portion of the continental shelf of each State, 
according to the customary solution, must 
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"... be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon what is 
the natural prolongation of the territory of another State. " 121 
As it was given a fundamental character for both the entitlement and delimitation 
of the continental shelf, the concept of natural prolongation was, then, the favorite born 
of the ICJ. However, the development of the continental shelf doctrine throughout the 
subsequent cases proved the said concept to seem to have a less, or perhaps deg udin"g 
importance. 
The greatest debate was whether the concept of natural prolongation had a 
geophysical, or legal, or a combination of both legal and geophysical connotation. As 
this question was not settled, States tried to interpret the said concept according to the 
way they preferred it to be. In the example of the Tunisia/Libya Case the parties tried to 
prove, scientifically, their land's natural continuation into and under the sea. With the 
aid of Plate Tectonic and other geological doctrines, each party tried to convince the 
Court that the disputed area of the continental shelf constituted its territory's extension 
into the sea. Examining the host of scientific research made by both parties, the Court 
eventually rejected both sides' contentions saying that, it 
"... is ... unable to accept the contention of Libya that "once the natural prolongation of 
a State is determined, delimitation becomes a simple matter of complying with the 
dictates of nature"..... Nor can the Court approve the argument of Tunisia that the 
satisfying of equitable principles in a particular geographical situation is just as much a 
part of the process of the identification of the natural prolongation as the identification of 
the natural prolongating is necessary to satisfy equitable principles. " 122 
What does natural prolongation mean then? The Court carried on to say that 
"The satisfaction of equitable principles is, in the delimitation process, of cardinal 
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importance, as the Court will show later in this judg4ment, and identification of natural 
prolongation may, where the geographical circumstances are appropriate, have an 
important role to play in defining an equitable delimitation, in view of its significance as 
the justification of continental shelf rights in some cases; but the two considerations - the 
satisfying of equitable principles and the identification of natural prolongation - are not to 
be placed on a plane of equality. "123 
Having said so, the ICJ seemed to have dealt the first blow to the natural 
prolongation concept. The fundamental character of the said concept seemed to be 
restricted to its role as a basis of entitlement. As for the delimitation question, the 
concept of natural prolongation became workable only as a matter of convenience. That 
is to say, the natural prolongation concept became merely a factor among the other 
factors to be taken into account when the delimitation process would be carried out. 
Consequently it is subject to the balancing process which will decide whether the 
natural prolongation factor is able to be taken into account or not. 
In the Libya/Malta Case, the Court was more firm in suppressing any contention 
based on the natural prolongation concept. Because the Court declared the emergence 
of the EEZ concept, it realized that the continental shelf concept and the EEZ coincide 
and overlap with each other for a distance of 200 nautical miles from the shore. This 
idea lead the ICJ to declare the inapplicability of the concept of natural prolongation 
within this distance in favour of the distance criterion. And in order to rationalize its 
viewpoint, the Court commented that 
"This is not to suggest that the idea of natural prolongation is now superseded by that of 
distance. What it does mean is that where the continental margin does not extend as far as 
200 miles from the shore, natural prolongation, ..., is in part defined by distance from the 
shore, irrespective of the physical nature of the intervening sea-bed and subsoil. The 
concept of natural prolongation and distance are therefore not opposed but complementary; 
and both remain essential elements in the juridical concept of the continental shelf. "124 
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With this development in mind, the question here is, did the ICJ sentence the 
natural prolongation concept to death within the 200 miles EEZ distance? Did the ICJ 
substitute the said concept for the distance criterion? And in this case what is the legal 
status of the natural prolongation concept with respect to the entitlement and 
delimitation aspects of the continental shelf? 
The Status of the Natural Prolongation Concept 
As has been said above, the natural prolongation concept was alienated from the 
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geophysical connotation since the early 1950s when the ILC chose the legal notion of 
the continental shelf doctrine. However, the development of the said concept, 
especially since it was first conceptualized by the ICJ in 1969, succeeded in 
complicating the concept rather than eliminating its vagueness. In this sense the ICJ 
said that, 
"..., natural prolongation, which in spite of its physical origins has throughout its 
history become more and more a complex and juridical concept, ... 
", 125 
What does this mean? 
Does this mean that the said concept began as a geophysical concept and then its 
development has taken it to a juridical connotation? or Does it mean that the natural 
prolongation concept has, since the very beginning, been a juridical concept and has 
never been a geophysical notion? 
As for the first question it can, only, be answered in the light of the interpretation 
that the natural prolongation concept, when it was originated in the Truman 
Proclamation, had a geophysical conception. However, the development of the concept 
of natural prolongation has paralleled the development of the continental shelf doctrine, 
i. e., the said concept has developed into a legal concept. 
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If the answer to the second question that natural prolongation has, from the start, 
been a juridical concept was in the affirmative, then the ICJ meant the starting point of 
the natural prolongation concept to be instigated in the 1969 Cases, for, ever since then 
natural prolongation has been a juridical concept. Nevertheless, since in both cases the 
natural prolongation concept, regardless of its origin, is a juridical concept, so the 
question is, what does juridical concept mean? It obviously means that(it)has a legal 
definition which is different from its geological or geomorphological conception. Then 
what is the legal definition of the natural prolongation concept? 
The legal notion of natural prolongation can be seen from two different 
perspectives. In the first place, since the origins of the natural prolongation concept has 
its roots in the physical structure of the continental shelf, so the said concept is not 
completely alienated from the geophysical connotation. In fact, it remains partly 
dependent on the geophysical structure of the continental shelf. That was why the 
interruption of such a physical structure was invoked in a number of cases under the 
title of natural prolongation, (e. g. the Hurd Deep faults in the Anglo-French Case, 
Tripolitanian Furrow in the Tunisia/Libya Case, and the so called "rift zone" in the 
Libya/Malta Case). 126 
This finding can, indeed, be proven another way. That is to say, the partial 
geophysical implication of the natural prolongation concept can be deduced from 
another fact. The partial dependence of the legal continental shelf doctrine on the 
geophysical structure of the continental shelf renders all the aspects of the continental 
shelf doctrine to have the same partial dependence on this geophysical structure. 
Besides, natural prolongation, as will be seen hereafter, has two interwoven 
conceptions. Natural prolongation in the first instance is a general principle, whereas it 
is a relevant factor in the second. Being a relevant factor, natural prolongation, as will 
also be seen, is a geological factor. And because this factor is applicable only in a small 
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number of cases, so, that indicates that natural prolongation, at least in such cases, 
depends on the geophysical structure of the geological continental shelf. 
Secondly, the partial dependence of the juridical natural prolongation on the 
geophysical facts relates more to the geological, than any other aspects of the 
geophysical structure of the continental shelf. International Law is not interested in the 
geological theories or interpretations of origins, emergence, and movements of the 
continents or any other natural structures of the earth. 127 It is, in fact, more interested 
in the geophysical facts and realities based on which it can establish a rule of law or a 
judicial decision. It is this idea that-mderlain the Courts rejection of both parties' 
contentions in the Tunisia/Libya Case when both countries invoked the geoscientific 
doctrines to prove that the direction of the whole continent or only the direction of the 
Tunisian platform was in favour of one of them at the exclusion of the other. 128 
The legal concept of natural prolongation then is applicable when it can be proven 
by physical facts which enjoy no doubt of their existence. Based on this finding two 
observations are worthy of note. First, the natural prolongation concept can be 
applicable in only a few cases. 129 Second, there is no burden of proof on either party 
to a dispute because, the concerned judicial organ applies this concept whenever such a 
geophysical fact exists in reality. 
Thirdly, Based on the above-said findings, the natural prolongation conception 
can be understood as a factor among the other factors, the balancing of which is 
supposed to produce the fairest equitable solution. The degree of effect of this factor 
depends always on, first, the existence of certain geological facts, and second, on the 
degree of seriousness of the said facts. It is on this ground that the Court, in the 
Libya/Malta Case, rejected the consideration of the so called "rift zone", because it 
could not constitute "a fundamental discontinuity" of the respective continental shelf. 130 
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The fundamental discontinuity, therefore, is the principal idea that underlies the 
natural prolongation concept. That is to say, the natural prolongation concept is that 
sort of concept which can be proven in a negative way. This negative way is the 
existence of a natural fundamental discontinuity of the continental shelf. 
Fourthly, the remaining question is, if the natural prolongation concept has 
become a factor among the other relevant factors, so how can this finding be reconciled 
with the Courts finding in the 1969 Cases? In the 1969 Cases, as has been seen earlier.. 
"natural prolongation" was considered a fundamental principle to effect both the 
entitlement and delimitation of the continental shelf. The development of the concept, 
on the other hand, proved the natural prolongation concept to be a mere factor which 
might, or might not, play a role in the delimitation question. However, in order to 
reconcile these two findings which, in principle, contradict each other, some discussion 
is necessary here. 
To begin with, based on paragraph 19 of the 1969 ICJ judgement there is no 
doubt that the natural prolongation concept is considered the basis of entitlement of the 
continental shelf, regardless of whether it was a descriptive expression or a normative 
concept 131 As for the delimitation question natural prolongation can be understood to 
have two overlapping senses. Since the said concept is the sole basis of title which 
"exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of' the State's sovereignty on its land, so each 
State must have that part of the continental shelf which constitutes its natural 
prolongation into and under the sea. And so long as "natural prolongation is a juridical 
concept which is built on legal and certain geological facts, two remarks must be made. 
On the one hand, the objective of the natural prolongation concept is those areas of the 
continental shelf which, though exist ab initio, are identified by the delimitation 
process itself. That is not to say that the delimitation process creates or establishes 
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what constitutes the natural prolongation of the coastal State. The delimitation process 
is, in fact, the manifestation or declaration of the natural prolongation which already 
belonged to the State concerned. Natural prolongation, therefore, is not the 
delimitatory result. 132 Rather it is a juridical fact that is attributed ipso facto and ab 
initio to the coastal State; and it is, therefore, a normative concept but not descriptive 
expression. 
On the other hand, the above-said interpretation of the concept can be understood 
to be the general principle of natural prolongation. This general principle, however, is 
qualified by the existence of certain geological circumstances in some cases. This 
restriction makes the natural prolongation concept play an auxiliary role beside its main 
role as a general principle. According to this auxiliary role the natural prolongation 
concept becomes just a factor among the other factors which are relevant to the case 
concerned. Being a factor, "natural prolongation" can be proven, as has already been 
seen, in a negative way, i. e., the existence of the natural discontinuity of the continental 
shelf. Natural prolongation as a general principle is applicable in all cases; for, it is 
considered the basis for both the entitlement and the delimitation of the continental 
shelf. At the same time, and conversely, natural prolongation as a relevant factor is 
applicable only in certain cases that could satisfy certain conditions which will be the 
subject of a separate discussion. 133 
Conclusion 
Having given a brief account on both the Conventional and Customary rules and 
principles relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf between neighbouring 
States, the discussion comes to the following conclusions. 
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General 
To begin with the Conventional rule , as was enshrined in Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention on the continental shelf, introduces a three-point solution. This three-point 
solution presents two basic rules of delimitation. The first is the rule that contains the 
obligation to enter into negotiations in order to achieve an agreement. Those 
negotiations must be serious and meaningful, and must be guided by the spirit of 
equitable principles which take account of all the special circumstances. The second, 
which is considered as an alternative solution in default of agreement, is the 
equidistance/special circumstances rule. The rule here stated is composed of a general 
rule and an exception. The equidistance principle is considered a general rule which is 
qualified by the special circumstances clause. According to the history of development 
of the continental shelf doctrine the combined character of the equidistance/ special 
circumstances rule was underlain by the desire that the delimitation process should 
achieve an equitable solution. 
Two main problems are attributed to the Conventional rules. The first is 
concerned with the legal status of the equidistance principle. As for this problem, it is 
suggested that despite the consideration of the equidistance principle as a general rule, 
which means its obligatory character, the role that this principle plays in the 
Conventional rules is reduced(to its lowest effect The degree of emphasis that can be 
had to the equidistance principle as a conventional obligation is mitigated by the 
inclusion of the special circumstances clause which made the legal status of this 
principle similar to that of the same principle in customary international law. 
The other problem, or perhaps the other loophole, is the vagueness of the special 
circumstances clause. The meaning and scope of this clause was left without a reliable 
explanation. According to the available records the only relevant information 
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concerning the special circumstances clause were those which provided a few scattered 
examples (these examples were stated by the ILC and some of the judicial organs in the 
relevant cases). This problem is the most serious problem of the continental shelf 
delimitation question which, therefore, will be discussed, thoroughly, in Chapter V. 
Correspondingly, although the Customary solution, like the Conventional 
solution, puts first the obligation to resort to agreement, the former solution consists of 
one single set of principles. The delimitation process, whether by agreement or by any 
other means, should be carried out in accordance with equitable principles taking into 
account all the relevant circumstances. Besides, having found that every case of 
delimitation was unique, and it was quite difficult to find one single reliable rule that 
could be applicable to all cases, the customary solution found it more appropriate to 
seek one final goal instead of one rule. That is, the delimitatory result should always 
contrive an equitable solution. 
One of the most entangled principles, that is attributed to the customary solution, 
has been the natural prolongation concept. Because the natural prolongation concept 
was considered as the basis of title of the continental shelf doctrine, the greatest debate, 
with regard to the delimitation question, was whether this concept had a geophysical, or 
legal, or both geophysical and legal connotation. 
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As the end of the debate was that the natural prolongation concept had been a 
juridical concept, the remaining question is, what is the implication of such a juridical 
concept? Bearing in mind its development, especially throughout the related judicial 
cases, the natural prolongation concept is found to have two interwoven connotations. 
The first introduces the natural prolongation concept as a general principle which 
constitutes the basis of title to the continental shelf 
koctrin4 (i. e., it is a basis for both 
the entitlement and delimitation matters). In this case, the natural prolongation concept 
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is a pure legal concept which exists ipso facto and ab initio for the benefit of all 
States. The second is that, the natural prolongation concept constitutes a geological 
relevant circumstance in some cases where it is , 
'proven by the existence of a 
fundamental natural discontinuity of the relevant continental shelf. This indicates that 
the natural prolongation concept, in the said sense, is based on some pure geological 
facts. Based on what has been said, the juridical concept of natural prolongation is a 
combination of legal and geological considerations. In other words, the juridical 
natural prolongation is a legal concept which depends, partially, on some geological 
facts. 
As for the equidistance principle, the Customary solution does not regard it as 
IN 
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having a prior character in the delimitation question. Rather it is considered a method 
among the other methods in international law. The only distinction which the 
equidistance has, in view of the Customary solution, is that it has a scientific character, 
as well as easiness and practicability in application. The equidistance principle, 
therefore, has no privilege with respect to the other international methods. For, the 
utilization of any method, whether it is the equidistance or any other one, is examined 
in the light of achieving an equitable solution. 
The Customary solution suffers from three gaps. In the first place, its principles 
are very broad and vague. Equitable principles, equity, and equitable solution are 
ambiguous terms for two reasons. Firstly, there has not been sufficient explanation as 
to what each term means. Secondly, Those terms have been given a relative meaning 
which varies from one case to another. 
The second loophole is that, despite the mention of a number of principles to 
guide the delimitation process, the Customary solution is dominated by only one 
concept. That is the concept of equity which has a relative and ambiguous meaning. It 
is, therefore, quite difficult to secure an objective delimitation process since the concept 
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of equity is open to misinterpretation. The lack of sufficient criterion/criteria, by the aid 
of which the objective character of equity can be achieved, is the major problem that 
faces the Customary solution. 
The third is the vagueness of the relevant circumstances clause. Like the "special 
circumstances" clause in the Conventional rules, the "relevant circumstances" clause 
has not been given enough explanation. The ICJ found it appropriate to mention some 
examples of those relevant circumstances. However, these examples were of very little 
help in illustrating or setting a precedent to judge other unforeseen circumstances in 
other cases. Yet according to the available records, it is definitely not easy to find any 
objective criterion in the light of which any circumstance can be judged whether it is 
relevant or not. Because this problem is the most serious of all, it will be discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
Comparison & Conclusion 134 
The above citation of the Conventional and Customary solution leads to the 
following conclusions. First, both Customary and Conventional solutions introduce 
the obligation to resort to agreement in the first place. Yet the conditions for agreement 
in both solutions are identical. 
Second, the Conventional solution establishes an alternative obligation to guide 
the parties in default of agreement, whereas the Customary solution leaves the matter to 
the judicial organs which will decide the appropriate solution in the light of the 
applicable rules and principles. 
Third, although it seems that the Conventional solution gives more weight to the 
equidistance principle than the Customary solution, the actual weight which is given to 
the equidistance principle in both solutions is quite similar. The inclusion of the 
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"special circumstances" clause in the Conventional solution has mitigated the weight 
that is given to the equidistance principle to its lowest effect so that it has become the 
last resort when no other solution proves to satisfy the requirements of the fairest 
equitable solution. Obviously, it is the same weight which is given to the equidistance 
principle in the customary solution. 
Fourth, without any question of the relation between Customary Law and Treaty 
Law; and regardless of the fact that the Conventional solution is applicable only 
between the parties to the 1958 Convention on the continental shelf whereas the 
Customary solution is applicable to all cases; the relation between the Conventional and 
Customary solutions, with regard to the delimitation question of the continental shelf, 
can be understood to have a unique status. Article 6, as it presents the Conventional 
solution, introduces two specific rules, agreement and equidistance/special 
circumstances rules. These two rules are supposed to be controlled by the relevant 
principles in international law. Customary solution, on the other hand, does not 
introduce, apart from the obligation to resort to agreement, any specific rules. Rather, 
it establishes some principles according to which the delimitation process is carried out. 
Equitable principles, equity, equitable solution, and natural prolongation, represent 
general principles which guide States in their endeavour to arrive at a reliable solution to 
delimitation of the continental shelf. 
When the ICJ was asked to identify the rules and principles that are applicable to 
the delimitation question of the continental shelf it exerted most of its efforts to review 
the history of the development of the continental shelf doctrine. The Court eventually, 
instead of declaring some applicable rules, declared some general principles to guide 
States efforts in their delimitations. That is to say, there was an underlying acceptance 
of the available rules at the time. The Court found that the available Conventional rules 
are sufficient to effect any delimitation. However, the Court had to bridge two gaps. 
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The first was that the Conventional solution was applicable only between the parties to 
the 1958 Convention. The second was that the wording of Article 6 was broad and 
ambiguous. 
In order to bridge the said two gaps, the Court found that the best solution was to 
adopt some principles, instead of rules, which were said to be the Customary solution. 
In so doing the Court bridged the first gap by considering these principles as a 
Customary solution which indicates its applicability to all cases. 
As for the second gap, the Court has established, as has been said, some general 
principles and not rules. For, if it had established some rules, so the question would 
have been related to the relation between Customary Law and Treaty Law. By 
establishing only general principles, the Court proved the fact that it found the relating 
Conventional rules to be acceptable. However, it also found that these rules needed 
some clarification and restrictions so as to be applicable in all cases without 
misinterpretation. That was why the Court tried to provide some explanations and 
restrictions to the Conventional rules through the Customary principles which it 
established. For instance, the concept of equitn especially in its unique meaning, . 
constitutes a sort of guideline according to which the Conventional rules can be 
understood more easily. Yet the concept of equity constitutes some sort of restrictions 
in the light of which the Conventional rules are controlled. From this one can deduce 
that the Conventional solution of the delimitation of the continental shelf is regulatory, 
whereas the Customary solution is explanatory. 135 
The pressing question here is, does this mean that the Conventional and the 
Customary solutions are the same? The answer to this question can be seen from two 
different perspectives. The first, which is the rigid answer, is that the two solutions 
vary from each other. For, the strict interpretation of the wording of Article 6 leads to 
some differences between the two solutions, (such as the legal status of the 
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equidistance principle, and the special circumstances clause in comparison with the 
relevant circumstances clause). The second, which is the flexible answer, is that the 
two solutions are the same. 
Figure 11: 1 
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Taking a moderate stand, the Conventional and Customary rules can be said to be 
very similar. For, as it has been said previously, the Customary solution constitutes a 
1 17 
set of principles the function of which is to explain and guide the Conventional rules in 
order to be applicable to all cases. Besides, the legal status of the equidistance principle 
is very similar in both solutions. However, with regard to the "relevant circumstances" 
clause, (of the Customary solution, ) and the "special circumstances" clause, (of the 
Conventional solution, ) there seems to be a need for more discussion to see whether 
they are similar in both solutions or not. The said two clauses will be the subject of 
discussion in Part U. 
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Solution, see Figure 11: 1 
135- The question whether the court has succeeded in filling the second gap or not is another matter. 
As has been said above, the customary solution itself suffers from some vagueness and ambiguity. 
Accordingly, it can be said that the customary solution has succeeded, only to an extent, in 
clarifying the conventional solution; but, it at the same time contributed to the complication of 
the delimitation question of the continental shelf. 
125 
ýýýl To® 
umbluoOi1cftm 
General 
Having dealt with a brief comparative study of the relation and interrelation 
between the Conventional and Customary solutions, the second Chapter reached the 
conclusion that the main problem of the two solutions was the meaning and scope of 
the "special circumstances" and "relevant circumstances" clauses. Furthermore, the 
final question of the second Chapter was whether the said two clauses had identical, (or 
at least similar, ) or different meaning and scope. So a thorough examination of the two 
clauses is very necessary before any such judgement is taken. 
As it is suggested, this Part is going to deal with the "relevant circumstances" 
clause in the Third and Fourth Chapters deferring the "special circumstances" clause to 
the Fifth Chapter. Thus, an introductory section concerning the two clauses is 
indispensable. Because the two clauses have very often been mixed with each other, so 
it is quite important to find a reliable criterion according to which the differentiation 
between the two clauses is facilitated. The function of the introductory section is then 
to attempt to fined such a criterion. 
Criterion 
According to the available literature, it was almost impossible to find any 
differentiation between the "relevant circumstances" and "special circumstances" 
clauses. Yet the two terms, generally speaking, were very often used in an 
indistinguishable meaning to express the same thing concerning the factors and 
elements which would play a role in the continental shelf delimitation between 
neighbouring States. That being the case, it is not an easy task to find out which is 
which. So, in order to overcome this difficulty, it is found that some criteria must be 
sought. The function of such criteria is to make easy, or at least to facilitate the 
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identification of the scope of each of the two terms concerned. 
Two criteria can be said to be of use. The first is that which is interested in the 
chronological order of these two terms. Before 1969, (the North Sea Cases), the only 
existing term was the "special circumstances" term. For, in the 1969 Cases the term 
"relevant circumstances" was established. From that date on the two terms appeared to 
parallel each other. Accordingly, all the cases, (though there could hardly have been 
any), and the literature that was advanced before 1969 would refer only to the "special 
circumstances" term. After, and including, the 1969 cases another criterion must be 
used because the said terms have been mixed with each other since that date. 
However, an observation should be made with regard to the above-said criterion. 
As for State practice, this criterion cannot be applicable. For, State practice is an 
independent source of international law which is very hard to be classified in 
chronological-order categories. That is to say, State practice is very changeable and 
susceptible to change its direction from time to time even with respect to each individual 
State. Besides, State practice concerning delimitation of the continental shelf was never 
uniform. States adopted several verified solutions, including the equitable principles 
solution since the early development of the continental shelf doctrine. Accordingly, any 
unilateral or multilateral State practice must be studied in the light of another criterion. 
The second criterion is concerned with the applicable law. According to this 
criterion two possibilities are likely to arise. The first is those cases, literature, and 
State practice that apply, or suggest the application of the Conventional rules which was 
embodied in the 1958 Convention on the Continental shelf - Article 6 in particular. 
These materials are supposed to contain a clear reference to the' isedýspecial 
circumstances. However, the case is not always so easy. Some materials suggest 
partial application of the said Conventional rules, such as applying the Conventional 
rules to some areas and the Customary solution to some other areas. The case here, 
then necessitates the application of an auxiliary criterion which will be discussed later in 
this section. 
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The second possibility is those materials that apply, or suggest the application of 
the Customary solution. Like the first possibility, there is no doubt about the obvious 
indication to the "relevant circumstances" term where the case concerned is subject 
wholly to the Customary solution. However, again the partial applicability of the 
Customary solution will create the same difficulty which is said to arise where the 
Conventional solution is also partially applicable. As has been said above, this problem 
can be solved by the application of an auxiliary criterion. 
Regarding those materials which indicate the application of the Customary 
solution to some of the involved areas and the Conventional solution to the other areas, 
there could be no problem where the circumstance is explicitly clarified as being 
relevant or special circumstance. The auxiliary criterion, however, is only applicable 
when vague or no such clarification is available. 
As far as the auxiliary criterion is concerned, the environment and facts of the 
case in question are of great relevance. Any problematical circumstance must be 
examined in the light of the environment and facts according to which the circumstance 
is judged. The result of this examination will show either the real category - relevant or 
special - to which the circumstance belongs or will at least show the most likelihood of 
such category. For instance if one of the agreements did not mention whether the 
utilized circumstances were special or relevant, so these circumstances could be known 
in the light of questions such as: Were the States concerned parties to the 1958 
Convention on the Continental shelf? Did they issue any proclamation favouring the 
Customary or the Conventional solution? What is the most likelihood of the applicable 
law? And so on. 
The criteria mentioned-above are assumed to work in the light of a supplementary 
criterion. This criterion is concerned with the literal differences between the two 
words: special and relevant. According to The Oxford Dictionary the word special is 
used to mean that the item in question is "... of such a kind as to exceed or excel in 
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some way that which is usual or common ... ". Moreover, it means that the item is 
exceptional in character, quality or degree. l So, applying this meaning to the special 
circumstances term, two qualifications must be available for any circumstance to be 
considered special. The first is that the circumstance must exceed what is usual or 
common. The second is that this circumstance must have something exceptional in its 
character, quality or degree. According to this meaning only those unusual and 
exceptional factors may fall within the scope of the special circumstances category. 
That is to say, special circumstances category, according to the literal meaning, has a 
reasonably limited scope. 
As for the word relevant, it is used in two different fields in two different 
meanings. Relevant, in literature, means that the thing in question is bearing upon, 
connected with, or pertinent to the matter in hand. In the legal field, relevant is used, in 
Scottish Law, to mean pertinentjor sufficien42 Accordingly, the word relevant can be 
said to have two basic meanings: connected to or pertinent, on the one hand, and 
sufficient, on the other. Applying these two meanings to the relevant circumstances 
term, two contradicting ranges of circumstances would be produced. As far as the first 
meaning - connected to or pertinent - is concerned, the relevant circumstances category 
embraces a very wide range of circumstances. For, any link, however weak, can be 
categorized under the meaning of the words connected to or pertinent. Such a category, 
then, can be said to be an open ended one. Conversely, according to the second 
meaning - sufficient - the relevant circumstances category is restricted to embrace 
circumstances that have a sufficient or adequate link with the case concerned) This 
sufficiency or adequacy is always tested by how serious the link is. If a circumstance 
has a negligible or insufficient link with the case concerned, so it can be disregarded 
from being relevant to the case. The scope of the relevant circumstances category 
according to the second meaning of the word relevant - sufficient - has, then, :h 
narrower scope than according to the first meaning of the said word - connected to/ or 
pertinent. 
So, what is the real meaning of the word relevant? 
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As far as the literal rnea'ning is concerned, both said meanings are correct. 
However, since the main concern here is the legal connotation of the word, since the 
word "relevant" according to the second meaning - sufficient - is specified and 
restricted within the scope of Scottish Law, and, since the first meaning of the said 
word - connected to or pertinent - is more likely to be used in English Literature in 
general, (soothe second meaning is more likely to have been meant by the ICJ and 
consequently attributed to the relevant circumstances term. 
Conclusion 
In order to facilitate the differentiation between the "relevant circumstances" and 
"special circumstances" clauses, three criteria are said to be applicable: first, the 
criterion that is concerned with the chronological order of the establishment of the two 
clauses; second, the criterion which is interested, 'tr'the applicable law to the case 
concerned; and, third, the auxiliary criterion which examines the facts and environment 
of the case in order to judge whether the involved circumstance is relevant or special. 
As for the literal differences between the two words "special" and "relevant", it 
is clear that they slightly vary in meaning and this variation may affect their scopes. 
Since "special" denotes something unusual with an exceptional character, quality, or 
degree, it restricts the special circumstances category and causes its scope to be 
reasonably limited. The meaning of "relevant" - being sufficient -, renders the relevant 
circumstances category to be also relatively limited. 
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Introduction 
The relevant circumstances concept is said to contain a wide-ranged variety of 
circumstances. According to the available records, it has been almost impossible to 
find one single study or legal document that covers all, or at least all the up-to-date, 
circumstances that might be considered relevant. That is why this Chapter has 
concerned itself with making a general study examining the available materials in order 
to identify those circumstances and subsequently to group them into proper categories. 
The discussion, therefore, will be interested in three main areas. As they are the only 
useful source of the relevant circumstances, State practice - unilateral and multilateral -, 
judicial cases, and literature will be the subject matter of this Chapter. 
S&nqü®m a 
Relevant Circumstances 
State Practice 
I 
Unilateral State Practice 
' 
nilaterai( State practice has been of very little use with respect to the 
interpretation of the relevant circumstances clause or of any suggestion relating to 
circumstances as such. However, it is still important that an idea about such State 
practice must be provided. 
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A collection of proclamations, laws, acts, ... etc., which belong to 76 States, has 
been collected from the available records. These 76 States can be classified into two 
main categories: States which are parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, (31 States, ) and States which are not parties to the said Convention, (45 States. ) 
As for the former category of States, although-i' ma)"fall within the scope of the special 
circumstances term, except those States which made some reservations to Article 6 of 
the 1958 Convention, it is still necessary to examine them here. The said 31 States 
could be classified into two categories. First, twenty-one States did not indicate their 
preferential circumstances. These 21 States could be further classified into 
proclamations that were promulgated before 1958; 3 and those which were enacted after 
1958.4 The remaining 10 States, were in favour of the Conventional solution; i. e., 
they would relate to special circumstances as they were meant to be in the said 
solution. 5 
The other category contains those States which are not party to the said 1958 
Convention. They are 45 States which can be classified into three groups. The first, 
which is of tio(-usO. at all, is concerned with those States which do not claim any method 
of delimitation or any special or relevant circumstances. These are 24 States. 6 The 
second is interested in those States which some methods or circumstances can be 
deduced from the available information about them, such as Cayman Islands, Oman, 
India, Italy, and Turkey.? 
The third and last group, which is the most important of all, is that which is 
concerned with those States which expressed their full adherence to the solution 
embodied in Customary Law. These are 18 States. 8 Only two of these eighteen States 
have, explicitly, mentioned some information about the circumstances that might be 
taken into account. Honduras proclaimed that its boundaries might be modified 
"according to circumstances arising out of new discoveries, studies, and national 
interests which may emerge in the future. "9 No more explanation was provided in this 
decree as to what sort of circumstances it referred to. However, the inclusion of " 
national interests" can be understood to mean political, economic and security interests. 
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Table III: 1 
Unilateral State Practice 
States Which Are not Parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf 
States Claiming Agreement or 
Agreement / Equitable Principles 
Solution 
- Abu Dhabi 10 June, 1949 
- Ajman 20 June, 1949 
-Bahrain 5 June, 1949 
-Cook Islands 14 Nov., 1977 
Dubai 14 June, 1949 
- F. R. Germany 20 Jan., 1964 
- Iran (equity) 18 June, 1955 
Iraq (in accordance with 
International Law) ............ 1968 
- Kuwait 12 June, 1949 
- New Guinea (Australia; in accor- 
dance with the principles of Inter- 
national Law) 11 Sep.. 1953 
Nicaragua 6 Nov., 1950 
- P. D. R. Yemen (the suggestion 
provided for the territorial sea; 
however because the law was 
both continental shelf & territo- 
rial waters, so the suggestion is 
valid for both. ) ............ 1970 
- Qatar 8 June, 1949 
- Ras Al Khaima 17 June, 1949 
- Saudi Arabia 28 May, 1949 
- Sharjah 16 June, 1949 
- Umm Al Qaiwain 20 June, 1949 
- Honduras (on the basis of recip- 
rocity) 19 Dec., 1957 
States Claiming Other Solution 
States Which Did not Claim Any 
Solution or Relevant Circumstances 
- Cayman Island ............ 1969 
- India, Agreement/ ............ 1976 
Median line%therwise agreed 
-Oman (median 17 July, 1972 
line) 
-Turkey 9 May, 1968 
-Italy, Agreement/ 21 July. 1967 
median line. 
Argentina II Oct. 1946 & 
........... 
1966 & 
23 May, 1973 
-Bahamas26 Nov., 1948 & 
............ 1970 
Brazil 8 Nov., 1950 
British Honduras 2 Dec.. 1949 
- British Solomon Island .... 1970 
Chile 23 June, 1947 
- Dahomy 14 Dec., 1950 
- Figi 1970 
- Ecuador 6 Nov., 1950 
- El Salvador 14 Dec., 1950 
- Iceland 5 April. 1948 
- Ireland ........... 1968 
- Ivory Coast ........... 1967 
- Korea Republic 18 Jan., 1952 
- Panama I Mach, 1946 & 
2 Feb.. 1967 
- Papua New Guinea ......... 1977 
- Pau 1 Aug., 1947 & 
12 March. 1952 
- Philippenese .............. 1949 
- Sarawak .............. 1954 
- Seyschelles 15 Oct.. 1962 
- Sri Lanka (Seylon) 19 Oct.. 1957 
- Sri Lanka ............. 
1976 
- Sudan ............. 1970 
- Togo 21 May, 1968 
-India 1955. & 1959 
Saudi Arabia was more confined in referring to such circumstances. Regarding 
the Arabian Gulf area it stated that "fishing rights in such waters and the traditional 
freedom of pearling by the people of the Gulf are in no way affected. " 10 Furthermore, 
in the other decree which was concerned with the Red Sea it suggested a joint 
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development of the seabed "sharing with the neighbouring governments in a common 
zone. "11 This kind of suggestion is very often used when a mineral deposit straddles 
between two or more countries and they all have interests therein. 12 
Accordingly, three types of circumstances are being recommended by the said 
States: being, national interests - political, economic, and security -, fishing rights, and 
joint development of a common oil and mineral deposit. Nevertheless, an observation 
relating to islands is necessary. 
Numerous proclamations that belong to the latter category have included a special 
provision giving their islands a continental shelf of their own. 13 Although, as is very 
obvious, these proclamations do not state islands as a relevant circumstance, they draw 
attention to the fact that the claimant States consider such islands as an indispensable 
part of their continental shelf. In fact, by claiming islands to have a continental shelf of 
their own it can be deduced that, it is a fortiori to claim these islands as a relevant or 
special, (subject to status, ) circumstance. 14 
II 
Multilateral State Practice 
Multilateral State practice is purported to be more useful than the unilateral one, 
with respect to the differentiation between special circumstances and relevant 
circumstances clauses. However, it was quite difficult to get enough of such 
information from the available State practice without going through an analytical study 
of this practice. The following paragraphs are, therefore, going to analyse instead of, 
only, cite the relevant State practice, in order to see what sort of circumstances is used 
thereby. 
Sixty-three agreements out of 80 agreements are said to have negotiated their 
boundaries on the basis of equitable principles. 15 These 63 agreements are found to 
belong to two categories. The first contains agreements which have used the 
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equidistance principle; and the second contains agreements which have used some 
means other than the equidistance principle. 
Before embarking on the relevant discussion, an observation must be drawn to 
attention. Having examined these 63 agreements, almost none of them was found to 
have indicated, explicitly, any circumstances or factors which the contracting parties 
took into account during their negotiations. That is not to say that these agreements did 
not contain any such circumstances or factors. In fact, such circumstances and factors 
can be deduced from the environments and facts that can be said to have influenced 
each agreement. 
Nevertheless, Qne difficulty might arise when examining each agreement in the 
light of its environment and facts. If the geophysical circumstances were a sufficient 
indicator to the underlying reasons of the agreed boundary line, so there would be no 
problem at all. The problem however, will be serious when either there is no 
geophysical circumstances at all, or the available geophysical circumstances are not 
sufficient to explain all the underlying justifications of the agreed boundary line. To 
solve this problem, it is suggested that reliance on the available data, that relate to the 
concerned parties, might be of great help. 
i- Agreements Utilized the Equidistance Principle 
As for those agreements which utilized the equidistance principle, they can be 
classified into two sub-categories. The first is concerned with those agreements which 
concluded a simple equidistant boundary line. And the second sub-category is con- 
cerned with those agreements which have applied a modified equidistant boundary line. 
a- Agreements Applied a Simple Equidistance Line 
Nine of the said 63 agreements found the simple equidistance method the most 
appropriate solution, suited to all the respective parties. Although these agreements are 
supposed to contain no relevant circumstances, it is still quite important to provide a 
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brief summary on each of them. 
Two agreements e'f south east Asia'.. used a simple equidistance method. The 
first was between Sri Lanka and India (23 March, 1976), according to which the two 
countries delimited their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of 
Bengal. As far as these two boundaries are concerned the two countries can be 
considered adjacent, rather than opposite Stäte:. The boundary line concluded in this 
agreement is the median line, and neither State is a party to the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. (See Figure 1) 
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Figure 1, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 224. 
The other agreement which was held between Sri Lanka, India and Maldives on 
23 July, 1976, was concerned with their trijunction point. With regard to this 
trijunction point, which was equidistant from the nearest point of the three countries, 
the involved countries were also opposite States. And again none of those three States 
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was a party to the 1958 convention on the continental shelf. 
In the Mediterranean, the convention between Italy and Spain, which was 
concluded on 19 February, 1974, was concerned with States of opposite coasts. 
According to the available maps, the agreed median boundary line gave full effect to all 
the relating islands in the region regardless of their size. No justifications were made in 
this agreement as to why those islands were given such a full effect. Regarding the 
membership to the 1958 Convention, Spain was a party to it, whereas Italy was not. 
(See Figure 2) 
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Figure 2, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 173. 
In the southeast Pacific Ocean, the U. S. A. concluded two agreements, relating to 
Samoa Islands, with Cook Islands on 11 June, 1980, and with New Zealand (Tokelau) 
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on 2 December, 1980, concerning the maritime boundary therein. The two agreements, 
which agreed on median boundary lines were carried out by States of opposite coasts. 
Although the three countries were parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, the said Convention was not obligatory to them, when they concluded these 
agreements, due to the fact that they were concerned with a single maritime boundary 
and not with the continental shelf only. 16 ( See Figure 3) 
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Turkey and U. S. S. R. concluded an agreement on 23 June, 1978, concerning 
their continental shelf boundary in the Black Sea. The two countries agreed to delimit 
the said continental shelf "... on the basis of the principle of justice... ". 17 The course of 
the concluded boundary line seems to be an equidistant line from the two respective 
coasts. The USSR was a party to the 1958 Convention, whereas Turkey was not. 
The Black Sea is an enclosed sea bordering four States: U. S. S. R. from the north, 
Turkey and the U. S. S. R. from the east, Turkey from the south, and Romania and 
Bulgaria from the west. Turkey and the U. S. S. R., which have the biggest share of the 
Black Sea, are adjacent as well as opposite States with respect to this sea. The 
a,.,,, 
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geographical configuration of the Black Sea is not very complicated, consisting of a 
curved coast with some small indentations. As for the continental margin of the Black 
Sea, it is quite wide in the north-west, very narrow in the north and south, and it has a 
reasonable width in the east and west. (See Figure 4) 
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Figure 4, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 196. 
According to the available facts, the equidistance method was beneficial to Turkey 
and the U. S. S. R. However, there would be a good deal of doubt if this method would 
suit Rumania and Bulgaria in their future delimitations with the U. S. S. R. and Turkey 
concerning the rest of the Black Sea. 
The U. S. A. signed an agreement with Mexico on 4 May, 1978, concerning the 
Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. As proposed by Mexico, the two countries 
agreed that the two boundaries - in the east and the west - would be a simplified 
equidistant line following the same method which was used in their agreement of 23 
November, 1970,18 concerning their respective territorial waters. The said equidistant 
line have given full effect to the islands from both countries regardless of their size. 
However, with regard to the Gulf of Mexico, the agreed boundary line left two gaps 
concerning those areas where the opposite coasts of the two countries exceed 400 
nautical miles; the first, which extended for 129 miles, was between Louisiana (USA) 
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and Yutacan (Mexico); and the other was near the yet-to-be-concluded common point 
between the USA, Cuba and Mexico. 19 
As for the geographical considerations, the geographical configuration favours 
Mexico in the Gulf of Mexico, whereas it favours neiiwof the two States in the Pacific 
Ocean. Due to the outgrowth of the Mexican coast of Yutacan, the Gulf is shaped like a 
three-quarters arc of a circle forming Bay of Campech (Mexico) at the first two quarters 
of this arc. The USA-Mexico land intersection with the sea occurs at the beginning of 
the third quarter. The coast of the USA, therefore, despite some curves, seems to be 
flat facing the curved Mexican coast. Besides, the presence of some of the small 
Mexican islands near the Yutacan outgrowth, adds some complexity to the disadvantage 
of the U. S. A. That was why, Hedberg did not agree with the calculation of those 
Mexican islands when drawing the equidistance line. 20 The answer to this 
disagreement came by Fledman and Colson who justified the consideration of the 
Mexican islands in the Gulf of Mexico as a compensation to the calculation of the 
American islands - near Florida - in the Pacific 
21(See Figure 5) 
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Figure 5, taken from, 75 AJIL, (1981), P. 745. 
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C 
Unfortunately, due to a subsequent geological survey concerning the hydrocarbon 
potential in the Gulf of Mexico, the U. S. A. Senate disregarded this agreement on 16 
September, 1980.22 And since it was not approved by the Senate, so the matter will be 
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left to future negotiations between the two countries in an effort to agree a more 
equitable solution. Both the USA and Mexico were parties to the 1958 Convention. 
In the Caribbean Sea, one of the Colombian agreements was concluded with 
Panama on 20 November, 1976. Colombia has ratified the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, whereas Panama has not'yr'' This agreement which was between 
two adjacent States, drew two equidistant boundary lines - in the Caribbean Sea, and in 
the Pacific Ocean. The choice of the agreed two equidistant lines seems to have been 
influenced by the macrogeographical configuration of the relating coasts of central 
America, and the location of these two States on these coasts. (See Figure 24) 
One of the French agreements in the Caribbean Sea was concluded with Saint 
Lucia on 4 March, 1981, concerning the French Island of Martinique. The agreed 
boundary line was equidistant from the coasts of both Martinique Island and Saint 
Lucia Island. Apparently, there was no reason to deviate from the equidistance course 
1 
of the boundary line. (See Figure 6) France was a party to the 1958 Convention, 
whereas Saint Lucia was not. 
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Figure 6, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 131. 
b- Agreements Applied a Modified Equidistant Line 
Thirty-two agreements of the said 63 agreements resulted in either a modified 
equidistant boundary line, or an equidistant boundary line modified in some of its parts. 
Italy held three of its agreements on the basis of equitable principles. All these 
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agreements resulted in modified equidistant boundaries. Regarding the Adriatic Sea, 
Italy and Yugoslavia, being adjacent and at the same time opposite States, concluded an 
agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf on 8 January, 1968. Both States 
agreed that the equidistance principle, generally speaking, could produce an equitable 
solution. However, the presence of some islands therein caused the agreed boundary 
line to deviate from its equidistance course at some points. If the Yugoslav islands of 
Jabuka, Pelagrus, and Kajola were given full effect the median line would have created 
an inequitable result at the disadvantage of Italy. So, it was agreed that those islands 
should be given a partial effect pushing the boundary line towards Yugoslavia and 
hence giving Italy a more equitable share of the continental shelf. 23 Beside, according 
to the available maps, the distorting effect of the median line was not only produced by 
the presence of the said Yugoslav islands but also by the geographical configuration of 
the Italian coast against these islands. The unusual outgrowth of the Italian coast facing 
the said islands was the other facet as to why a true median boundary line would have 
it 
created(an inequitable solution. Yugoslavia wßs a party to the 1958 Convention; but 
Ls Italy vvs not. (See Figure 7) 
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Figure 7, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN. New York, 1987, P. 190. 
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In the Mediterranean Sea, Italy concluded another agreement with Tunisia, being 
opposite States, on 20 August, 1971. The two parties have agreed that the median line 
can be employed taking into account the presence of islands, islets and low tide 
elevations. Nevertheless, as the full effect of the Italian islands of Lampoine, 
Lampedusa, Linosa and Partelleria would have produce an inequitable solution, the two 
countries agreed that the said islands should constitute an exception. Subsequently, the 
said four islands were)discernerlfrom the calculation of the median line provided that 
these islands should be given a semi-enclaved continental shelf. This semi-enclaved 
continental shelf extended up to 13, (as for the Lampione Island 12), nautical miles 
around the Tunisian side of the said four islands and until they met the median line. 
This exception was caused by two circumstances. The first is the location of the said 
islands close to the Tunisian coast. And the other is the geographical configuration of 
the Tunisian coast, which, as far as macrogeography is concerned, (especially the 
geographical situation of Italy, Malta, Libya and Tunisia), would have made Tunisia a 
disadvantaged State if a true median line was used. Neither was a party to the 1958 
Convention. (See Figure 8) 
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Figure 8, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 180. 
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The third agreement was between the two opposite States Italy and Greece, which 
agreed on the median boundary line with some "... mutually approved minor 
adjustments, ... " on 24 May, 1977. The agreed median line was adjusted at turning 
points 1,2,3,8,15 and 16. The agreement did not mention any justification as to why 
such approved adjustments were made. Yet no apparent reason could be deduced 
therefrom. Neither was a party to the 1958 Convention. (See Figure 9) 
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Figure 9, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 96 
Fifteen of the agreements that were concluded in South East Asia were negotiated 
on the basis of equitable principles and resulted in a modified equidistant boundary line 
or trijunction. The Indian share of these 15 agreements was some six agreements 
concluded with four of its neighbours, among which only Thailand was a party to the 
1958 Convention. Delimiting their historic waters, India and Sri Lanka agreed on a 
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modified application of the equidistance method on June 26,1974. The two countries 
to this agreements were of opposite coasts. 24 This agreement did not clarify the 
reasons of the approved modification of the median line. Seemingly, the effective 
underlying reasons of these modifications were the presence of a good number of the 
Sri Lanka islands therein, as well as the geographical configuration of the coasts of 
both countries. ( See Figure 10) 
Figure 10, taken from, Churchill, R., Nordquist, M., & Lay, H., New Directions in the Law of the 
Sea, Vol. V, Oceana Pub., INC, 1977, P. 332. 
The second agreement was between India and the Maldives, (opposite States), on 
28 December, 1976. The agreed boundary line "... closely approximates an equidistant 
line. ", with minor adjustments at some of its points. 25 Full effect and slightly less than 
full effect were given to the involved islands causing the said minor adjustments. No 
reason, as to why these various effects were given to the concerned islands was 
mentioned in the agreement; and yet it was quite difficult to deduce any such reason. 
The third agreement, which was concluded on 22 June, 1978, was concerned 
with the India, Indonesia and Thailand trijunction between their respective opposite 
coasts. The approved point was essentially equidistant from India and Indonesia, on 
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the one hand, but further away from Thailand, on the other. The geographical 
configuration of the Indonesian and the Andaman Indian Island's coasts is relatively 
concave against the Thai coast which is, also relatively, convex in a similar degree 
facing the other two coasts. Combined with this, Thailand is stuck between Malaysia 
and Burma, and blocked by Indonesia from facing the open Indian Ocean. These two 
facts were very likely to have been the reasons why the location of the agreed 
trijunction point was meant to give Thailand some additional continental shelf areas as a 
remedy for its disadvantaged position. 
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Figure 11, taken from. Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 211. 
Having established its trijunction point with Indonesia and Thailand, India 
concluded another three agreements with these two States: one agreement with Thailand 
on 22 June, 1978, (See Figure 11); and two agreements with Indonesia on 8 August, 
1974, (See Figure 12), and 14 January, 1977, (See Figure 13). As for the 
India/Thailand agreement and the first India/Indonesia agreement, they conclude 
equidistant boundary lines modified in some of their parts. Because these two 
agreements have not clarified why they have deviated from the equidistance course, the 
analysis said with respect to their trijunction can be said here again. 26 
''l THAILAND 
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The third agreement, (the second India/Indonesia agreement), concluded a boundary 
line essentially equidistant from the coasts of the two countries. In addition, " it ... 
appears that all islands and rocks have been given full and equal weight in the 
equidistance calculation 27 
Figure 12, taken from, Churchill, R., Nordquist, M., & Lay, H., New Directions in the Law of the 
Sea, Vol. V. Oceana Pub., INC, 1977, P. 269. 
Beside the above-said two agreements with India, Indonesia concluded 5 other 
agreements with another two of its neighbours, (indonesia was not a party to the 1958 
Convention, whereas the other two States were parties). Two agreements were 
concluded with Thailand on 17 December, 1971, and 11 December, 1975. The first 
IndonesiaiThailand agreement, (as opposite States), determined a partial continental 
shelf boundary starting from the agreed common point between Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand. Although the other turning points of this partial boundary are equidistant 
from the baselines of the two States, it cannot be categorized as equidistant because its 
starting point, (the common point), is not equidistant 28 
The Indonesia/Thailand second agreement concluded the other part of the 
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boundary between the two countries. This part of the boundary was close to 
equidistance in only one point, (point A). The rest of the boundary was a negotiated 
boundary line which is closer to Indonesia than to Thailand. This fact proves the above 
said analysis concerning the India/Indonesiali'hailand trijunction point 29 
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Figure 13, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984). Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 235. 
The other three agreements were concluded by Indonesia and Australia, which 
were opposite as well as adjacent States, on May 18,1971, (See Figure 14), October 9, 
1972, (See Figure 15), and January 26,1973. Concerning the Arafura Sea, the said 
two countries have agreed on a median boundary line taking full account of the islands 
therein. The second agreement, which was supplementary to the previous one, 
extended the agreed boundary line of the Arafura Sea to and into the Timor Sea forming 
a modified median boundary line by giving various partial effects to the islands 
concerned. It is necessary to say that this agreement has left the area between point 
A 16 and A 17 unsettled. The third Indonesia/Australia agreement was concerned with 
the lateral boundary between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, which was at the time 
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an Australian Trust! The concluded boundary line seems to approximate an equidistant 
line joining the Indonesia/Papua New Guinea land intersection with the agreed 
continental shelf boundary of the first agreement. 
Figure 14, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN. New York, 1987, P. 267. 
Figure 15, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York. 1987, P. 272. 
As far as the said three agreements are concerned, the entire agreed boundary is 
equidistant at some points and negotiated at some others. The negotiated section of the 
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boundary seems to have been affected by the presence of a huge number of Indonesian 
islands scattered in the Timor Sea; the reason that a median line would have allocated an 
inequitable portion of the respective continental shelf to Australia. That was why some 
of these Indonesian islands were given partial effects to the advantage of Australia. As 
for the undelimited part of the boundary in the Timor Sea it was, apparently, affected 
by the combination of the said presence of the Indonesian islands and the geographical 
configuration of the Australian coast. The Australian coast facing the undelimted area 
of the boundary is indented concavely creating a circumstance according to which 
Australia is, in the Indonesian eye, supposed to lose the concession of giving a partial 
effect to the respective Indonesian islands. 
Having become independent from Australia, Papua New Guinea concluded an 
agreement with Australia on 18 December, 1978, concerning their opposite maritime 
boundaries in the Torres Strait and the Coral Sea. After identifying the sovereignty 
matter over some islands in the region, this agreement contrived four kinds of boundary 
lines: a fishing boundary, a seabed boundary, fishing and seabed boundary and a 
protected zone. As a matter of concern, the latter three boundaries are relevant. The 
seabed boundary, which coincide with the fishing boundary at its outer edges is, in 
fact, a negotiated line giving various kinds of effects to the respective islands. The 
interesting thing about the various effects given to the islands was that the central part 
of the boundary had ignored completely the presence of some Australian islands which 
were very close to the Papua New Guinea coast. That is to say, the Australian islands 
situated north-wards the agreed boundary, were given a, so to speak, minus effect. 
This choice of the location of the boundary line was due to the geographical complexity 
of the area in question: the presence of scattered islands that belong to one party close to 
the other party's coast, and the geographical situation of the area - being as a strait. 
(See Figure 16) 
As for the historic fishing rights of the interested people, the two parties have 
agreed to establish a Protected Zone within which such rights are protected for both 
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parties in accordance with the agreed proportion: 75% to 25% in some places; and 50% 
to 50% in some other places. 
Figure 16, taken from, 18-1 ILM., (1979). P. 324-325. 
151 
In east Asia two agreements were concluded between Japan and Korea, on 5 
February, 1974. As the first agreement delimited the continental shelf boundary in the 
northern part of their opposite coasts, it concluded, except point 3, a median boundary 
line. Besides, the agreement ignored the so called Liancourt group of rocks (Tok-do 
according to Korea, or Take-Shima according to Japan), which were located 
northwards the agreed boundary, due to the dispute over them between the two 
countries. The rest of the islands in the area were given full and equal effects 
regardless of their size. As for the deviation of point 3 from the equidistance course, 
no apparent reason could be inferred, (See Figure 17). 
Figure 17, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984). Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 285. 
The second agreement, which was interested in the southern part of their 
continental shelf, Japan and Korea agreed on establishing a Common Zone for the 
purpose of joint development. (See Figure 18) 
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Figure 18, taken from, Churchill, R., Nordquist, M., New Directions in the Law of the 
Sea, Vol. IV, Oceana Pub., INC, 1975, P. 133. 
Another agreement in southeast Asia, which was concluded by Indonesia and 
Malaysia on 27 October, 1969, resulted in an equidistant boundary line modified at 
some of its points. The first two sections of the boundary were equidistant; and the 
third, which was north of Tanjong Datu - the Indonesia/Sarawak land boundary 
termination -, was deviated from the equidistance course towards Indonesia to the 
advantage of Malaysia. 30 As for the equidistant section, it was drawn by giving full 
effect to the concerned islands from both sides, "... even though the Indonesian islands 
groups lie some 250 miles from the mainland of Borneo. "31 The deviation from the 
equidistance course in the third section was drawn by giving partial effect to some 
Indonesian islands such as the groups of Kepulanan Natuna Selatan and Kepulauan 
Natuna Utara which were given a decreasing partial effect according to their distance 
from the mainland. 32 
More important than the presence of the said islands was the geographical 
153 
complication of the area concerned. The two countries were opposite in the west - 
Strait of Malacca -, whereas they were adjacent in the east - Borneo (Indonesia) and 
Sarawak (Malaysia). The Indonesian islands scattered at the mouth of Strait of Malacca 
as well as in the South China Sea. Malaysia had some islands therein as well. 
However, the Malaysian islands were smaller in number and nearer to the shore than 
the Indonesian's. Besides, Malaysia was a disadvantaged State as it was blocked by 
Indonesia and its islands from the west, south and east, as well as from Thailand and 
South Viet Nam in the north and north east. This disadvantaged position would have 
produced a very small portion of the surrounding continental shelf if it was not taken 
into consideration. These various factors affected, in some way or another, the 
drawing of the boundary line between the two States. 
Agreed and potential boundaries in the Persian Gulf 
Figure 19, taken from, Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Boundaries of the World 
METHUEN. London & New York, 1985, P. 170 
At least seven of the collected agreements, which were concerned with the 
continental shelf of the Arabian, (Persian, ) Gulf, were negotiated on the basis of 
equitable principles, (for a general view on all the Gulfs agreements, see Figure 19). 
Five of these agreements were concluded between Iran and five of its opposite 
neighbours; and the other two were between four of the Gulfs Arabian States. None 
of them was a party to the 1958 Convention. 
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The first Iranian agreement was held with Saudi Arabia on October 24,1968. 
The resulting boundary line was a modified equidistant line. Having established a 
mutual recognition of sovereignty over Farsi (Iran) and Al-Arabia (Saudi Arabia) 
islands, the two countries agreed on giving two various kinds of effect to these two 
islands. Full effect was given to them with respect to each other causing the boundary 
line to be a median line from their low water mark; and partial effect was given to them 
with respect to the whole boundary line causing it to follow the respective belt of their 
12 nautical miles territorial waters. In the northern part of the boundary line, the 
Iranian Kharg island was given a partial effect - half effect - as well. 
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Taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 253, and 250. 
The second agreement, which was concluded between Iran and Qatar on 20 
September, 1969, seemed to have reached an equidistant boundary line. However, 
what was unusual about this agreement was that the agreed median line had disregarded 
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the presence of all islands in the area. Were the concerned islands to be taken into 
account, the median line would have been pushed towards Qatar giving more 
continental shelf areas to Iran. The boundary line then is not a true median line to the 
disadvantage of Iran. 34 (See Figure 20) 
The third agreement was held between Iran and Bahrain on 17 June, 1971. This 
agreement resulted in an equidistant boundary line modified at some of its points. The 
unique feature of this agreement was that the modified turning points of the boundary 
were based on some already existing agreements. 35 (See Figure 21) 
The fourth was the Iran/U. A. Emirates agreement of 13 August, 1974. This 
agreement resulted in a modified equidistant boundary line which gave various partial 
effects to some of the concerned islands, such as Sirri Island (Iran), and Sir Abu 
Nu'ayr (Sharjah). As for the Tumb group of islands and Abu Musa Island, they were, 
(and still are, ) in dispute between the two countries. 36 
Figure 22, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 247. 
The fifth, which was the Iran/Oman agreement of July 25,1974, was concerned 
with the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary in the Strait of Hormuz. The 
agreed boundary was an equidistant line modified at some of its turning points. Apart 
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from the geographical configuration of the area: being as a strait, and the presence of 
some islands, no other geographical circumstances seem to have been present therein. 37 
(See Figure 22) 
The remaining two agreements were the Saudi Arabia/Bahrain (which were 
opposite States) agreement of 22 February, 1958, and the Abu Dhabi Qatar - adjacent 
States - agreement of March 20,1969. As for the former agreement it seemed to have 
concluded a median boundary line. However, having disregarded all small islands, the 
agreed boundary could not be considered a true equidistant line, although some of its 
points were equidistant. After solving the question of sovereignty over the two 
Lubainah Islands - the small to Bahrain and the big to Saudi Arabia - the agreement 
considered the tip point of each island as a turning point of the continental shelf 
boundary. i. e., these two islands were not only disregarded from the equidistance 
calculation but also they were given a partial minus effect according to which neither of 
them was given any continental shelf areas from the side that faced the other country. 
Some islands, however, were given full effect in the calculation of the median line, 
such as Khaur Fasht and Kaskus. 38 
The other problem facing Saudi Arabia and Bahrain was that a true median line 
would have passed through the Fasht bu Saafa oil field. In order to solve the problem, 
the two countries agreed on establishing a hexagon Common Zone, under the 
administration of Saudi Arabia, for the purpose of sharing the revenue between each 
other. 39 
As for the last agreement, which was held between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, it 
concluded a modified equidistant line. Only two points of the agreed boundary line 
were equidistant from the coasts of both countries: Point A and Point D. The other two 
points, (B and C), were not equidistant. Whereas the location of point C was based on 
some obscure reason, point B was chosen "... to coincide with the location of an oil 
well... " (Al-Bundoq oil well) 40 The recognition of the Abu Dhabi sovereignty over 
the Dayyinah Island caused the boundary line to deviate towards Qatar. The said 
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island, however, was not given full effect. In fact, it was given a semi enclaved arc 
which would coincide with the three-miles belt of territorial waters until it met the 
boundary line. As for the dispute over the Al-Bunduq oil well, the two countries have 
agreed to establish a Common Zone around the said well under the administration of 
Abu Dhabi for the purpose of sharing the received revenue. 
The main feature of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf agreements above-cited was that 
the geographical considerations played a relatively minor role in comparison with the 
other factors. More important than the geographical factors, were the following three 
considerations, namely, the strategic importance of the Gulf, the land-border 
uncertainties, and the presence of a respectable deposits of crude oil therein. Due to the 
strategic importance of the Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz, international political 
influence was very likely to have taken place during the concerned negotiations. 
41 
Regarding the dispute over some of the Gulf islands, as well as over the territorial 
boundaries between the Gulf States, most of the concluded and the yet-to-be-concluded 
agreements were affected by those disputes and uncertainties 
42 Lastly, the presence of 
a huge quantity of good quality hydrocarbon deposits in the Gulf made the negotiations 
on the continental shelf boundaries to be based on each side's account of the location 
and importance of such deposits. 43 
In brief, national as well as international interests played, (and is very likely to 
play in the future, ) a significant role in the delimitation of the continental shelf 
boundaries in the Gulf. 
Two agreements in Central and South America were concluded by Argentina and 
Uruguay on 19 November, 1973, and by Costa Rica and Panama on 2 February, 1980. 
Although these two agreements indicated the equidistance method, the actual concluded 
boundary lines were different from the equidistant course. In the former agreement 
(Argentina/Uruguay agreement, as between adjacent and opposite states at the same 
time), the first section of the boundary line (Points 9 to 23) generally followed the 
navigation channel except in Point 10 which seemed to be equidistant from both 
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countries. 
Considering the second section - Points 23, A, B, C, D, E and F -, the Parties 
agreed that the boundary line is "... defined by an equidistant line, determined by the 
adjacent coasts methods, which begins at the midpoint of the baseline consisting of an 
imaginary straight line that joins Punta del Este (Uruguay) and Punta Rasa del Cabo 
San Antonio (Argentina). "44 The actual boundary between Point A and E was a 
modified equidistant line, or, as it was called, "... a segment of a parabolic curve. ", 45 
affected by Argentina's coast geographical configuration and the Uruguayan section of 
the closing line of Rio de la Plata - Point 23 to Pta del Esta. The presence of the 
Uruguayan island of Lobos was given a full effect in the calculation of the equidistant 
line at Point E, which continued until the 200 nautical miles limit 46 The agreement 
established a Common Fishing Zone and a Pollution Control Zone as well, beside the 
consideration of the Argentina island, Martin Gracia, which was near the Uruguayan 
coast, as "devoted exclusively to a natural preserve for the conservation and 
preservation of the native fauna and flora. "47 
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Figure 23, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 97,6 December, 1982. 
The other agreement, which was implemented by Costa Rica and Panama, was 
concerned with two boundary lines, viz, in the Caribbean Sea and in the Pacific Ocean. 
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Apart from some points, which were equidistant from the two countries' coasts, both 
boundaries were more likely to be perpendicplar lines to the general direction of the 
coast than being median lines 48 The boundary in the Caribbean Sea was affected by 
the presence of some islands - Colon (Panama), and Punto Mona (Costa Rica) -, 
whereas the boundary in the Pacific Ocean was influenced by the coastal irregularities 
and the presence of islands of both countries, (near-shore Panamian islands and Coco 
Island of Costa Rica). (See Figure 23) 
Another agreement in Central America was concerned with two Caribbean Sea 
States, namely, the Venezuela/Dominican Republic (being opposite States) agreement 
of 3 March, 1979. The western third section of the agreed boundary line was 
equidistant from both countries, whereas the other two thirds were a modified 
equidistant line. As for their tripoint with the Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela and 
Dominican RLagreed to connect their agreed boundary with the termini agreed by the 
USA and the Netherlands 49 Apart from the presence of some near-shore islands on 
both coasts, there does not seem to have been any other geographical circumstances in 
the area. It may be necessary to say that, although both Venezuela and Dominican RL 
were Parties to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and due to the fact that 
their said agreement was concerned with the maritime boundary, and not only with the 
continental shelf, these facts rendered the said agreement to be subject to the customary 
rules. instead of the 1958 Convention. Besides, the two countries emphasized, in their 
agreement, that they desired to delimit their maritime boundary "... justly, accurately, 
and on the basis of equitable principles ... 
". 50 (For a general view on the Caribbean 
and Gulf of Mexico continental shelf and maritime boundaries, see Figure 24). 
Another agreement was concluded in the Caribbean Sea by Cuba and Haiti on 27 
October, 1977, concerning their maritime boundary. The agreed boundary was a 
median line, from the low water mark of the coasts of both countries, modified slightly 
at some of its points. 51 It seems that the geographical configuration of the two coasts 
was the underlying circumstance for the deviation of the boundary from the 
equidistance course. It may be necessary to say that the two countries provided that 
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they desired to conclude the boundary "... on the basis of the principle of equidistance 
or equity, as the case requires. "52 Haiti was a party to the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, Cuba was not. 
Concerning their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico, Cuba and the USA 
signed a modus vivendi agreement on the basis of equitable principles, on 16 
December, 1977. The agreed boundary was a modified equidistant line, though it 
appeared, prima facie, as if it was a pure median line. Having disagreed with the 
Cuban already defined baselines, USA established 49 "artificial construction lines"53 
around the south coast of Florida instead of rejecting the Cuban baselines which were 
not agreeable to the USA. Subsequently, a median line between the artificial 
construction lines and the Cuban baselines was established as the agreed first section of 
the boundary line between the two countries. Considering those artificial construction 
lines, the agreed first section of the boundary line cannot be counted as true median 
line. The third section of the boundary was a median line measured from the low water 
mark of the two opposite coasts. And finally, the second section was drawn according 
to selected points between the first and the third sections. 
Apart from the said USA artificial lines, and the low water mark measurement of 
the third section, no other circumstances could be deduced. As for the geographical 
configuration of the Florida coast it constitutes a pointed outgrowth from the American 
coast facing the Cuban slightly concave coast. That is to say, a true median line would 
have been at the disadvantage of the USA. It may be necessary to say that, the USA 
was a party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Cuba was not. 
Mexico and Cuba concluded an agreement on 26 July, 1976, concerning their 
EEZ and continental shelf boundary in the Gulf of Mexico. Although the two States 
agreed that the dividing line would be drawn on the basis of the equidistance principle, 
the actual boundary, according to the available maps, did not seem to be a true 
equidistant line. 
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Figure 24, taken from, Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Boundaries of the World, 
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Cuba is an archipelag f State consisting of the main island of Cuba and some other 
smaller islands around it. As far as this agreement was concerned, the main island of 
Cuba and Isla De Pines were relevant. The Mexican relevant coast was that of Yutacan 
and its surrounding islands especially Cozumel Island. Being that the case, the two 
countries formed an opposite as well as adjacent, geographical position. Regarding the 
Yutacan Channel, they were opposite each other with two pointed coasts. Conversely, 
in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, they were more likely to be adjacent than 
being opposite. Thus, the geographical configuration of the two coasts together was 
flat in the Gulf of Mexico, and concave in the Caribbean. 
GULF OF MEXICO 
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Figure 25, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 170. 
Considering the above*-Ad facts the agreed boundary was equidistant only in 
Yutacan Channel (points 5-8), where the two States were of opposite coasts. In the 
Gulf of Mexico, the situation was different. Since the geographical configuration of the 
two coasts was flat in the Gulf of Mexico, so the agreed boundary was more akin to a 
perpendicular line to the general direction of the two coasts than to an equidistant line 
(points 1-5). The boundary in the Caribbean Sea was a modified equidistant line 
(points 9-13). If a true equidistant line was drawn, full and equal weight should have 
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been given to the islands concerned from both sides, viz., Isla De Pines (Cuba), and 
Cozumel (Mexico). It follows that, a true equidistant line would have been located 
eastwards the actual agreed boundary line, and hence it would have given additional 
maritime areas to Mexico. Isla De Pines, therefore, can be said to have been given 
more than full weight pushing the boundary line towards Mexico in favour of Cuba. 
This interpretation can also be said, even if the concerned parties have measured their 
assumed equidistant line from the main island of Cuba and not from Isla De Pines; for it 
has the same result. (See Figure 25) 
One of the agreements of the Indian Ocean, was the Kenya/Tanzania agreement, 
which was concluded on the basis of equitable principles on 9 July, 1976. The resultant 
boundary line was a complicated one due to the fact that it was drawn in accordance 
with three methods. The first section was drawn on the basis of the equidistance 
principle . 
However, giving full effect to the Mawmba Wamba beacon -a rock 
belonging to Tanzania -, the boundary line declined towards the Kenyan territory giving 
more maritime areas to Tanzania. 54 The third section of the boundary line was also 
drawn on the basis of the equidistance principle giving full effect to Mpunguti ya juu 
lighthouse (Kenya), and Ras Kigomasha on Pemba island (Tanzania). 
The drawing of the second section of the boundary line depended on the first and 
third sections. For obscure reasons, a point was determined on the mid of the line 
between Mpunguti ya juu lighthouse and the starting point of the third section on the 
boundary line. From this point, which was called X, an arc of circle was drawn 
between the terminus point of the first section and the starting point of third section of 
the boundary line. This arc of circle constituted the second section of the boundary line 
which was obviously a negotiated boundary line. It could be assumed that the said arc 
of circle gave additional maritime areas to Kenya in return for the additional areas that 
was given to Tanzania by giving more than full effect to the Mawmba Wamba island. 
As for the fourth section of the boundary line, it was drawn in accordance with 
the parallel of latitude method. It is very likely that the choice of the parallel of latitude 
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method was inspired by both the geographical configuration and the general direction of 
the coast. 
...,,.. -- ýýr ----- 
Figure 26, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 92,23 June, 1981. 
Geographically speaking, the concerned area is very complicated. Tanzania and 
Kenya are adjacent States with respect to the first and second sections, opposite States 
with respect to the third section and again adjacent States with regard to the fourth 
section. The presence of islands of various sizes, that belong to both sides, facilitates 
this complexity. Accordingly, from a microgeographical viewpoint, this geographical 
complexity can be said to have been the underlying reason of the choice of methods in 
drawing the first three sections of the boundary line. The fourth section, however, can 
be said to have been affected by the general direction of the African coast, (of course as 
well as by the geographical configuration), in the area concerned. The geographical 
configuration of the Kenyan coast was slightly concave, i. e., in the normal 
circumstances the boundary line would be pushed downwards south of the parallel of 
latitude line. Nevertheless, the fact that the macrogeographical general direction of the 
concerned two coasts constitutes a line, though slightly concave, nearly vertical to the 
latitude line declining slightly towards the northeast, as well as the presence of Pemba 
island (Tanzania), caused the boundary line to be pushed upwards again forming a 
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parallel of latitude line. (See Figure 26) Kenya was a party to the 1958 Convention, 
but Tanzania was not. 
ii- Agreements Did Not Utilize the Equidistance Principle 
Twenty-two agreements out of the above-said 63 agreements are said to have 
negotiated their boundaries by means of equitable principles which resulted in either a 
negotiated boundary line, a perpendicular line to the general direction of the coast, or a 
parallel-to-latitude boundary line. 
Because the agreements relating to the North Sea have been discussed thoroughly 
in legal literature, so a brief summary will be sufficient here. Three of the North Sea 
agreements were concluded by the F. R. Germany and each of the following States: 
Denmark on 28 January, 1971; the Netherlands on 28 January, 1971; and UK on 25 
November, 1971. These three agreements were affected by the geographical 
configuration of the North Sea coast and the location of the States concerned on that 
coast. All three agreements were concluded after the decision of the ICJ in the 1969 
Cases to which three of the said States were parties, viz, F. R. Germany, Denmark and 
Netherlands. As the negotiations between F. R. Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands resulted in a negotiated boundary line different from the equidistant, the 
UK, which would not have had a maritime boundary with Germany if the equidistance 
method was followed, had to conclude an agreement on the basis of equitable 
principles as well. 
The F. R. Germany was a party to another agreement concerning its maritime 
boundary with the German D. R. on 29 June, 1974, in the Lubeck Bay. The resultant 
boundary line did not follow the equidistance course. In fact, the boundary line mostly 
fell within the territorial waters of the German D. R. No relevant circumstances to 
justify such a deviation were mentioned in this agreement. However, the indication to 
the presence of some navigable channels might have influenced the concerned 
negotiations. For, "[m]ost of the boundary (A-B-C-D) coincides with the southeast 
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edge of the shipping rout 3 ... ". 
55 
Another factor might be said to have played a role in choosing the method of 
drawing the said boundary line. This factor is again the geographical configuration of 
the Lubeck Sea, which is markedly concave, and the occurrence of most of the 
concavity in the coast of the F. R. Germany. Conversely, the German D. R. 's coast is 
slightly convex against the concavity of the F. R. Germany's coast. (See Figure 27) 
Figure 27, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 74,5 Oct., 1976. 
Four agreements of the said 22 agreements were concerned with the Caribbean 
Sea. The first was held between Colombia and Costa Rica on 17 March, 1977. 
Having concluded a negotiated boundary line, the agreement contained no indication to 
any of the circumstances that were considered during the course of negotiations. The 
only possible geographical circumstances, that were likely to have affected the 
delimitation of the respective shelf, were those of the geographical configuration of the 
Caribbean coast from a macrogeographical viewpoint. The presence of Panama 
between the two States, and the concavity of the coast in the west (Costa Rica coast), 
facing the convexity of the coast in the east (the Colombian coast), might have 
constituted effective circumstances. Both States were not a party to the 1958 
Convention. (See Figure 24) 
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Another two agreements were concluded by Venezuela and two of its neighbours: 
USA on 28 March, 1978, and the Netherlands, on 31 March, 1978. The agreed two 
boundaries of the two agreements were negotiated boundary lines. Several factors 
played a role in these delimitations. The first is the geographical complexity of the area 
concerned. Beside the geographical configuration of the Caribbean Sea (being a semi- 
enclosed Sea), the presence of islands constitutes a real problem therein. The Aves 
Island (which belong to Venezuela), for instance, is so close to Puerto Rico (USA). 
Yet, the title over the Aves Island itself was disputable until it was recently solved in 
favour of Venezuela. The other example of islands was the Netherlands Antilles of 
Aruba, Curacao, and Bonaire. These islands were very close to the Venezuelan coast. 
The position of Puerto Rico and the Netherlands Antilles as opposite to Venezuela, 
caused the former to block the latter from having an open window to the Caribbean 
Sea. (See Figure 24) 
Political factors also played a role therein. The Netherlands Antilles were quite 
far from the Netherlands land itself, i. e. in order to protect those Antilles, Netherlands 
had to keep good relations with its neighbours in the Caribbean. That was perhaps 
why the Netherlands had to "... concede 5200 square nautical miles of sea and seabed 
in the west and 7000 square nautical miles in the east which would have fallen to the 
Netherlands if the median lines had been drawn. "56 As for the USA, it wanted to have 
an access to "... a democratic regime in Latin America. "57 
The fourth agreement was the France/Venezuela agreement of 17 July 1980, 
concerning the maritime boundary between Venezuela and the French islands of 
Guadeloupe and Martinique. Having followed the meridian line, the agreed boundary 
was a negotiated line. Due to the presence of the Venezuelan Aves island quite far from 
the Venezuelan coast, the Aves island was given a partial effect in favour of the said 
two French islands. The other fact relating to the Aves Island was that it was very 
small in comparison with the two french islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. No 
other circumstances seem to have been present therein. (See Figure 24) 
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On the American coasts of the Pacific Ocean, three of the concluded agreements 
followed the parallel of latitude method. The Chile/Peru/Ecuador Declaration of 28 
August, 1952, the Ecuador/Peru Agreement, 4 December, 1954, and the Chile/Peru 
agreement of 4 October, 1954, established a special Maritime Frontier Zone, which 
extended for 10 miles on each side of the agreed parallel of latitude boundary line 
beyond the 12 nautical miles territorial waters. This Zone was necessary to protect 
those innocent and inadvertent violators of the established maritime frontier from being 
penalized in case of such a violation. In fact, the establishment of this zone was sort of 
a solution to the traditional fishing right existing in the mind of those individual 
fishermen who would operate with small enterprises. It may be necessary to say that 
the two agreements in question were concluded in the light of the declaration of 18 
August, 1952, and the supplementary agreement of 8 October, 1954, between Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru. Chile, Peru and Ecuador were adjacent States; and neither of them 
was a party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf: they all signed but never 
ratified it. (See Figures 28, and 29) 
n-s 
MARITIME BOUNDARY: 
CHILE - PERU 
.. a. ý. ý., ý, 
14 
MY- 
PERU ný'.. 
ý 
Lesýrow 
ý 
A4n 
ý. 
Fý 
6 
PACIFIC 
.,. 7- 
ý 
CHILE 
m ,.,.,,. 
.. 4-. 
]111.19STfTEAG 
Figure 28, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 86,2 July, 1979. 
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Figure 29, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 88,2 Oct., 1979. 
The geographical factors that were likely to have affected the drawing of the 
boundary lines of the said two agreements were those which were concerned with the 
geographical configuration and the general direction of the coasts concerned. These 
two factors can be seen from both microgeographical, and macrogeographical 
viewpoints. From a microgeographical viewpoint it is noticeable that the intersection of 
the land frontier of Ecuador and Peru with the sea occurs at a point where it divides the 
relevant coast of the two countries into two semi-asymmetrical coasts. From a 
macrogeographical viewpoint, the general direction of the Chile-Peru-Ecuador coast is 
forming almost vertical line to the latitude lines. The parallel of latitude method, 
therefore, is the most appropriate method for those three States. 
The third agreement, which also followed the parallel of latitude method, was 
signed between Colombia and Ecuador on 23 August, 1975. Colombia and Ecuador 
also established a fishing zone of 10 miles on each side of the agreed maritime frontier, 
which was called "buffer zone", similar to that of Chile/Peru and Peru/Ecuador ones. 
The choice of the parallel of latitude method in the Colombia/Ecuador Agreement 
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was inspired by a combination of-two circumstances. The boundary line was affected, 
only partially, by the geographical configuration and the general direction of the coast 
of the two countries. The Colombian coast was slightly convex, whereas the 
Ecuadoran coast was slightly concave. Besides, the general direction of the two coasts 
was semi-vertical to the latitude lines declining slightly towards the north-east direction. 
The presence of some Ecuadoran islands (Islands of Galapagos) played an 
effective role in the choice of the parallel of latitude method. If these islands had not 
been there, the geographical configuration of the coast, from a macrogeographical 
viewpoint, would have justified another boundary line. As far as macrogeography is 
concerned the coast is concave if one considered the coast of Ecuador, Colombia and 
Panama. That is to say, in normal circumstances the boundary between Ecuador and 
Colombia must give effect to the Colombia/Panama maritime boundary which is 
supposed to push down the Ecuador/Colombia boundary line. However, the presence 
of the said Ecuadoran islands managed to push the Ecuador/Colombia boundary line up 
again causing it to be a parallel of latitude boundary line. (See Figure 30) 
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On the American coast of the Atlantic Ocean, Brazil and Uruguay, which were 
Figure 30, taken from, Limits in the Seas, No 69, April 1,1976. 
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adjacent States, concluded an agreement on 21 July, 1972. The agreed boundary line 
was nearly perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, contrary to the two 
governments' declaration of 1969, which recognized the median line "... as the lateral 
limit of their respective maritime jurisdictions, ... ". 
58 According to the available maps, 
the choice of the perpendicular line method was due to the geographical configuration 
of the concerned coasts. For, both coasts of the two countries form a semi-straight 
coast with some negligible indentations. (See Figure 31) 
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Figure 31, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 105. 
Anther agreement on the American coast of the Atlantic Ocean was the 
Brazil/France agreement of 30 January, 1981, concerning the maritime boundary 
between Brazil and French Guiana. This agreement was concluded on the basis of the 
rules and principles of International Law taking into account the work of the UNCLOS 
III. In addition, the agreement, also, took into account the existing Utrecht Treaty of 
11 April, 1713, and the Arbitral decision of the Swiss Federal Council of 1 December, 
1900, and its application by the French-Brazilian Joint Commission on Border 
Delimitation following the negotiations held between 24-28 September, 1979, and 
between 19-23 January, 1981.59 
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Due to the geographical configuration of the concerned American coast, the 
agreed boundary was perpendicular to the general direction of the coast. despite the 
presence of some indentations on the relevant Brazilian coast, and the slight concavity 
of the Amapa (Brazil) - Surinam (French Guiana) outgrowth of the American coast, the 
macrogeographical general direction of the respective American coast formed more or 
less a straight line. That was why a perpendicular line to the general direction of the 
coast constituted an appropriate solution for both parties especially if one took into 
consideration the length of the Brazilian and French Guiana coasts: only the north- 
eastern part of the Brazilian coast measured at least six times as much as the length of 
the French Guiana coast. (See Figure 32) 
ATLANTIC OCEAN 
Figure 32, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 89. 
On the European coast of the Atlantic Ocean, France and Spain signed a 
convention on 29 January, 1974, concerning their maritime boundaries in the Bay of 
Biscay. With regard to the Bay of Biscay, France and Spain can be considered adjacent 
as well as opposite States. Both France and Spain were parties to the 1958 Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. Although the said France/Spain Convention referred to the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, France expressed its full adherence to its 
reservations to Article 6 which excluded the Bay of Biscay from being subject to the 
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provisions of the said Article. 60 
The negotiations between the two Parties resulted in a boundary line consisting of 
two sections. The first section, which was concerned with the territorial waters and the 
contiguous zone, was drawn in accordance with the equidistance principle, whereas the 
second section, which was concerned with the continental shelf, was a negotiated 
boundary line. The geographical configuration of the Bay of Biscay was concave in its 
north-eastern part (the French coast), and straight in its south-western part (the Spanish 
coast). Such a configuration would have made France disadvantaged if the 
equidistance method was used; for, it would have deprived France from the extension 
of its continental shelf to the Atlantic Ocean. This idea must be considered not only 
from a microgeographical but also from a macrogeographical viewpoint, taking into 
account the Spanish coast, which is a convex coast, and the yet-to-be concluded Anglo- 
French continental shelf boundary; (the Anglo-French continental shelf boundary was 
later concluded after the 1977-78 Arbitration). The geographical configuration of the 
coast, then, was the decisive factor justifying the agreed boundary line in the second 
section which declined towards the Spanish coast leaving the door open to France 
towards the Atlantic Ocean. 
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Figure 33, taken from, Churchill, R., Nordquist, M., & Lay, H., New Directions in the Law of the 
Sea, Vol. V, Oceans Pub., INC, 1977, P. 260. 
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Another important factor had underlain the choice of the agreed boundary line. 
The presence of some natural resources deposits near (relatively speaking) the spanish 
coast was the other reason why the boundary line declined towards Spain. For, France 
desired access to these natural resources. Having made the boundary line pass through 
the deposits area, the two countries agreed to consider this area as a Common Zone for 
the purpose of joint and equal development. (See Figure 33) 
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Figure 34, taken from, Maritime Boundary Agreements (1970-1984), Office for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, the UN, New York, 1987, P. 102. 
On the African coast of the Atlantic, Gambia and Senegal signed an agreement on 
4 June, 1975. Because Gambia was situated within the Senegal's territories, (Senegal 
surrounds Gambia from the north, east and south), the two countries had to negotiate 
two boundaries: the northern and southern boundaries. Having negotiated these two 
boundaries the two countries concluded a parallel of latitude line in the north, and a 
parallel of latitude line, with some deviations, in the south. With regard to the choice of 
the parallel of latitude method, it is very likely to have been affected by the general 
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direction of the geographical configuration of the coast. From a macrogeographical 
viewpoint, despite some negligible curves, the eastern coast of Africa forms a semi- 
straight configuration which is perpendicular to the latitude lines. However, as for the 
deviations from the parallel of latitude method in the southern boundary line it is very 
likely to have been influenced by the presence of some indentations as they are 
considered from a microgeographical viewpoint. (See Figure 34) 
In the Norwegian Sea the agreement between Iceland and Norway of 22 October, 
1981, was based on the Parties' conciliation of June, 1981.61 The Conciliation 
Commission recommended that the boundary line should coincide with the Icelandic 
outer limit of the EEZ. For, the agreement between Iceland and Norway on "... 
Iceland's 200-mile economic zone has already given Iceland a considerable area beyond 
the median line ... 
"62 Accordingly the Parties agreed to have their boundary line 
coincided with the 200 nautical miles limit of the Icelandic EEZ. That is to say, the 
boundary line was closer to Jan Mayen (Norway) than to Iceland. In addition, as 
recommended by the Conciliation Commission's Report, the two countries have agreed 
to establish a Common Zone for joint development. This Zone was situated on the said 
agreed boundary line which divided it, (the zone), into a proportion of 25% to Iceland, 
and 75% to Jan Mayen (Norway). The joint development of the said Zone was 
regulated by Articles 2-9 of the agreement according to which each party was given a 
share of 25% in the other party's portion of the Zone. 
According to the Conciliation Report, it could be understood that the choice of the 
boundary line was based on two factors. The first is the existing agreements of the two 
countries which identified the outer limit of the Icelandic EEZ. The second is the 
economic circumstances of Iceland. This latter factor was considered in the light of the 
potential presence of the natural resources in the area, and the fact that "... Iceland is 
totally dependent on imports of hydrocarbon products. " Subsequently, as the 
continental shelf, which surrounded Iceland, "... is considered by scientists to have 
very low hydrocarbon potential. ", and since the Jan Mayen Ridge is "... the only area 
which is considered to have the possibility of finding hydrocarbons. ", which Iceland 
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can have access to; so the Conciliation Commission recommended that the boundary 
should coincide with the outer limit of the Icelandic EEZ and around the Jan Mayen 
Ridge a Common Zone should be established 63 (See Figure 35) 
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Figure 35, taken from, 20 ILM, (1981), P. 828. 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement regulating their seabed and 
subsoil in the Red Sea on 16 May, 1974. The agreement established three zones. Each 
of the two zones, which extended up to 1000 meter isobath from each party's coast, 
was allocated, exclusively, to the party concerned. The third zone, which consisted of 
the area between the said two zones, was designated as a Common Zone for the 
purpose of joint exploration and exploitation on the basis of equal shares. 
The choice of this method of delimitation was due to the geological structure of 
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the seabed in the Red Sea, and the location of both parties on its two banks: being 
opposite States. Such a choice is almost akin to the'Mi'1 Thalewg Channel Method 
which has been used in the delimitation of some international rivers. The seabed of the 
Red Sea consists of three basic zones. The first is the shallow waters up to 1000 
meters isobath; the second is up to 2000 meters isobath; and the third is the deep seabed 
of more than 2000 meters isobath. The second and third zones constitute a narrow 
channel which is sandwiched between the shallow waters in a semi-equal portion from 
the two sides. 
Considering the said geological structure of the Red Sea seabed, beside the fact 
that the narrow channel of the second and third zones are quite rich in hot brine pools 
and mineral fields, 6 it becomes clear that the said concluded method was motivated by 
the desire of both countries to have an access to the the said resources. It may be 
necessary to say that, Saudi Arabia and Sudan were not parties to the 1958 Convention 
on the Continental Shelf. 
A set of agreements in South East Asia, which were concluded by Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand between 17-21 December, 1971, were, in fact, concerned with 
three boundaries and a trijunction. Regarding their Common Tripoint, the said States 
concluded the first agreement. The agreed Tripoint, which was allocated on the basis 
of equitable principles, resulted in a point 52 nautical miles from Cape Jumbu Ayre 
(Indonesia), 98.9 nautical miles from Lang Kaui (Malaysia), and 76.1 nautical miles 
from Buntang (Thailand). This agreement did not mention why this point was chosen 
in that location. However, the geographical configuration of the respective coasts, and 
the presence of some near-shore islands may have affected such a choice. 
As it is seen on the available maps, the most disadvantaged State, with respect to 
the Strait of Malacca, is Malaysia. Thailand and Indonesia have a good access to the 
Andaman Sea. The Tripoint was, therefore, chosen to be far from the Malaysian shore. 
As for Thailand, the presence of Kophuket Island and some other small islands made 
the general direction of its coast concave in a way that was able to give Thailand an 
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additional circumstance to push the location of the said Tripoint towards the Indonesian 
coast. That was the reason why, the agreed Tripoint was nearer to the Indonesian coast 
than to any of the other two countries. 
The second agreement was concluded by Indonesia and Malaysia, (being opposite 
States). This agreement extended the agreed continental shelf boundary of the 1969 
agreement and connected it with the above-said agreed Indonesia/Malaysia/Thailand 
Tripoint. Since the Tripoint was a negotiated point, so the agreed boundary between 
Indonesia and Malaysia would also be considered a negotiated boundary line. Hence, 
the justification regarding the choice of the Tripoint, mentioned-above, could be stated 
here again. 
The third agreement was between Indonesia and Thailand on 21 December, 1971, 
which drew the section of the disputed boundary line between the 
Indonesia/Malaysia/Thailand Tripoint and the terminus point of the Indonesia/Thailand 
agreed boundary of 17 December, 1971.65 This section of the maritime boundary 
between the two States was a negotiated boundary based on the same reasons that were 
justified with respect to the said Tripoint of the three countries. 
The fourth agreement was signed between Malaysia and Thailand as adjacent 
States. Having negotiated the respective maritime boundary, Malaysia and Thailand 
concluded a boundary line closer to Thailand than Malaysia. It was assumed that the 
choice of the turning points of this boundary line was inspired by the fact that all the 
concerned Thai islands were smaller than the Malaysian islands present in the area 
66 
That is to say, the size of the islands was the utilized factor in deciding the proper 
solution. 
Having overcome their difficulties and solved their problems without invoking an 
ad hoc Arbitration, as was decided in 1980, the UK and the Irish Republic concluded 
an agreement on 2 November, 1988. This agreement established two boundary lines: 
the first was concerned with the Irish Sea, St. Georges Channel and Celtic Sea; (see 
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Figure 36) and the second was mainly interested in the continental shelf boundary west 
of Scotland, (see Figure 37). The method of delimitation used in determining both 
boundary lines was a combination of parallel of latitudes and longitudes forming a kind 
of irregular zigzag lines. 
Although Ireland is geographically situated opposite to the UK, the two States 
could be regarded as opposite and simultaneously adjacent States with respect to the 
said two boundary lines: they were opposite in the Irish Sea and St. Georges Channel, 
and adjacent in the Celtic Sea and west of Scotland, (in the Atlantic Ocean). As far as 
the geographical configuration is concerned the coast of Ireland which faces the UK 
constituted a smoothly curved line with numerous minor and negligible indentations 
except in the Dundalk Bay and Wexford promontory. Besides, few small off-shore 
islands were present close to the said Irish coast. Conversely, the UK's west coast 
was indented deeply in several places in the middle and south, and full of fjords and 
fringe of islands in the north. This geographical complexity of the UK coast revealed 
great difficulties so that a true median line would be almost impossible to be drawn. 
Alternatively, the Parties found that the zigzag of parallel of latitude and longitude could 
serve the same purpose especially if it followed a course similar to that of the median 
line. 
Thus, the actual courses of the agreed boundary lines in the Irish Sea and St. 
Georges Channel of the southern boundary, and in the very beginning of the northern 
boundary, where the Scottish and Irish coast were opposite each other, were very likely 
to be equidistant from selected points on the coasts of the two countries. That is to 
say, the said boundary lines were negotiated median lines although they were drawn in 
accordance with the method of zigzag of parallel of latitudes and longitudes. 
The remaining sections of the two boundary lines, where the coasts of the two 
countries were more likely to be adjacent than opposite States (in the Celtic Sea and 
west of Scotland), were very likely to have followed a course of negotiated lines. As 
for the general course of the remaining part of the southern boundary it seemed that it 
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was close to a perpendicular to the closing line of the upper part of the Celtic Sea which 
would be drawn between the Scilly isles and the most south-western point of the Irish 
coast. Similarly, the remaining part of the northern boundary line seemed. to have been 
influenced by the general direction of the two countries' coasts. The general direction 
of the two countries coasts, which faced the Atlantic Ocean, constituted a right angle 
especially if one disregarded the Connacht outgrowth of the Irish Island. This right 
angle formed a line of north-south direction which declined slightly towards the north- 
east and the south-west. If the general direction of the said coast was vertical to the 
latitude, then a single parallel of latitude boundary line would have been the most 
proper solution. However, as the general direction of the coast declined slightly in a 
north-east/south-west direction, the situation necessitated a redress in favour of Ireland. 
That was why the two Parties agreed on a set of parallel of latitude lines joined together 
with a set of parallel of longitude lines forming a zigzag boundary line the general 
course of which deviated towards the north-west direction in favour of Ireland. 
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Figure 36, taken from, Press Release 
In summary, the agreed two boundaries were negotiated lines drawn in 
accordance with two combined methods: negotiated equidistance method, and a zigzag 
of parallel of latitudes and meridian method. The choice of the said method was mainly 
influenced by the geographical configuration of the coasts of the two countries 
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especially the United Kingdom's. As for the question of islands, it does not seem to 
have played any role in such a choice; for instance, the Scilly isles were given very little 
weight in the calculations of the used method. 
Nothing in this agreement was mentioned as to the status or weight of the Rockall 
Islet the sovereignty over which was claimed by the UK and disputed by Ireland, 
Denmark and Iceland. 67 However, in the debate that was proceeded in front of the 
House of Commons, both the UK Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister emphasized 
that the agreement with Ireland on the delimitation of the continental Shelf would not 
affect the status of the Rockall Islet as it belonged to the UK. 68 
Figure 37, taken from, Press Release 
It may be necessary to state that, the UK has ratified the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, whereas Ireland, though it signed it, has not ratified it yet. The 
agreement, therefore, can be assumed to have been negotiated on the basis of equitable 
principles. 
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Relevant Circumstances 
The Judicial, Arbitral and Other Cases 
Judicial cases relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf, or to the 
maritime boundary, are of great significance with respect to the identification of the 
relevant circumstances. This Chapter has concerned itself with the examination of the 
available cases in a bid to discover what sort of circumstances they regard as falling 
within the scope of the relevant circumstances clause 69 
Being the first, and the foremost, case relating to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, the North Sea Cases, (1969), established the term "relevant 
circumstances", (which replaced the conventional term "special circumstances". Due to 
the lack of sufficient State practice, and because the continental shelf delimitation 
question was still, relatively speaking, a new issue in International Law, the ICJ 
desired not to restrict itself with a precise definition of the relevant circumstances 
clause. That is why it says that, 
"..., there is no legal limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the 
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures. "70 
However, the ICJ did not leave the matter without clarification at all. It, in fact, 
provided some examples of such circumstances; and yet it discussed some of these 
examples. In its concluding decision, the International Court stated that, 
"(D) in the course of negotiations, the factors to be taken into account are to include: 
(1) the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the presence of any 
special or unusual features; 
(2) so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological structure, and 
natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved; 
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(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out 
in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the 
continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast 
measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of 
the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between 
adjacent States in the same region. "71 
Beside these three categories of factors, another factor is of fundamental 
importance. When applying the agreement-equitable principles customary solution, the 
concerned parties must take 
"... account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as 
possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of the other, ... 
". 72 
According to the International Court, therefore, five geographical factors fall 
within the scope of the relevant circumstances term. These five factors are: the 
geographical configuration of the coast, the presence of any special or unusual features, 
the unity of any oil or mineral deposit, the element of a reasonable degree of 
proportionality, and the non encroachment on the natural prolongation of the other 
States. 73 
Of these five circumstances the actual applicable circumstances to the North Sea 
Cases were those which related to the geographical configuration of the North Sea 
coast, the reasonable degree of proportionality and the presence of mineral deposits. 
As for the geographical configuration, the North Sea concave coast made F. R. Germany 
disadvantaged, especially if the equidistance method was used; for, it would have 
produced an inequitable result 74 The question of proportionality would be applicable 
as well, due to the fact that the three concerned countries had coastlines which were 
comparable in length. 75 Finally, the North Sea is quite rich in mineral deposits, 
especially petroleum, the reason that the Court suggested the unity of deposit as a 
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circumstance to be taken into account during the Parties renegotiations. 
Because of the partial applicability of the Customary solution to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf in the Anglo-French Arbitration, (1977-78), some relevant 
circumstances could be deduced therefrom. These relevant circumstances were mainly 
geographical circumstances. 
Regarding the Channel Islands area the applicable law was the Customary 
solution. 76 The Channel Islands were considered a relevant circumstance which would 
justify some deviation from the median line. 77 Two factors underlain the consideration 
of these Islands a relevant circumstance. The first was that these British Islands were 
situated closer to the French coast than the British that if a true median line was 
employed giving full effect to these Islands, this would have created inequities. 78 The 
other factor was that the Channel Islands were considered separate islands of the United 
Kingdom. 79 In fact, the Channel Islands were not only "on the wrong side" of the 
mid-Channel median line but also "wholly detached geographically from the United 
Kingdom". 80 It was, therefore, according to these factors that the Tribunal decided to 
use two methods of delimitation. The main boundary line was the median line which 
ignored the presence of the Channel Islands; and a band of 12-mile continental shelf 
around the northern and western coasts of the Channel Islands was drawn leaving the 
continental shelf areas between this band and the median line to belong to France. 81 
The choice of the 12-mile limit around the Channel Islands was due to the existing 
12-mile Fishery Zone of the Channel Islands, which was "... expressly recognized by 
the French Republic ..., '; 
82 and also due to "... the potentiality of an extension of their 
territorial sea from three to 12 miles. "83 Besides, the invocation of the security, defence 
and navigational defence considerations by the UK was approved by the Court which 
accepted these equitable considerations "... as carrying a certain weight; ". 84 Due to, 
inter alia, these considerations the Court rejected the French proposition of giving the 
Channel Islands a 6-mile enclave continental shelf around them. 85 
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Security, defence and navigational defence considerations were also invoked by 
France "... in favour of a continuous link between the eastern and western parts of its 
continental shelf in the Channel; ... 
". 86 Having examined this contention, the Court 
concluded that the said considerations "... tend to evidence the predominant interest of 
the French Republic in the southern areas of the English Channel, ... ". 
87 
Another example of relevant circumstances, relating to this Case, can be found 
in the Atlantic sector of the boundary line. Although the applicable rules in the Atlantic 
sector were those of the Conventional solution, (Article 6 of the 1958 Convention), the 
Tribunal commented that, 
"... the course of the boundary in that region will be the same whether the delimitation is 
made on the basis of Article 6 or of the rules of customary law. "88 
The presence of the Ushant Island and Scilly Isles, therefore, can be said to have been 
considered a special circumstance and a relevant circumstance as well. Whereas the 
Ushant Island was given full effect, the Scilly Isles were given only half effect, due to 
the fact that, 
"[t]he distance that the Scilly Isles extend the coastline of the mainland of the United 
Kingdom westwards onto the Atlantic continental shelf is slightly more than twice the 
distance that Ushant extends westwards the coastline of the French mainland. "89 
The distance criterion, then, was the factor which was behind the Tribunal's decision of 
giving half effect to the Scilly Isles despite the Tribunal observation that, it 
"... without attributing any special force as a criterion to this ratio of the difference in the 
distances of the Scillies and Ushant from their respective mainlands, finds in it an 
indication of the suitability of the half effect method as a means of arriving at an 
equitable delimitation in the present case. "90 [Emphasis added] 
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Having found that the natural prolongation concept could not be "... a suitable 
basis for the solution... " in the Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) Conciliation in 1981, the 
Conciliation Commission recommended two basic circumstances: the existing 
agreement of 1980 between Iceland and Norway, and the economic circumstances of 
Iceland. 
The Iceland/Norway agreement of 28 May, 1980, recognized the 200 miles 
Icelandic EEZ which was claimed by Iceland in June 1,1979.91 In so doing, Iceland 
was given considerable areas of continental shelf beyond the median line, bearing in 
mind that the shortest distance between Jan Mayen and Iceland was about 290 nautical 
miles 92 This finding was combined with the relevant economic circumstances which 
were based on four considerations. These considerations were, a- the total dependence 
of Iceland on imports of hydrocarbon products; b- the very low hydrocarbon potential 
of the continental shelf surrounding Iceland; c- the sole possibility of finding 
hydrocarbons is considered to be available in the Jan Mayen Ridge situated between Jan 
Mayen and the Icelandic 200 miles EEZ; and d- the fact that, due to the water depths, 
the exploitation of hydrocarbons was not commercial unless found in great quantities 93 
Weighing up the above-said considerations, the Commission found no reason to 
recommend a boundary line different from that which coincided with the outer limit of 
the Icelandic EEZ. Besides, concerning the Jan Mayen Ridge area, it recommended the 
Parties to establish a Common Zone for the purpose of joint development 94 Briefly, 
the Common Zone constituted a rectangle enclosing the Jan Mayen Ridge, and situated 
on the said outer limit of the Icelandic EEZ at a proportion of about 75% beyond the 
Icelandic EEZ, and 25% within the said Zone. Subsequently, each Party was given the 
right of 25% of the joint-venture arrangement in that part of the rectangle which was on 
the other Party's continental shelf, and 75% in that part of the rectangle which is located 
on the Party's own continental shelf. 
95 Needless to say, the Parties have implemented 
these recommendations in their agreement of 198196 
Several relevant circumstances were said to have played a role in identifying the 
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method of delimitation of the continental shelf between the concerned States in the 
Tunisia/Libya Case of 1982. Some of these circumstances were of a geographical 
nature, and others were of a legal nature. 
Having divided the concerned continental shelf areas into two sectors, the 
International Court based its determination of the boundary line of the first sector on 
three factors. These three factors were, the conduct of the two parties, 97 the method of 
perpendicular line to the general direction of the coast, 98 and the land frontier between 
the Parties. 99 The presence of a line from Ras Ajdir at an angle of some 26° east of 
north was considered by the Court as a de facto line due to the fact that the said line 
divided 
"... concession areas which were the subject of active claims, in the sense that 
exploration activities were authorised by one party, without interference, or (until 1976) 
protest, by the other. " 100 
The 26° line was, in fact a perpendicular to the general configuration of the concerned 
coast ignoring the outgrowth of the coast near Jerba Island and the presence of the said 
Island itself. 101 That is to say, Jerba Island and the relating outgrowth were not given 
any weight at all during the course of identifying the proper method of delimitation. 102 
The second sector of the line was influenced by the geographical configuration of 
the coast, as well as by the presence of Kerkennah Islandr, The so called radical change 
in the direction of the Tunisian coast northwards the Gulf of Gabes forming Ras 
Kaboudia was -taken into the Court's account; and subsequently affected the course of 
the perpendicular line to deviate towards the east. This deviation started from a point 
occurring at the latitude line which passed through the most westerly point of the Gulf 
of Gabes-103 The fact that the said change of the Tunisian coast rendered Tunisia and 
Libya more likely to be opposite, rather than adjacent, States convinced the Court that 
the equidistance principle became 
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"... a factor to be given more weight in the balancing of equitable considerations than 
would otherwise be the case. " 104 
This conclusion was also underlain by the presence of the Kerkennah Island. 105 
However, bearing in mind the presence of some islets and low-tide elevations around 
them, the Kerkennah Islands could not be given full effect because such an effect 
would have amounted "... to giving excessive weight to the Kerkennahs". 106 
Accordingly, the said island was given half effect in the calculation of the equidistant 
line in the second sector. 107 
Regarding the Gulf of Maine Case of 1984 between Canada and USA, the 
conventional solution was not applicable thereto, though both Parties had ratified the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 108 The reason for this was that Canada and 
USA asked the Court to determine a single boundary line for both the continental shelf 
and the EEZ areas. As there was no codified rules applicable to a single maritime 
boundary the applicable rules and principles were those which were deduced from 
General International Law, (agreement, equitable principles, relevant circumstances, 
and a proper method of delimitation), 109 as well as Special International Law, 
(principles such as the land dominates the sea, and the non encroachment 
principles). 110 
The major relevant circumstance that affected the drawing of the boundary line in 
the Gulf of Maine was the geographical configuration of the respective coasts. It was 
due to this geographical configuration that the Chamber divided the Gulf into two 
sectors. In the first sector the two States were considered adjacent States, whereas in 
the second, they were considered opposite each other. 111 In the first sector an equal 
division of the areas concerned was appreciated by the Chamber. 112 However, the 
equidistance method was not the method used. 113 Alternatively, the dividing line, 
(from A to B) was based on a simple geometrical method which bisected the areas of 
the first sector into two equal sections. 114 
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The dividing line in the second sector was influenced by several relevant 
circumstances, namely, the coastal configuration, the general direction of the coasts, the 
presence of islands, and the element of proportionality. 115 These various factors 
played an important role in achieving a modified equidistant line giving only half effect 
to the Seal Island and the surrounding small islets. 116 
Beyond the second sector, which fell outside the Gulf of Maine areas onto the 
Atlantic Ocean, the concluded boundary line was a perpendicular to the closing line of 
the Gulf. 117 This choice of method was due to the fact that the said closing line 
"... would form a right angle, corresponds eventually to the direction of the coastline at 
the back of the Gulf,... " 118 
The most effective relevant circumstances in the Libya/Malta Case of 1985 were 
those which related to the geographical position of the two States concerned, and to the 
proportionality element. The delimitation process started with establishing a 
provisional median line by the help of which the final boundary line could be better 
assessed 119 Because of the distorting effect of the Maltese Filfla Islet, the provisional 
median line did not take it into account; for, the inclusion of such an island in the 
calculation of the median line would have dissatisfied the test of equitableness. 120 
However, the geographical position of the Island of Malta, from a 
macrogeographical viewpoint, "... as a relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea 
... 
", in addition to "... the great disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts of the two 
Parties. ", convinced the ICJ that "... some northward shift of the boundary line [ (the 
provisional median line) was] needed to produce an equitable result. "121 
The interesting thing about the above-mentioned geographical circumstance was 
that it was inspireded by a hypothetical situation. Because of the disadvantaged 
position of Malta (being a small island in a semi-enclosed sea), the ICJ established an 
assumption the implication of which was that the Maltese Islands were assumed to be 
part of the Italian territory and the question of delimitation was between Libya and Italy. 
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In such a situation, the Maltese Islands would have been in the' position of a 
geographical circumstance for which at least some account would have been taken; 
11 
...; and even 
if the minimum account were taken, the continental shelf boundary 
between Italy and Libya would be somewhat south of the median line between the 
Sicilian and Libyan coasts. " 122 
That was why the Court considered such an imaginary circumstance in favour of Malta; 
and hence it concluded that the shift of the said provisional median line between Malta 
and Libya must fall south of the said imaginary median line between Sicily and 
Libya. 123 
The degree of the said shift of the provisional median line was based on the 
weighing of several various circumstances. These various circumstances were: the 
general geographical configuration of the two countries' coasts and their relation with 
each other within the macrogeographical context, the great disparity between the lengths 
of the coasts of the two States, and the avoidance of bringing into play other 
circumstances such as security; of course as well as the said upper limit of the shift of 
the imaginary median line between Sicily and Libya. Eventually, a shift of about three- 
quarters of the distance between the provisional and the imaginary median lines was 
approved by the Court. That is to say, the final boundary was that line which emanated 
from the transposition of the provisional median line northwards up to the distance of 
three-quarters of the distance between the provisional and imaginary lines. 124 
Finally, a test of the absence of any disproportionality between the portions 
allocated to both Parties was carried out by the Court proving that the resultant 
boundary was an equitable solution. 125 
The most recent case was the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Arbitration, which delivered 
its award on 14 February, 1985. Like the Gulf of Maine Case, this Arbitration was 
concerned with the delimitation of a single maritime boundary between the two 
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countries. Resting on the west African coast, the two States were adjacent States; and 
according to the Tribunal, (though this question was not that important), the two 
countries may be partially opposite each other. 126 
The circumstances that influenced this case were mainly concerned with an 
existing agreement, which was in force between the two Parties, and with the 
geographical considerations of the respective area. The final boundary line constituted 
three sectors each of which was based on circumstances different from the other. As 
for the first sector, it was drawn by employing the southern limit of the maritime 
boundary agreed on in the Convention of 12 May, 1886, which was held between 
France and Portugal and succeeded by Guinea and Guinea Bissau. Following the said 
southern limit, this sector of the boundary approached the Alcatraz Island at a distance 
of 2.25 miles to its north. Because the Tribunal believed that the Alcatraz Island 
(Guinea) should be given a distance of 12 miles - the territorial sea limit according to 
the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea - to the west, the Tribunal drew the second 
sector between the terminus point of the first section and the said point at a 12 mile- 
distance to the west of the said Island with no account being given to the respective 
reefs. 127 That is to say, the Alcatraz Island was given a partial effect which was at its 
minimum weight near the intersection of the first and second sectors - 2.25 nautical 
miles -, and its maximum weight near the end of the second sector - 12 nautical miles - 
where the third section was due to be drawn. The third sector of the boundary line was 
based on a combination of the geographical configuration and the general direction of 
the two coasts. Due to the presence of numerous islands close to the shore, the coastal 
configuration of Guinea Bissau was convex. On the contrary, the Guinean coast was 
slightly concave. However, as far as macrogeography was concerned, the 
geographical configuration of the two coasts together formed a concave coast line 
which was "accentuated" by "... the presence of Sierra Leone further south. "128 
Finding that the equidistance method was inappropriate, (due to its drawbacks, and cut- 
off effects), 129 the Tribunal favoured the employment of the general direction of the 
coast line in the course of their search for the appropriate method. After studying the 
macrogeographical general direction of the respective coastline, and the possible ways 
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of identifying such a direction, the Tribunal rejected one of the possible ways which 
was concerned with the outer perimeter of the coasts and their islands. 130 Instead, the 
Tribunal preferred that way which would use the maritime facade by "... selecting a 
straight line joining two coastal points on the continent. "131 The Tribunal chose the 
two points - Almadie Point (Senegal), and Cape Chilling (Sierra Leon) -, which were 
thought to be the most suitable for identifying the general direction of the coast and, 
subsequently, decided that the third sector of the boundary line should be a 
perpendicular line to the line joining the said two points. 
From this, it can be deduced that the Guinea Bissau's Bijagos and Poiao islands 
were ignored in the calculations of the delimitation as a remedy to the disadvantaged 
position of Guinea. For, Guinea had a concave coast, i. e., it would be disadvantaged 
if the equidistance method was used in delimiting its maritime boundaries with its two 
neighbours, (Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone). 
Condusion 
Having cited States practice - Unilateral and Multilateral -, and the judicial, arbitral 
and other cases, which applied the customary solution of the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, in order to search for the used relevang circumstances, numerous such 
circumstances could be found therein or deduced therefrom. The most effective 
relevant circumstance, which was used by the majority of cases was the one relating to 
the geographical configuration of the involved coasts. This circumstance manifested 
itself in three various forms. These forms were, the geographical configuration of the 
relevant coasts in both macrogeographical and microgeographical contexts, the general 
direction of the respective coast from microgeographical as well as macrogeographical 
perspectives, and the geographical complexity of the area concerned. 
The question of Islands occupied the second rank of importance in influencing the 
parties during their negotiations. Islands were not dealt with in all cases on the same 
plane. Rather, variegwted weights were given to islands in various situations. These 
varieted weights ranged from giving islands full effect, to partial effect, to complete 
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disregard, and even to giving them minus effects. 
The legal circumstances played a significant role in the delimitation question of the 
continental shelf. The applicable law to the case concerned, the existing agreements, 
treaties or conventions which were in force between the interested parties, and the 
presence of any historical or traditional rights in the area in question were examples of 
such legal circumstances that influenced both the selection of the method of delimitation 
and the identification of the final boundary line of the continental shelf. 
As far as the economic circumstances were concerned, they were very likely to 
have underlain the impulses and motivations of States during the process of selecting 
the method of delimitation and identifying the actual course of the final boundary line. 
The presence or the possibility of the presence, of potential hydrocarbon, or mineral 
deposits, or any natural resources in the relevant areas of the continental shelf, beside 
the likelihood of their commercial exploration, were some of the salient factors that 
contributed to a considerable number of the concluded agreements on the delimitation of 
the continental shelf. 
And finally, although it was quite difficult to prove the role of political 
considerations, they were very likely to have backed the stand of the interested States 
concerning the economic circumstances mentioned-above. Nevertheless, circumstances 
such as those relating to the security and defence considerations of the interested States, 
and the strategic importance of the area in question, could be included in the manifest 
facade of the said political considerations. 
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Introduction 
As the previous Chapter has discussed the up-to-date utilized relevant 
circumstances as they have been used in the context of each case of delimitation, this 
section is going to deal with the said circumstances, as they can be seen from their own 
perspective. That is to say, this Chapter is mainly interested in examining each 
individual circumstance in order to see why and how such a circumstance has been 
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considered relevant to the cases concerned, as well as in identifying the degree of 
credibility of such a circumstance. 
For the purpose of a better illustration, it is suggested that the examination of the 
relevant circumstances will be more appropriate if they are considered into categories 
each of which contain those circumstances which have common elements with each 
other. So far, four categories seem to be the most likely categories that are able to 
comprehend all the relevant circumstances: being, the geophysical, legal, economic and 
political circumstances. 
0&nqü®M a 
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Mainly, five relevant circumstances can be said to have a geophysical character. 
These are, the geographical configuration of the coasts, the presence of islands, natural 
prolongation, proportionality and the presence of mineral deposits. 
I 
Geographical Configuration 
Relevant Circumstance 
The geographical configuration of the coasts has been the prime relevant 
circumstance throughout the history of development of the continental shelf doctrine. 
State practice as well as the juridical cases have proven that the geographical 
configuration considerations have been the most effective circumstances in respect of 
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the delimitation question. Yet a thorough look at the world-wide map proves that the 
geographical configuration circumstance will be the most effective circumstance in the 
delimitations that may arise in the future. 
The origin of the geographical configuration considerations was rooted deeply in 
the early stages of the development of the continental shelf doctrine. ' However, it was 
not until the 1969 Cases that the ICJ articulated these considerations as a relevant 
circumstance. Among the other factors to be considered was 
"1- the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the presence of any 
special or unusual features; "2 
As it was put in the first place, the ICJ's citation of this circumstance gave it special 
emphasis the implication of which could be interpreted as giving it priority with respect 
to the other cited factors. Indeed, this primacy, as will be further seen below, became 
more credible when the subsequent judicial cases developed it into a concrete fact. 
Two foundations had underlain the geographical configuration when it was 
advanced into a relevant circumstance. These two foundations were the genuine link 
between the geophysical fact of the continental shelf and law, and the appurtenence of 
the coastal State to this geophysical fact. The geophysical structure of the shelf was the 
indispensable basis of the legal doctrine of the continental shelf without which such a 
doctrine "... would never have existed, ". 3 So far as the geophysical structure of the 
continental shelf constitutes the natural extension of the land into and under the sea, so 
due account should be given to certain configurational features; for, 
"..., in certain localities, they point-up the whole notion of the appurtenence of the 
continental shelf to the State whose territory it does in fact prolong. "4 
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Based on the notion of appurtenence and the land extension into and under the 
sea, and "..., since the land is the legal source of power which a State may exercise 
over territorial extensions to seaward, ... "5 so the applicable principle is that "... the 
land dominates the sea. "6 Yet the International Court of Justice went far beyond these 
notions when it considered the continental shelf as "... no longer areas of sea, ... but 
stretches of submerged land; for the legal regime of the continental shelf is that of a soil 
and subsoil, two words evocative of the land and not of the sea. "7 For these reasons, 
the delimitation process must first examine the features that are attributed to these 
stretches of submerged land. 
The importance of the geophysical features of the continental shelf was reaffirmed 
in the recent judicial, arbitral and other cases; and, furthermore, it was given a priority 
to the other factors. For instance, the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration, 1977- 
78, says that the method of delimitation "... is a function or reflection of the 
geographical and other relevant circumstances ... ". 
8 In another Paragraph the Tribunal 
says that, "... the appropriateness - the equitable character - of the method is always a 
function of the particular geographical situation. "9 In the Tunisia/ Libya Case, 1982, 
the ICJ comments that "[t]he coast of each of the Parties, ..., constitutes the starting 
line from which one has to set out... . 
"10 By the time the Gulf of Maine Case was at 
... L. _ 
stake, it was high time that the Chamber declared that, "[t]he delimitation line to be 
ý--ý-L 
drawn in a given area will depend upon the coastal configuration. "11 
The geographical configuration as a relevant circumstance can be found in various 
forms. The coastal configuration of the concerned States has been the classical form of 
the geographical configuration circumstance, so to speak. In the North Sea Cases, the 
concavity of the coastal configuration of the three interested States made Germany 
disadvantaged as it was stuck between Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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As time went by, it was realized that, not only the coastal configuration of the 
interested States was relevant but also the coastal configuration of the whole area in 
question whether it related to the States concerned or to their neighbours. The most 
recent examples of the case in point were, the Libya/Malta Case of 1985, and the 
Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case of 1985. In the former case, the geographical 
configuration of the States concerned was considered in the light of the coastal 
configuration of the whole Mediterranean Sea, as a semi-enclosed sea, as well as in the 
light of the coastal configuration of the neighbouring States especially Italy. 12 
Similarly, the coastal configuration of Guinea and Guinea Bissau was examined in the 
light of the coastal configuration of their neighbouring States - Sierra Leone and 
Senegal -, bearing in mind the concerned coastal configuration of the whole of west 
Africa. 13 This latter form of the said circumstance is interested in the 
macrogeographical coastal configuration taking into account any other "actual or 
prospective" neighbouring continental shelf delimitation that may affect the interested 
States. In fact, the geographical configuration from a macrogeographical viewpoint, 
was (as will be shown later) first instigated by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases in 
1969, when it provided the example of proportionality as a relevant circumstance. 14 
However, it was not until the said two cases were agreed, that the notion of 
macrogeography was put in to application. 
The geographical configuration circumstance appears in another form concerning 
the general direction of the coast. The selection of the method of delimitation is very 
likely to be affected by the general direction of the coast. If the general direction of the 
coast constituted a right or semi-right angle, so the method of delimitation would be, 
and very often was, a perpendicular line to that general direction. At least two instances 
can be recalled. The first was the third sector of the boundary line in the Gulf of Maine 
Case, (1984). Due to the general direction of the back of the Gulf, which constituted a 
right angle, the appropriate method of delimitation was a perpendicular line to that 
angle. 15 The other was that of the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case, 1985.16 The third 
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section of the final boundary line was a(perpendicular)line to the general direction of the 
west African coast, which was chosen instead of the general direction of the coasts of 
the concerned States, as it would result in a more equitable solution. Besides, the 
presence of any unusual change in the general direction of the coast might result in a 
change in the used method. Thjs case was found in the Tunisia/Libya Case, (1982), 
when a radical change in the general direction of the Tunisian coast showed the 
inappropriateness of the method used in the first sector to be used in drawing the 
boundary in the second sector. That was why the Court used the equidistance principle 
in the second sector in substitution for the perpendicular to the general direction of the 
coast which was used in the first sector. 17 
Although the general direction of the coast is more likely to be a 
macrogeographical circumstance, it also appears as a microgeographical circumstance. 
For example, whereas the general direction of the coast in the Gulf of Maine and 
Tunisia/Libya cases was examined in a microgeographical context, it was used in a 
macrogeographical context in the Guinea/ Guinea Bissau Case. 
Finally, the geographical configuration can be seen in the form of a geographical 
complexity where a mixture of several geographical factors are present in the same 
place. Such a geographical complexity can be formed by a combination of the coastal 
configuration and the presence of islands, (Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case, second 
sector, )18 or a combination of the coastal configuration and the general direction of the 
coast, (the Gulf of Maine Case, first sector, )19 or a combination of the general direction 
of the coast and the presence of islands, (Tunisia/Libya Case, the second sector), 20 or a 
combination of the coastal configuration, the general direction of the coast, and the 
presence of islands, (the Gulf of Maine Case, second sector, 21 and Guinea/Guinea 
Bissau Case, the third sector) 22 
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Although the geographical configuration 
relevant 
circumstance 
can be said to 
possess a sort of priority to the other relevant circumstances, it is still the function of 
equity to decide the weight which is supposed to be given to such a circumstance 
during the weighing process. To illustrate this fact two instances can be provided. In 
the Tunisia/Libya Case, (1982), the geographical configuration stood side by side with 
the conduct of the parties relevant circumstance in deciding the course of the boundary 
line in the first sector. 23 It was due to both s? id"circumstances that the boundary was a 
perpendicular line. Despite the fact that the said perpendicular line, when originally 
chosen as a modus vivendi, 24 was based on the geographical configuration of the 
relevant coasts, the conduct of the parties circumstance was an essential subsequent 
element according to which the line was granted approval by both parties. The situation 
of the second sector of the boundary line in the Tunisia/Libya Case was different. In 
this sector the geographical configuration was the prime factor that justified deviation 
from the perpendicular method used in the first sector. Nevertheless, due to the 
presence of Kerkennah Islands, which created complexity in the geographical 
configuration circumstance, the requirements of equity made it sufficient to grant the 
said island only half effect. 25 That is to say, the weight given to the geographical 
complexity circumstance was modified only to the extent that the requirements of 
equity were satisfied. 
In the second sector of the Gulf of Maine Case, (1984), the situation was quite 
similar to that of the second sector of the Tunisia/Libya Case discussed-above. The 
coastal configuration, and the general direction of the coast were combined with the 
presence of the Seal Island creating a geographical complexity circumstance which 
required some modification of the boundary line. Accordingly, using the 
proportionality element as a parameter, the weight given to the said circumstance was 
modified by giving the Seal island only half effect. 
26 
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II 
Islands 
Asa 
Relevant Circumstance 
So as to avoid any confusion, it is advisable to differentiate between two main 
problematical issues concerning islands: the first is islands when generating a 
continental shelf of their own; and the second is islands as a relevant circumstance. 
Because the discussion in this thesis is more interested in the latter issue than in the 
former, the relevant discussion hereunder will be exclusively interested in islands as a 
relevant circumstance. In addition, because this issue has been thoroughly dealt with in 
legal literature, the present subsection is going to deal with it as briefly as possible. 
Islands, as a geographical relevant circumstance, play a significant role in the 
delimitation process of the continental shelf. However, despite the orthodoxy that the 
presence of islands is considered a relevant circumstance in most of the cases, the 
biggest controversy is very often attributed to two groups of considerations. One can 
find, first, those considerations which relates to the identification and qualifications of 
islands; and second, those considerations which are concerned with the degree of effect 
that can be given to an island when it is regarded as a relevant circumstance. These 
two groups of considerations will be the ultimate concern of this Subsection. 
To begin with, several questions identify the problem matter of the definition of 
islands. These are, what is the definition of islands? In other words, what features 
must be available in a geographical projection in order to be considered an island? Are 
small islands, islets, rocks, and reefs considered islands? On what criterion/criteria 
must such an evaluation be based? Is it the size, population, political status, or only 
geographical status that is of concern? 
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Because of the great difficulties faced in the search for a confined and 
comprehensive definition of islands, it was not until the UNCLOS III that islands 
found the least controversial definition. It is, therefore, advisable to study the 
definition of islands throughout the history of the development of the continental shelf 
doctrine, so that it enriches the clarification of the issue at stake. 
Working on, inter alia, the definition of islands, the iLCIconcluded that, 
".... An island is an area of land surrounded by water which in normal circumstances is 
permanently above high-water mark"27 
However, in order to restrict the broad meaning of this definition, the 
Commission commented that two categories must be excluded from the said definition. 
These two categories were, 
"(i) Elevations which emerge at low tide only..... 
(ii) Technical installations built on the seabed, .... 
"2ß 
Besides, Article 12 of the same Report suggested that, 
"Drying rocks and shoals which are wholly or partly within the territorial sea may be 
taken as points of departure for delimiting the territorial sea. "29 
As the above-said definition of islands was recommended by the ILC in its final 
report, it went over to the UNCLOS I, held at Geneva in 1958. In the Conference, 
Article 12, referred to above, was deleted, whereas Article 10 was subject to two main 
changes. The first change was the omission of the first sentence which read, "Every 
island has its own territorial sea. "30 The other change was the addition of the 
expression "naturally-formed" to the second sentence. Accordingly, the new definition 
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reads, 
"1- An island is a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide. "31 
Obviously, the expression "naturally-formed" was added so that the definition excludes 
all those artificial projections which were stated by the ILC comment on Article 10, 
mentioned-above. 32 
Two features can be attributed to the concluded definition of islands: being, the 
definition is somewhat general, and has a broad and wide-ranged interpretation. The 
definition is somewhat general because it describes the general framework of the 
qualifications that must be available in a geophysical object so that it can be considered 
an island. This framework consists of three basic qualifications. The first is that, the 
object in question must be a naturally formed area of land excluding all artificial and 
man-made projections. The second is that such an object must be surrounded by water, 
in order to exclude all sorts of promontories, outgrowths, peninsulas, and so on. And 
the third is that this object must be above water at high tide. 33 These qualifications, 
though they seem prima facie, confined and well formed, are in fact so general that their 
meaning might include numerous objects which are not islands in the actual meaning of 
the word. This leads us to the second feature concerning the fact that the said definition 
has a broad and wide-ranged interpretation. 
The geophysical objects that can fall within the scope of the said qualifications of 
islands range from a small drying off-shore rock, such as Eddystone rock, to a huge 
island such as the British island itself. Such a wide-ranged meaning can include, islets, 
reefs, cays, rocks of various sizes, shoals, as well as islands in the actual meaning of 
the words. These features render the definition of islands insufficient and subject to 
criticism. 
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In order not to fall in the same trap, the ICJ found itself obliged to provide some 
more restrictions to the qualifications of islands when they would be used for the 
purpose of delimitation of the continental shelf. It says, 
"These prolongations meet and overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of a 
median line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks, and minor coastal projections, 
the disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means, such a 
line must effect an equal division of the particular area involved. "34 [Emphasis 
added] 
Having said so, the Court can be said to have taken into account an implicit criterion, 
the implication of which is two fold. On the one hand, it considered the size of a 
geophysical projection as an indication to its importance. If it is a small islet or a little 
rock, so it cannot be regarded as a relevant circumstance. On the other hand, and of 
foremost importance, the ICJ considered the "disproportionally distorting effect" of 
such a geophysical projection as a criterion in the light of which the projection in 
question can be judged as to whether it is a relevant circumstance or not. 
35 Should the 
disproportionally distorting effect of a geophysical projection be redressable by other 
means, it is by no means a relevant circumstance, and vice versa. Nevertheless, what 
is the idea that underlies the expression "disproportionally distorting effect"? Is it not 
the distance criterion - how far from the shore the object is -, especially if we bear in 
mind that the above-cited ICJ wording has been taken from a paragraph which 
originally discusses the situation of opposite States? If the answer to the latter question 
was affirmative, so the two fold meaning of the ICJ's implicit criterion would be 
concerned with the size and distance parameters. 
The need for a precise criterion suitable for a confined definition of islands grew 
more than ever during the UNCLOS III, when numerous suggestions were submitted 
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by the conferees. According to Karl, 
"[t]he common thread running through almost all of the draft articles submitted to the 
Conference was a belief that factors such as population, size, economic viability, 
geographical configuration, and distance from the mainland, as well as the political status 
of an island should be considered when maritime delimitations are affected by the presence 
of that island. "36 [Footnotes omitted] 
Without unnecessary details, the final result of the Conference was in favour of 
the economic viability and population criteria. This meaning was provided in Article 
121 the first paragraph of which repeated verbatim the wording of paragraph 1 of 
Article 10 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 
However, paragraph 3 of Article 121 stated that, 
"3- Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive zone or continental shelf. "37 
Having cited the definition of islands as was embodied in the 1982 Convention, 
an observation must be brought to attention. As terminology is an important matter in 
respect of legal issues, so each term must be interpreted according to the text and 
wording of the article concerned. With regard to Article 121, the term "an island" has 
two meanings, viz, a general definition of islands - paragraph 1 -, and the definition of 
islands when generating, inter alia, a continental shelf of their own - paragraphs 2 and 
3. Unlike the latter definition, which is restricted for certain purposes - generating a 
continental shelf or EEZ of their own -, the former was devoted to a general definition 
of islands whenever the term "an island" was mentioned in International Law. The 
economic viability and population conditions are, therefore, applicable only when the 
question is concerned with islands as an independent object, and strictly speaking, 
when islands are questioned whether they are entitled to, inter alia, a continental shelf 
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of their own or not. On the contrary, since the first paragraph of Article 121 provides a 
general definition of islands for all purposes, so the question of whether an island can 
VA .. 1 be considered a relevant circumstance or not, falls within the meaning and scope of this 
general definition; i. e., within the scope of Paragraph 1, and only Paragraph one, of 
Article 121. 
As explained earlier, the definition of islands provided in paragraph 1 of Article 
121 of the 1982 Convention used the exact wording of paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Hence, the same 
comments that have been said in respect of the latter can be said, again, in respect of the 
former. That is to say, the UNCLOS III has brought nothing new regarding the 
definition of islands as a relevant circumstance. And despite the fact that the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea has not come into force yet, its implication is still 
important because it reflects State practice on the issue at stake. 
Bearing in mind the above, islands as a relevant circumstance has a wide-ranged 
scope restricted only in four respects. These are, 1- it must be naturally formed area of 
land; 2- it must be surrounded by water, 3- it must be above water at high tide; and 4- 
the disproportionally distorting effect of it must not be able to be redressable by other 
means. One other qualification must be provided in this regard. That is, the 
consideration of islands as a relevant circumstance must not be dominated by the other 
relevant circumstances of the case involved. Under such a wide-ranged definition, 
rocks, reefs, islets, and islands of all sizes, can be included whether they are inhabited 
or uninhabited and without any question of their respective economic or political status 
or any other consideration other than the above-said qualifications. 
To prove the foregoing conclusion two examples can be invoked. The first is 
concerned with the consideration of Eddystone Rock "as a relevant base-point for 
delimiting the continental shelf boundary in the Channel. ", in the Anglo-French 
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Arbitration in 1977-78.38 The other is interested in Jerba Island which has not been 
considered as a relevant circumstance in the Tunisia/Libya Case in 1982.39 These two 
examples indicate that, though Eddystone is just a rock and Jerba Island is an inhabited 
island and there is no doubt that it has an economic life of its own, they were examined 
by relying on respects other than their respective economic and population status. 
Both, Eddystone Rock and Jerba Island manage to satisfy the first three qualifications 
of the said definition of islands as a relevant circumstance: being naturally formed 
areas, surrounded by water, and above water at high tide. However, Eddystone Rock 
managed to pass the test of the fourth and fifth qualifications, whereas Jerba Island did 
not. The disproportionally distorting effect of the presence of Eddystone Rock was so 
great that disregarding it would have created an inequitable solution to the disadvantage 
of the UK. Besides, the consideration of Eddystone Rock as a base-point was 
confirmed by the conduct of the parties relevant circumstance. 40 On the contrary, 
despite the fact that the disproportionally distorting effect of Jerba Island was also 
great, this distorting effect was supposed to have been redressed by the presence of the 
other relevant circumstances, and also was dominated by the presence of the conduct of 
the parties relevant circumstance. 41 
Two other similar examples can be demonstrated in another two cases. Due to the 
fact that the consideration of Filfla Islet, in the Libya/Malta Case in 1985, had the 
impact of an irredressable disproportionally distorting effect at the expense of Libya, 
the said Islet was disregarded. 42 And the other happened in the Guinea/Guinea Bissau 
Case in which the group of islands including Bijagos and Poiao, which belong to 
Guinea Bissau were disregarded because the disproportionally distorting effect of their 
presence was remedied by the method of considering the general direction of the coast a 
relevant circumstance 43 
Having dealt above with the qualifications of islands as a relevant circumstance, 
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the last two qualifications - concerning the disproportionally distorting effect, and being 
not dominated by the presence of other relevant circumstances -, show the need for 
more discussion. Such a discussion is more likely to be connected with the second 
problem of islands as a relevant circumstance to which the discussion will now turn. 
The other problem of islands as a relevant circumstance relates, as has been seen 
above, to the degree of effect that can be given to an island when it is considered a 
relevant circumstance. According to State practice and the judicial, arbitral and other 
cases, variegated kinds of weight were given to islands in various situations. These 
varieQvi;,: d kinds of weight were, full effect, partial effect, no effect at all, and minus 
effect. Full effect was given when the concerned island, or islands, is, or are, 
considered as a full relevant circumstance at the exclusion of the others in the area 
involved. These can be found, for instance, in the Ushant Island in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration, and in the Italian and Spanish islands in the Convention between Italy and 
Spain in 1974.44 It is realized that in almost all the cases that have given islands full 
effect, a simple median line has been used unless it has been affected by the presence of 
other relevant circumstances. In the examples mentioned-above, Italy and Spain agreed 
on a median boundary line, whereas the Anglo-French Arbitration drew a modified 
equidistant line in the Atlantic Region, due to the effect of the partial weight that was 
given to the Scilly isles. 
As far as the partial effect is concerned, it appears also in various forms. The 
most salient form of the partial effect is the half-effect form. This form was used in 
numerous cases such as the above-said Scilly isles in the Anglo-French case, 
Kerkennah Island in the Tunisia/Libya case, and the Seal Island in the Gulf of Maine 
case. 45 The other form of the partial effect ranges between giving islands some more 
or some less effect than the half effect. The notable example of such forms can be seen 
in the Guinea/Guinea Bissau case in which the Alcatraz island was given two kinds of 
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partial effect - minimum in the north, and maximum in the west and south 46 Giving 
islands partial effects appears also in another form. That is the enclaved and semi- 
enclaved method of delimitation around islands: the example of the former is the 
Channel Islands in the Anglo-French case, 47 and of the latter is the agreement between 
Italy and Tunisia in 1971.48 The most likelihood of the boundary line, when islands 
are given partial effect, is either a modified equidistant line, or a negotiated line, or a 
mixture of both methods, beside the usage of the enclaved or semi-enclaved methods in 
some cases. 
Although it seems illogical to call it minus effect, it is, in fact, one of the kinds of 
effects that can be given to islands in certain situations. Such a case can be found in 
Torres Strait agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea in 1978, and in the 
agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1958. In the Torres agreement some 
of the Australian islands were so close to the Papua New Guinea coast that if the 
boundary line gave them the minimum partial effect, it would have resulted in an 
inequitable solution at the expense of Papua New Guinea. Instead, the said Australian 
islands were left without any continental shelf and the boundary line was drawn on 
their southward side leaving the shelf around them to belong to Papua New Guinea. 49 
That was why such an effect was called a minus effect since it deprives the concerned 
islands from any continental shelf by means of a cut-off effect. This kind of minus 
effect can be called a full minus effect. 
As for the' example of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain the minus effect that was given to 
each of the Lubainah islands was different from the one said-above. Because the 
sovereignty problem over the said islands was solved by giving each party that island 
which was closer to the other country's territories than to his own, the two Parties 
agreed to use these two islands as turning points of the boundary line. 50 Accordingly a 
selected point on the tip of each island was chosen for that purpose. That is to say 
these two islands were cut off and deprived from any continental shelf from the side 
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that faced the territories of the other country. So, this kind of effect is called a partial 
minus effect. 
In order to have a better view of the said full and partial minus effects, these 
effects must be compared with an example of islands which are given no effect at all 
during the delimitation process. When the presence of islands is dominated by the 
presence of other relevant circumstances these islands will be given no effect at all in 
the delimitation of the continental shelf. However, the depriva6f 'an island from any 
weight does not mean that this island will have no continental shelf at all. What it does 
mean is that this island will still have a marginal continental shelf the extent of which is 
always dependent on the weighing up process of the other effective relevant 
circumstances in the case concerned. On the contrary, as far as the minus effect - 
whether full or partial - is concerned, the island in question is deprived not only from 
any weight, but also from having any marginal continental shelf whatsoever. In such a 
case the only remaining power of the interested State is its sovereignty over the 
mainland of the island involved. The best examples of the comparison at stake would 
be the case of the Jerba island, which was disregarded and given no weight at all in the 
Tunisia/Libya case, and the Australian islands northwards the continental shelf 
boundary line, which were said to have been given minus effect in the Australia/Papua 
New Guinea agreement. Jerba Island remained on the Tunisian portion of the 
continental shelf, meaning that it was still enjoying a marginal shelf. The Australian 
islands were located on the Papua New Guinea portion, and away from the Australian 
portion of the continental shelf, which meant that they were allocated no continental 
shelf at all and the only remaining thing was the Australian sovereignty over their 
mainland. 
One remaining observation must be made in this regard. This observation is 
interested in the difference between the full and partial minus effects. The only 
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difference between the two said minus effects is that, the full minus effect deprives the 
involved islands completely from any continental shelf however small it is, whereas the 
partial minus effect deprives only Fome parts of t}ielinvolved islands from havinglkny 
continental shelf. The above-said example of the two Lubainah islands would illustrate 
how those parts that faced the other country were cut off from having any continental 
shelf, and those parts that faced the interested party have a marginal shelf connected 
with the country's portion of the continental shelf. As can be recalled, in the case of the 
Australian islands, these islands were given no continental shelf at all. 
Having had an idea about the various kinds of effects which can possibly be 
given to islands when they are considered relevant circumstances, it is high time that the 
discussion now turns to another associated problem. That is, the factors and conditions 
which control the degree of effect that is given to an island. As has been seen, when an 
island is judged to be a relevant circumstance, such a judgement is supposed to be 
based on the five qualifications referred to above. In fact, three of these qualifications 
relate to the geophysical structure of islands, namely, being naturally formed area of 
land, surrounded by water, and above water at high tide. The other two qualifications - 
the irredressable distorting effect, and being not dominated by the presence of other 
relevant circumstances -, are more concerned with the effectiveness of islands when 
they become a relevant circumstance. That is to say, the former three qualifications are 
of a qualitative nature, whereas the latter two qualifications are of a quantitative nature. 
Thus, the degree of effect of an island as a relevant circumstance can be said to be 
controlled by the latter two qualifications. 
As for the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect principle, it controls 
three kinds of the said effects, namely, the full, partial, and minus effects. When an 
island is given no weight at all, it cannot be said to be controlled by the said principle, 
for, its effectiveness in such a case is nil. On the contrary, the degree of the 
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effectiveness of the other kinds of effects is always measured in the light of the 
irredressable disproportionally distorting effect principle. But, what is the implication 
of this principle? 
The irredressable disproportionally distorting effect of islands is a condition 
which, as has been seen earlier, might involve some factors such as the islands' size 
and the distance from the shore. 51 More effective than these two factors is the 
geographical complexity of the concerned area as a whole. Being proven by State 
practice, and the judicial, arbitral and other cases, it is found that the geographical 
complexity factor is very often the most likely condition that decides the degree of the 
disproportionally distorting effect of islands; and subsequently it decides the degree of 
effect that must be given to those islands whose presence cannot be ignored. In the 
Gulf of Maine case example, it was due to the geographical complexity of the Gulf that 
the presence of the Seal island could not be ignored. Yet, for the same reason, it would 
have, simultaneously, been excessive to give this island full effect. That was why the 
Chamber, with the help of the proportionality element, decided to give the said island 
half effect. 52 Such a case can be found in numerous other examples such as the 
presence of the Kerkennah island in the Tunisia/Libya case, and the presence of the Al- 
Katraz island in Guinea/Guinea Bissau case. 53 
The remaining question is, how does the said principle decide the degree of effect 
of islands as a relevant circumstance? In order to answer this question the exact 
wording, that established this principle, of the ICJ must be recalled. It said that, 
"...; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections, the 
disproportionally distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means,...,, 54 
Having said so, the ICJ described or rather qualified the distorting effect of a coastal 
projection by the word disproportionally. In order for the distorting effect of the 
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presence of a coastal projection to be irredressable, it must create some sort of 
disproportionality between the portions allocated to the concerned parties at the expense 
of one of them. 
Does this mean that the principle of irredressable disproportionally distorting 
effect of islands is underlain by the principle of proportionality? To an extent, the 
answer is, yes, especially if one considers the Tribunal's opinion in the Anglo-French 
case, regarding the proportionality principle which is said to be tested by the absence of 
any disproportionality between the portions allocated to each party. 55 It will, therefore, 
be the function of the proportionality principle to decide the degree of effect that can be 
attributed to certain islands when they are considered a relevant circumstance. 
However, if the foregoing conclusion has managed to involve one of the other 
relevant circumstances, (the proportionality principle, ) in the process of deciding the 
degree of effect that can be given to islands, the following discussion will show that all 
the other relevant circumstances are involved in playing a role in such a process. The 
intended discussion is primarily interested in the last qualification of islands as a 
relevant circumstance. That is, when an island is qualified enough to be a relevant 
circumstance, such a circumstance must not be dominated by any other relevant 
circumstance. 
As far as this last qualification is concerned, it is a condition in which, during the 
weighing process of the available circumstances, some circumstances occupy a degree 
of effectiveness higher than that of the involved islands; and hence those circumstances 
dominate the presence of islands circumstance. If such a case happened, the result 
would depend on whether the domination was wholly or partly. Had the presence of 
islands circumstance been wholly dominated by the presence of some other 
circumstances, such islands would no longer constitute a relevant circumstance. In the 
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Guinea/Guinea Bissau case, 1985, the geographical configuration of the coast was the 
dominant circumstance, the consideration of which resulted in disregarding the 
presence of the Bijagos and Poiao islands. 56 Similarly, this also occurred in the 
Tunisia/Libya case, (1982), regarding the Jerba island. 57 
When the presence of islands is dominated only Partly by the presence of some 
other relevant circumstances, it is realized that the degree of domination always leaves 
its marks on the degree of effect that is given to the presence of islands circumstance. 
The radical change in the Tunisian coast affected the presence of the Kerkennah island 
and consequently resulted in giving it only a partial effect - half effect. 58 The Channel 
Islands were not only detached geographically from the UK, but they were also on the 
wrong side of the median line, the fact that caused these islands to be also given partial 
effect by means of enclaved method. 59 In the example of the Australia/Papua New 
Guinea agreement of 1978, the fact that the Australian islands were very near to the 
Papua New Guinea coast and were also on the wrong side of the median line resulted in 
giving those Australian islands a full minus effect. 60 
The above-cited discussion calls to attention the question, would it be possible for 
the relevant circumstance of islands to dominate wholly or partly the presence of other 
circumstances? The answer, in theory, is yes, though in practice this is very seldom 
the case. According to the notion of equity, the presence of islands in some situations 
might be more effective than any other circumstance. This usually happens in areas 
where the presence of islands play the decisive role in forming the geographical 
complexity of the area in question, such as the Greece/ Turkey dispute in the Aegean 
Sea. 
In sum, the islands relevant circumstance constitutes a wide-ranged category 
embracing several kinds of naturally formed coastal projections which are surrounded 
by water and above water at high tide. This category includes rocks of all sizes, reefs, 
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shoals, isles, islets, and islands in the actual meaning of the word. As a relevant 
circumstance, islands were given four kinds of effects; being: full, partial, no weight at 
all, and minus effects. As for the process of calculating the proper weight of the 
relevant circumstance of island in a given situation, it is said to be controlled by two 
K4Y 
principles. The first is that the presence of islands must produce an irredressable 
disproportionally distorting effect, and the second is the presence of islands must not be 
dominated by the other relevant circumstances. The degree of the said distorting effect, 
and how far the presence of islands is dominated by the other involved circumstances, 
are the most likely factors that play the decisive role in identifying the degree of effect 
that the concerned islands are supposed to be given. 
III 
Proportionality 
Having given a brief account on the first two geographical relevant circumstances 
- the geographical configuration of the coast and the presence of islands -, the 
discussion provided hereunder will address itself to the third geographical 
circumstance. That is, the proportionality circumstance. 
Proportionality is one of the most complicated and vague principles of the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf. Although it is originally a simple 
geographical consideration, the said concept has, in fact, a more complicated 
implication than first meets the eye. In the beginning, the proportionality principle was 
vague and ambiguous, especially when it was clarified in two various ways by the 
North Sea Cases and the Anglo-French Arbitration judgement. However, it was not 
until further cases came to light that the implication of proportionality was given more 
clarification, enough to identify its real meaning. 
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Having established the customary rules and principles that were applicable to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between neighbouring States, the ICJ found itself 
bound to provide some examples of circumstances in its final decision of the 1969 
Cases. One of these examples was the concept of proportionality, which was 
embodied in the following paragraph. 
"(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out 
in accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the 
continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast 
measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken for this purpose of 
the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between 
adjacent States in the same region. "61 
Proportionality according to the above-cited paragraph is a concept that is mainly 
concerned with the mutual relationship between the lengths of the coasts of the coastal 
States and the continental shelf areas on which these States abut. In order to facilitate 
the identification of the implication of this mutual relationship, the ICJ established some 
conditions. Firstly, the lengths of the coasts must be measured in the general direction 
of the coastlines. That is to say, the measurement of the length of the coast will not 
necessarily follow all the swellings and sinuosities of the sea shore. Instead, the 
general curvature of the coastline is the sole sufficient basis for such a measurement. 
Secondly,. the said relationship between the lengths of the coasts and the extent of 
the continental shelf areas is to take into consideration any actual or prospective 
continental shelf delimitation that has an effect on the parties concerned. So, does that 
mean that proportionality is a macrogeographical concept? The answer is, it depends 
on the possibility of the presence of other delimitations which have an effect on the 
delimitation in question. The presence, or the possibility of presence, of some other 
delimitations in the area concerned is, in fact, not in itself the intended factor, for such a 
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presence must produce some actual or prospective effects on the delimitation at stake. 
If such a kind of effects was produced, then proportionality would be a 
macrogeographical concept. On the contrary, the absence of such a kind of effects 
would render proportionality to be a microgeographical concept. Proportionality, 
therefore, is to be understood not only as a macrogeographical concept but also as a 
microgeographical one. 
Above all, and the most important condition of all is that, proportionality is 
qualified by the condition that, it must be of a reasonable degree. The mutual 
relationship between the lengths of the coasts and the areas of continental shelf is not 
supposed to impose its fullest effect on the delimitation of the continental shelf. When 
the ICJ was explaining how the measurement of the coastline should be, it said that, 
"..., these being measured according to their general direction in order to establish the 
necessary balance between States with straight, and those with markedly concave or 
convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. "62 
[Emphasis added]. 
The necessary balance between the said kinds of coastlines is, therefore, the final aim 
of proportionality. Such a final aim can be achieved by granting the mutual relationship 
between the lengths of the coasts and the areas of continental shelf, only a reasonable 
degree. 
But, what is the meaning of 'a reasonable degree'? And to what criterion is such 
a reasonableness subject? The word 'degree' can be said to be an equivalent of the 
word 'weight' which was discussed in the Islands Section where islands were said to 
be given various kinds of weight. If this contention is true, the phrase 'a reasonable 
degree of proportionality' means that proportionality is to be given a reasonable weight 
or a reasonable effect. 
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As for the word 'reasonable', it can be said that it is subject to the weighing 
process of the various circumstances of the case concerned. The weighing process is 
supposed to result in assigning a certain weight to each involved circumstance 
according to the degree of effectiveness and credibility that such a circumstance enjoys. 
The criterion of reasonableness, therefore, is interested in the effectiveness and 
credibility of the proportionality circumstance as compared with the effectiveness and 
credibility of the other available circumstances. The result is to give each circumstance 
its due weight. A reasonable degree means, therefore, that, proportionality is to be 
given its due weight in each continental shelf delimitation in the light of the involved 
circumstances of that case. 
In conclusion, according to the North Sea judgement, proportionality is a 
geographical concept which is based on the mutual relationship between the extent of 
the continental shelf areas and the lengths of the coasts of the States concerned. 
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, the proportionality concept was facilitated with 
even more discussion. Proportionality according to the Arbitration was broader than it 
was in the North Sea cases; for, it was in the former "..., not linked to any specific 
geographical feature. "63 In order to explain this meaning, the Tribunal said, 
"[t]he factor of proportionality may appear in the form of the ratio between the areas of 
continental shelf to the lengths of the respective coastlines, as in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases. But it may also appear, and more usually does, as a factor for 
determining the reasonable or unreasonable - the equitable or inequitable - effects of 
particular geographical features or configurations upon the course of an equidistance-line 
boundary. "64 
So, what is the implication of the proportionality principle in the eyes of the Tribunal? 
The answer can be found in the following paragraph. 
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"In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle of proportionality 
which is the relevant criterion or factor. ...; it is rather a question of remedying the 
disproportionality and inequitable effects produced by particular geographical 
configurations or features .... Proportionality, therefore is to be used as a criterion or 
factor relevant in evaluating the equities of certain geographical situations, not as a 
general principle providing an independent source of rights to areas of continental 
shelf. "65 
What does this paragraph mean? Does it mean that the Tribunal has defused and 
dismantled the proportionality concept? Or, does it mean that the Tribunal has reshaped 
the said concept into a new form? 
It seems, prima facie, that the last sentence of the above-cited paragraph is a 
declaration of death of the proportionality concept as an independent relevant 
circumstance. However, this is not, at all, the case. In fact, the Tribunal believes that 
the proportionality concept does exist, but it has mixed two variant concepts together 
under a single title, namely, proportionality, and the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effect of islands. To prove this contention, some discussion is necessary. 
To begin with, the contention that the Tribunal believes that the proportionality 
principle does exist can be proven by providing the following two findings. On the one 
hand, the above-cited paragraph proves that the Tribunal has accepted the fact of the 
existence of the proportionality concept, although it does not agree with the ICJ in the 
North Sea Cases about the scope and meaning of such a concept 66 The Tribunal, on 
the other hand, has applied the proportionality concept in two places, the second of 
which is the focal point of confusion between proportionality and the principle of 
irredressable disproportionally distorting effect of islands. 
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The Tribunal applied proportionality in the English Channel as a relevant 
circumstance relying on the relationship between the continental shelf areas and the 
lengths of the coasts. In the course of identifying the boundary in the said area, the 
Court says that it, 
"... considers that the primary element in the present problem is the fact that the Channel 
Islands region forms part of the English Channel, throughout the whole length of which 
the parties face each other as opposite States having almost equal coastlines. "67 
[Emphasis added] 
This paragraph denoted that the length of the coastlines was one of the circumstances 
that justified the choice of the equidistance method, which resulted in equal division, 
because the Parties had almost equal coastlines in that area. 
In the Atlantic region the proportionality element was also utilized; and 
unsurprisingly, it was also based on the ratio between the continental shelf areas and 
the lengths of the coasts. According to the Tribunal's justifications, 
"[t]he distance that the Scilly Isles extend the coastline of the mainland of the United 
Kingdom westwards onto the Atlantic continental shelf is slightly more than twice the 
distance that the Ushant extends westwards the coastline of the French mainland. "68 
[Emphasis added] 
Because the said islands created various extensions to the mainland of the two 
interested countries, and such extensions were realized as producing a disproportional 
effect the ratio of which was two to the Scillies and one to the Ushant, the Scillies 
were given only half effect. 
However, the question that is called for, here, is, does the principle which has 
been invoked in the Atlantic region relate to the proportionality concept or to the 
227 
irredressable disproportionally distorting effect of islands concept? 
If one considered the said question from the viewpoint of the North Sea Cases 
judgement, the answer would be that the invoked principle to solve the problem of the 
Scilly isles was the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect of islands. But, 
should it be the viewpoint of the Anglo-French Arbitration, the answer would be that 
the invoked principle related to both concepts, the proportionality and the 
disproportionally distorting effect of islands; for both concepts, according to the 
Tribunal, could fall within the meaning and scope of one single principle, namely the 
proportionality principle. In fact, these two viewpoints, though seeming to be at odds 
with each other, draw attention to the most effective principle that plays the decisive 
role in the delimitation question of the continental shelf between neighbouring 
countries. This principle is the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect. 
Equity, as has been seen above and will further be seen, is the balancing process 
of the irredressable disproportionally distorting effects of the effective circumstances. 
This contention has been built on the fact that, in order for any circumstance to be 
considered relevant, such a circumstance must produce an irredressable 
disproportionally distorting effect. And, in order to produce an equitable solution, the 
various distorting effects of the relevant circumstances in a given case must be subject 
to the balancing process which evaluates and identifies the proper weight to each 
involved circumstance. The principle of the irredressable disproportionally distorting 
effect is, therefore, said to be the underlying infrastructure of the concept of equity. 69 
Nevertheless, the question is, what is the relationship, if any, between the 
proportionality principle and the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect 
principle? In other words, is the latter principle implied, in whole or in part, in the 
former principle, or are both principles different from each other? These questions can 
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only be answered in the light of the development of the proportionality concept 
throughout the recent cases of the continental shelf delimitation between States. 
In the Tunisia libya Case, 1982, the proportionality concept was introduced as a 
ratio between the extent of the continental shelf areas and the lengths of the relevant 
coasts. 70 In addition, more emphasis was provided in this case on the reasonableness 
feature of the proportionality principle, the reason why the Court did not deal "... with 
absolute areas, but with proportions. "71 However, the new significant feature of the 
said principle was that, proportionality was not dealt with as a relevant circumstance, 
but as a test in accordance with which the equitableness of the solution was tested. 72 
Proportionality in this case can be classified under the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effect principle; for, when proportionality is used as a test, it means that it is 
used as a yardstick to assure the absence of any disproportionality between the areas of 
the continental shelf that are to be allocated to each of the concerned parties. Such a test 
is, in fact, identical with the balancing process of the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effect of the relevant circumstances. 
Emphasizing again the reasonableness concept, the Tribunal in the Gulf of 
Maine Case used the proportionality principle as a relevant circumstance by means of 
the ratio between the continental shelf areas and the lengths of the coasts concerned. 73 
proportionality in this case was utilized as an auxiliary criterion to evaluate the weight 
that could be granted to Seal Island which was eventually given half effect. 74 The 
question is, Does the used proportionality concept fall within the scope of 
proportionality as an independent relevant circumstance, or as an irredressable 
disproportionally distorting effect principle. According to the judgement, it is more 
likely that proportionality was used as an independent relevant circumstance. For, the 
proportionality element was first calculated as producing a ratio of 1.38 to 1; and then 
due to the half effect that was given to Seal Island, this ratio was replaced by another 
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one, namely, 1.32 to 1.75 The best analysis that can be said in this regard is that the 
balancing process of the irredressable disproportionally distorting effects of the 
proportionality ratio and the presence of Seal Island - as being the most effective 
relevant circumstances in the area concerned -, has resulted in modifying the 
proportionality ratio so that it becomes more equitable. 
Proportionality was used in a similar sense - as an independent relevant 
circumstance -, in the Libya/Malta case, 1985.76 The great disparity between the 
lengths of the coasts of both countries was considered a relevant circumstance. 77 
However, proportionality was simultaneously utilized as a test of equity by the Court 
which emphasized that, 
"... there is certainly no evident disproportion in the areas of shelf attributed to each of 
the Parties respectively ... 
"78 
And finally, similarly proportionality was used as a test of equity in the 
Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case in 1985.79 
According to the recent cases one can deduce that the proportionality principle has 
been used in two various forms. The first is proportionality as an independent relevant 
circumstance; and the second is proportionality as a test ground of equity. Regarding 
these two forms, proportionality has been in all cases, used as representing a ratio 
between the extent of the continental shelf areas and the leng, Q s of the coasts 
i9a 
ed. concern 
Calling back the question of the relation between proportionality and the 
irredressable disproportionally distorting effect principles, the answer will be that the 
two principles are different from each other. Proportionality is solely concerned with 
the ratio between the continental shelf areas and the lengths of the coasts, whereas the 
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irredressable disproportionally distorting effect principle can belong to any relevant 
circumstance including the proportionality circumstance. 
Since equity is the balancing process of the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effects of the relevant circumstances in a given case, and since every relevant 
circumstance is tested by the degree of its distorting effect, so the proportionality 
circumstance is tested in the same way. i. e. it is tested by how much disproportional its 
distorting effect is. The irredressable disproportionally distorting effect of the 
proportionality circumstance, therefore, is a component among the other components of 
the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect principle. 
The foregoing conclusion can be best manifest in the case where proportionality is 
used as an independent relevant circumstance and as a test ground of equity, such as the 
Gulf of Maine case and Libya/Malta case. In such a case it is the absence of any 
disproportionality rather than the presence of proportionality that becomes the decisive 
factor. 
N 
Natural Prolongation 
as a 
Relevant Circumstance 
As has been seen in the Second Chapter, the natural prolongation concept is said 
to play two variant roles in the delimitation question of the continental shelf, namely, as 
a general principle, and as a relevant circumstance. 80 This subsection in turn is mainly 
concerned with discussing, and proving why and how, the natural prolongation is 
regarded as a relevant circumstance beside its having the main role as a general 
principle. 
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When the natural prolongation concept is invoked as a general principle to effect 
both the entitlement and delimitation of the continental shelf, it is regarded as being 
founded on a combined basis of legal and geophysical connotation. Conversely, 
natural prolongation as a relevant circumstance is, as will be seen, based on, and solely 
on, a geophysical ground. Of course, that is not to say that the natural prolongation in 
the latter meaning - as a relevant circumstance - is not a legal notion any more. In fact, 
the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is a legal notion which, like the other 
geophysical relevant circumstances, has been built on a geophysical basis. 
The other difference between the two implications of the natural prolongation 
concept is that whereas natural prolongation as a general principle is applicable in all 
cases, the said concept as a relevant circumstance is applicable, only, in certain cases. 
The question here is, what sort of cases can find the chance of applying natural 
prolongation as a relevant circumstance? In other words, what sort of features must be 
available so that such a relevant circumstance becomes indispensably applicable? 
The answer to these two questions can only be considered in the light of the 
concluded judicial, arbitral and other cases. Apart from the 1969 North Sea cases, 
which has instigated the natural prolongation concept, the said concept has been 
invoked in all the other cases that has been concluded up to date. Examining the facts 
of each of the said cases, the natural prolongation concept as a relevant circumstance 
was found inapplicable to any of them. 
In the pleading of the Anglo-French Arbitration, the UK emphasized that, "... the 
Hurd Deep and the Hurd Deep Fault Zone were regarded as marking the limits of the 
respective natural prolongations of the two States. ", 81 and that the said Deep 
constituted "a major and persistent structural discontinuity of the seabed and subsoil" of 
such a kind as to "interrupt the essential geological continuity of the continental 
232 
shelf, ". 82 The answer of the Court was that, 
"The geological faults which constitute the Hurd Deep and the so-called Hurd Deep Fault 
Zone, even if they be considered as distinct features in the geomorphology of the shelf, 
are still discontinuities in the seabed and subsoil which do not disrupt the essential unity 
of the continental shelf either in the Channel or the Atlantic region. "83 
Excluding the Tripolitanian Furrow from being considered a relevant 
circumstance, the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case, 1982, commented that unless the 
geophysical features 
"... were such as to disrupt the essential unity of the continental shelf so as to justify a 
delimitation on the basis of its identification as the division between areas of natural 
prolongation, it would be an element inappropriate for inclusion among the factors to be 
balanced up with a view to equitable delimitation. "8 [Emphasis added] 
In the Gulf of Maine Case, (1984), the continental shelf of the concerned States 
was "... a single continuous, uniform and uninterrupted physiographical structure, 
... 
"; 85 and no marked elevations or depressions, including the Northeast Channel, 86 
and Georges Bank, 87 was able 
"... to distinguish one part that might be considered as constituting the natural 
prolongation of the coasts of the United States from another part which could be regarded 
as the natural prolongation of the coasts of Canada. "88 
The Court of Justice in the Libya/Malta Case, (1985), found that the "... "rift 
zone" cannot constitute a fundamental discontinuity terminating the southward 
extension of the Maltese shelf and the northward extension of the Libyan as if it were 
some natural boundary. "89 However, having recognized the concept of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, the Court realized that the two concepts, the continental shelf and the 
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EEZ, would coincide with each other within the 200 miles distance from the shore. 
Thus, the ICJ indicated that, the concept of natural prolongation as a relevant 
circumstance cannot be applicable within the said 200 miles distance. 90 Nevertheless, 
"[t]his is not to suggest that the idea of natural prolongation is now superseded by that of 
What does it suggest then? The Court replies, 
"The concepts of natural prolongation and distance are ... not opposed 
but 
complementary; and both remain essential elements in the juridical concept of the 
continental shelf. "92 
Emphasizing again the inapplicability of the natural prolongation concept as a 
relevant circumstance within the 200 miles distance from the shore, 93 the Tribunal in 
the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case, (1985), said that, 
"... the rule of natural prolongation can be effectively invoked for purposes of 
delimitation only where there is a separation of continental shelves. "94 
On this basis, the continental shelf of the two concerned States was realized to be "one 
and the same" 95 
The essential unity or continuity of the continental shelf is, therefore, the focal 
point of the natural prolongation concept. From this, one can deduce the difference 
between the natural prolongation concept as a general principle, on the one hand, and as 
a relevant circumstance, on the other. If the continental shelf preserves its unity and/or 
continuity, then the natural prolongation concept is applicable as a general principle 
only. On the contrary, should the continental shelf display discontinuity, the natural 
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prolongation concept will be applicable as a relevant circumstance. 
But, what sort of discontinuity should the continental shelf display in order to 
satisfy the requirements of natural prolongation as a relevant circumstance? According 
to the above-cited paragraphs concerning the judicial cases, the conditions of the 
continental shelf discontinuity are: 
- It must be natural; 
- It must be substantial so that it constitutes a fundamental interruption of the 
continental shelf. The condition here stated is to exclude all the minor 
geomorphological projections, (such as troughs, rifts, ridges, banks, and so 
on, ) that do not constitute a real interruption of the geological continuity of the 
continental shelf. 
- It must be beyond 200 miles from the shore, because within these limits the 
distance criterion is the applicable one. 
It follows that, the relevant circumstance of natural prolongation is that sort of 
concept which can be proven in a negative way. That is to say, the applicability of the 
said circumstance must always be justified by the absence of interruption of the 
essential unity and/or continuity of the continental shelf. In other words, in order to 
apply the natural prolongation as a relevant circumstance, a substantial and fundamental 
. 
discontinuity of the concerned continental shelf must be available. These qualifications 
of the discontinuity concept are, therefore, the principal ideas that underly the natural 
prolongation concept when it is considered a relevant circumstance. 
The foregoing conclusion calls to attention an old doctrine which has/similar. 
it top 
interests. That is, the substantial fall-off doctrine. The intimate relationship between 
the natural prolongation concept and the substantial fall-off doctrine, to which the 
discussion hereunder will be interested, is of vital importance to understand better the 
said concept as a relevant circumstance. 
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Natural Prolongation 
and the 
Substantial Fall-off Doctrine 
According to the discussion cited-above, when the natural prolongation concept 
displays itself as a relevant circumstance, the indispensable conclusion is that such a 
circumstance is demonstrated by the geophysical structure of the continental shelf. It 
is, therefore, essential to examine this concept in order to identify what category of 
geophysical structure it belongs to. In other words, it is essential to know whether the 
natural prolongation circumstance belongs to the geological, or to the geomorphological 
considerations, or to both at the same time. 
The natural prolongation relevant circumstance is, in fact, found to belong 
exclusively to the geological considerations of the continental shelf. This fact is based 
on two reasons. The first is that, ºreyis fih$ the judicial cases of the continental shelf 
delimitation, one can find that all the conditions relating to the geomorphological 
considerations were regarded by the concerned judicial organ as not constituting a 
fundamental interruption of the geological continuity of the continental shelf in 
question. Examples of these can be found in the Hurd Deep and the Hurd Deep Fault 
Zone, Tripolitanian Furrow, Georges Bank, and the "rift zone". 96 
The second is that, as a matter of fact, the unity of a geological structure is only 
interrupted by a geological feature which puts an end to that unity. So, the essential 
unity, continuity or prolongation of the continental shelf cannot be interrupted by any 
geophysical feature unless this feature is of geological nature. 
Accordingly, and bearing in mind the stated-above three conditions necessary for 
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the natural prolongation to be a relevant circumstance, the definition of such a 
circumstance becomes as follows: The natural prolongation relevant circumstance is 
that geological feature which constitutes a fundamental interruption of the geological 
continuity of the continental shelf. The only geological feature that can satisfy such 
requirements is the substantial fall-off of the continental shelf, or, as is termed by 
Geographers, the continental slope. 
Because the outer limits of the continental shelf vy$s difficult to be identified in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, according to some the problem was solved by initiating the 
substantial fall-off doctrine. According to this doctrine, the continental shelf would 
constitute that slight slope of the seabed contiguous to a coastal State until it reached the 
first substantial fall-off. 97 In terms of Geographers this substantial fall-off was the so 
called continental slope. This doctrine lost its importance with regard to the outer limit 
of the continental shelf when the ILC's deliberations in the 1950s resulted in the 
adoption of the 200-meter depth/exploitability criterion, for the purposes of defining the 
continental shelf. 98 However, in the 1970s the UNCLOS III awakened this doctrine 
when it relied to a great extent, and in details, on the geological basis when defining the 
continental shelf. Generally speaking, the continental shelf is defined to extend up to 
the end of the continental margin, i. e., it embraced the geographical continental shelf, 
the continental slope, and the continental rise. 99 That is to say, the doctrine of 
substantial fall-off has been reemphasized as, and proved to be, the best suited basis to 
define the outer limits of the legal continental shelf, with only one difference. That is, 
the fall-off doctrine defined the continental shelf as it would terminate at the beginning 
of the continental slope, whereas the new definition of the continental shelf would 
terminate it not only at the foot of the slope but at the end of the continental rise as well. 
From this angle the natural prolongation relevant circumstance can be seen. 
Should the said discussion be true, it leads to two undoubted conclusions. The 
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first is that, the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is only applicable in 
situations where the continental slope and rise are present; and this continental slope 
and rise are located beyond the 200-mile distance from the shore. These situations are, 
as will be seen, very limited in number. 
The second conclusion is that, since the continental shelf is that geophysical 
structure which surrounds the continents and the oceanic islands, so it is almost 
impossible to find any adjacent-States position that is not on the same continental shelf. 
Thus, bearing in mind the first conclusion, (which indicates that the natural 
prolongation is tested by the presence of the continental slope and rise, ) such a 
circumstance finds a luko chance in application in case of adjacent-States position. 100 
The position of opposite States, however, can be assessed differently. Opposite States 
might belong to two different continents, the fact that indicates the likelihood of each of 
them abutting on a different continental shelf. That is to say, the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance might find applicability only in the opposite-States position. 
Is there, in reality, any such situation in which the natural prolongation relevant 
circumstance might be applicable? And if it is applicable, Is it fruitful? 
Having examined the world-wide map, it is found that, the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance might, in principle, be applicable in numerous opposite-States 
situations. These situations may mainly be present in areas such as the following: 
- In the Bering Sea, between USSR and USA. 
- In the Sea of Japan, between Japan and each of North Korea and South 
Korea, and USSR. 
- In the Pacific Ocean, between Philippines and each of Marianas Islands and 
Japan; and in the complexion of the far east oceanic archipelagoes such as 
between Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, and between New 
Caledonia and each of Vanuatu, Fiji and Australia. 
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- In the Coral Sea, between Australia and each of Papua New Guinea and New 
Caledonia. 
- In Tasman Sea, Between Australia and New Zealand. 
- In the Bay of Bengal, between India and each of Sri Lanka and Burma. 
- In the Arabian Sea, between India and Oman. 
- In the Indian Ocean, between Seyschelles and each of Somalia, Kenya and 
Tanzania; and between Seyschelles and Maldives. 
- In the Norwegian Sea, between Norway and each of Iceland and Greenland 
(Canada). 
- In the Bafin Bay and Labrador Sea, between Greenland (Denmark) and 
Canada. 
- In the North Atlantic Ocean, between UK and Ireland, on the one hand, and 
each of the said two States and Iceland, and between Ireland and Iceland and 
Greenland (Denmark), on the other hand. 
- And finally, in the Gulf of Mexico, between each of USA, Mexico and Cuba. 
Examining these situations, the following conclusions could be said. First, the 
natural prolongation relevant circumstance is, in practice, not applicable to the majority 
of the above-said situations; and although this relevant circumstance is applicable to the 
remaining few situations, its applicability to them is not fruitful. 
Second, the main reason for the inapplicability of the said relevant circumstance to 
the majority of these cases is that, apart from some oceanic islands, the continental 
shelves of all the continents are connected with each other so that they constitute a 
single and continuous continental shelf. That is to say, it is almost impossible to find 
any fundamental disruption of the continental shelf even between the continents 
themselves. In fact, the only fundamental disruption of the continental shelf of all the 
continents could be found at the outer edge of the continental margin, which is located 
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at a far distance from any opposite-States situation. 
Third, the reason for the fruitlessness of the applicability of the natural 
prolongation relevant circumstance to the said remaining few situations is that, since the 
presence of a fundamental disruption always marks the outer limit of the continental 
shelf, so it is not a matter of dispute between States. For, as a matter of fact, except 
within the 200-mile distance of the EEZ, no State can claim any right over the seabed 
beyond the outer edge of the continental margin; and consequently, it is not possible to 
find any overlapping claims beyond the said outer limit. 
Fourth, in order to prove these conclusions, a selected set of three samples of the 
above-cited opposite-States situations will be examined hereunder. 
The Bering Sea is a semi-enclosed Sea and is shared with by the USSR, in its far 
northeastern coasts, and the USA, in the Alaska coasts - the property of which has been 
transferred from the USSR to the USA since 1867.101 The seabed of the Bering Sea 
varies in depths. Whereas it is shallow in the north and northeast, the Bering Sea is 
quite deep with some ridges in the middle, south and southwest. 
Because the Bering Sea is located in the area between two continents - America, 
and Asia -, so it is supposed to show the outer limits which mark the end, or start, of 
each of the two continents with respect to each other. However, the situation of the 
Bering Sea is completely different. As the land of each of the two continents slopes 
down into and under the sea, they meet each other in shallow depths forming a single 
and continuous continental shelf belonging to both continents. This single continental 
shelf is quite wide in the north and northeast - contiguous to Alaska (USA, ) and the 
shores of Chukotskiy (USSR) -, and very narrow in the west and southwest - 
contiguous to the Kamchatka peninsula and Koryakskiy Khrebet shores of the USSR. 
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Besides, this continental shelf is connected with the continental shelf of the Arctic, 
passing through the Bering Strait, and forming also a single and continuous continental 
shelf. 
Being single and continuous, the continental shelf of the Bering Sea does not 
contain any geological feature that is able to be considered a fundamental disruption of 
that shelf except the continental slope and rise which mark its outer limit. That is to 
say, if, in theory, the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is best applicable to an 
opposite-States situation belonging to two different continents, such a relevant 
circumstance is found inapplicable, in practice, to the Bering Sea due to the continuity 
of the continental shelf therein. 
A similar situation can be found in the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic Ocean 
areas as being the supposed marking limits of the two continents, Europe and America. 
The continental shelf of Europe and that of America are connected with each other 
constituting a single and continuous continental shelf. And despite the presence of two 
basins - the Norwegian and Greenland Basins -, which slope down to great depths, 
these two Basins do not constitute a fundamental and continuous disruption of the said 
shelf. In fact, the presence of the Voring Plateau, Jan Mayen Ridge, the Aegir Ridge, 
the Icelandic Plateau, and Iceland-Faeroe Ridge, which are connected with each other, 
cause the continental shelf of Europe and that of America to be a single and continuous 
continental shelf. 
Accordingly, no State in the area can invoke the natural prolongation relevant 
circumstance so as to justify its entitlement over certain parts of the concerned 
continental shelf. Such a relevant circumstance, therefore, cannot be invoked in the 
network of continental shelf boundaries between the following States, the UK, 
Norway, Iceland, the Faeroe Islands (Denmark), Ireland, and Greenland (Denmark). 
Such was the case between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Norway) in their conciliation of 
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1981.102 
Nevertheless, two cases in the North Atlantic Ocean illustrate another fact 
concerning the natural prolongation relevant circumstance. That is, the natural 
prolongation relevant circumstance is very unlikely to be applicable because once its 
conditions are available, the situation ceases to be a matter of continental shelf 
delimitation between States. Rather, it becomes a matter of the outer limit of the 
continental shelf, 103 which is, relatively speaking, the concern of each State alone, and 
is subject to different rules, namely, Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and Article 76 of the 1982 Convention. 
The first case is concerned with the shelf delimitation between Iceland and 
Greenland (Denmark). 104 Although both countries abut on the same continental shelf, 
the presence of a thalewg, which slopes down to great depths, between Reykjanes 
Ridge (Iceland) and Eirik Drift (Greenland), might play an important role in this 
case. 105 Because this thalewg can meet the conditions of the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance - as being a fundamental disruption of the concerned continental 
shelves -, so it might be used to mark the southern part of the continental shelf 
boundary between Iceland and Greenland. However, the more likely solution is that 
the delimitation process between Iceland and Greenland will proceed only in the part of 
the continental shelf which is located northward of the said thalewg until the point 
where the thalewg starts. For, once the thalewg starts it marks the outer limit of the 
remaining parts of the continental shelf - the outer limit of the Reykjanes Ridge and that 
of the Eirik Drift -, which mean that there will not be any overlapping claims between 
Iceland and Greenland concerning the deep seabed of the thalewg area, because it is no 
longer a continental shelf. This area becomes, in fact, part of the seabed where no State 
has any right or any entitlement. 
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This analysis can also be true with respect to the continental shelf delimitation 
between Ireland and Iceland. The presence of a thalewg slopping down to great depths 
between the Rockall Plateau and Gardar Drift (Iceland) might play a significant role in 
this delimitation. 106 The role of the said thalewg is dependent on the solution of the 
dispute over the Rockall IslandYbetween Ireland and the UK,, And bexween each of the 
said two States and Iceland and Denmark If the dispute was solved in favour of 
Ireland, it would cause the boundary line between Ireland and Scotland to shift 
northward of the Rockall Island giving extra continental shelf areas to Ireland; and it 
would also mean that the said thalewg would become a minor feature in the area, which 
may or may not play a role in the delimitation of the continental shelf. On the contrary, 
if the dispute over the Rockall island was solved in favour of the UK or any of the 
other said States (apart from Ireland), it would cause the boundary line between the UK 
and Ireland to shift south of the Rockall Island giving Ireland less continental shelf 
areas; and this would mean that such a boundary line would meet the said thalewg 
causing it to become a major feature in the area. In this case the said thalewg would 
constitute a fundamental disruption of the continental shelf between Ireland and Iceland 
marking the outer limits of their continental shelves. Accordingly, there will not be any 
dispute between Iceland and Ireland concerning overlapping continental shelf areas, 
because the said deep seabed of the thalewg will constitute part of the seabed and not 
part of the continental shelf of either country. 
The situation between Australia and New Zealand will lead to a conclusion similar 
to the foregoing one, concerning the natural prolongation relevant circumstance. The 
continental shelf of Australia and New Zealand are connected with each other forming a 
single and continuous continental shelf. If a continental shelf delimitation question 
arises between the two countries, the only relevant areas of shelf will be located in the 
north of the Tasman Sea, namely, Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk Ridge. For, in the 
southern part of the said Sea the continental shelf of Australia and that of New Zealand 
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are both very narrow and all in all less than 200 nautical miles from the shores of each 
country, (as included in the EEZ limits). 
The Lord Howe Rise extends in a northwest-southeast direction joining the 
continental shelf of Australia with that of New Zealand. The Norfolk Ridge is a 
northward extension of the New Zealand continental shelf. Separating Lord Howe 
Rise from Norfolk Ridge, the Norfolk Trough slopes down to great depths ranging 
from 2890 to 3740 meters isobath. The outer edge of the Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk 
Ridge - as are marked by the Tasman Basin in the south and Norfolk Trough in the 
north - are the only features that can play a role as a fundamental disruption of the 
continental shelf of Australia and New Zealand. However, if these features are 
considered a natural prolongation relevant circumstance, the following findings will be 
of great significance. Firstly, if there had not been any other relevant circumstances in 
the area, the outer edge of the Lord Howe Rise would have been the best suited to 
identify the outer limit of the New Zealand continental shelf as distinguished from that 
of Australia; for, although the Rise is concerned with the Australian continental shelf, 
the point of connection occurs in the very northern parts of the Shelf and the Rise close 
to the Coral sea forming the continental shelf of Australia and that of New Zealand to be 
opposite each other in most of their parts. 
Secondly, nevertheless, the presence of the Lord Howe and Norfolk islands, 
which belong to Australia, on the Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk Ridge, respectively, 
constitute a significant relevant circumstance. In fact, the presence of these islands 
reduces the natural prolongation relevant circumstance to its lowest effect, because their 
presence on the New Zealand continental shelf constitute an extension of the Australian 
continental shelf beyond the Tasman Sea and Norfolk Island Trough. In this case, 
even if the minimum effect is given to the said two islands, and unless they are given 
minus effect, the question of continental shelf delimitation will be concerned with the 
division of Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk Ridge between the two countries. That is to 
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say, the outer edges of the said Rise and Ridge, as representing the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance, will find a luke Chance in playing a role in such a delimitation. 
However, the outer edge of the Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk Ridge is not 
deprived completely from playing any role in identifying the outer limit of the 
concerned continental shelf. In fact, the southern part of the outer limit of Lord Howe 
Rise, which abuts on the Tasman Sea, and the southern Part of the Norfolk Trough, 
will carry on playing their role as representing the outer limit of the New Zealand 
continental shelf, where no dispute between the two States would arise. 
Conclusion 
Having studied the world map in order to see where the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance can be applicable, the following are of prime importance. First, 
the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is in no way applicable to an adjacent- 
States situation. Second, because the continental shelves of all the continents are 
connected with each other, and because of the presence of the EEZ concept, the natural 
prolongation relevant circumstance is also found inapplicable in the majority of 
opposite-States situations. 106 In the remaining minority of opposite-States situations, 
the said relevant circumstance is, though in theory applicable, not fruitful in practice. 
The main reason for this is that, no sooner do the conditions of the natural prolongation 
relevant circumstance exist than the situation becomes a question of outer limit of the 
continental shelf rather than a question of delimitation of the shelf between States. 
However, although the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is more likely 
to belong to the question of the outer limits of the continental shelf, that does not mean 
that it is applicable once its requirements are met. In fact, like every other relevant 
circumstance, the natural prolongation circumstance is subject to the balancing process 
which will decide the degree of effect that can be attributed to such a circumstance. 
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Yet, it seems that the natural prolongation relevant circumstance is very likely to be a 
weak circumstance, because the presence of any other relevant circumstances might 
result in such other circumstances taking over the natural prolongation circumstance. 
This case can be best illustrated by a situation similar to that of Australia and New 
Zealand. If, in the said case, the two Australian islands - Lord Howe and Norfolk - 
had not been situated on the Lord Howe Rise and Norfolk Ridge, the outer limit of the 
Lord Howe Rise would have constituted a relevant circumstance as identifying the outer 
limit of the New Zealand continental shelf against the outer limit of the Australian EEZ. 
That is to say, the presence of the two Australian islands, as a relevant circumstance has 
wasted any opportunity for the natural prolongation circumstance to be effective. 
Accordingly, another requirements of the natural prolongation relevant 
circumstance is that, it must be subject to the balancing process which will help to 
identify the due weight that it must be given in a particular case. Regarding this 
condition, it is doubtful that the natural prolongation relevant circumstance can be given 
partial effect. In fact, it is more likely that this relevant circumstance can either be given 
full effect or no effect at all due to its special nature. 
V 
Mineral Deposits 
The Customary Solution 
Before this Subsection proceeds, some notes are important to be provided. First, 
the term 'mineral deposits' is meant here to include not only petroleum or natural gas 
but also any mineral or non-living natural resources, whether they are in the form of a 
field or structure, that is straddle underneath the continental shelf. Second, this 
Subsection is going to deal with the Customary solution of the common mineral 
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deposits, as to whether they constitute a relevant circumstance or not. As for the 
Conventional solution concerning common mineral deposits - whether they constitute a 
special circumstance or not -, it will be dealt with in the Fifth Chapter. Accordingly, 
the historical background of the problem of common mineral deposits is going to be 
deferred for discussion in that Chapter also. 
The main questions that identify the direction of discussion in this subsection are: 
do common mineral deposits constitutes a relevant circumstance? What are the 
applicable rules and principles to such a problem? And, what are the available solutions 
of this issue? 
Common mineral deposits have been a matter of concern since the early 
development of the doctrine of the continental shelf. 108 However, it was not until the 
1969 North Sea Cases that common mineral deposits were, explicitly adopted as a 
factor to be considered in the continental shelf delimitations between States. According 
to the ICJ, one of the factors to be taken into account is, 
"2- so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological structure, and 
natural resources, of the continental shelf areas involved; ". 
109 
A two-point comment is called for here. First, the main issue concerning 
common mineral deposits is that such deposits extend underneath the continental shelf 
and might lie on both sides of a dividing line between two States. Consequently, 
"..., a problem immediately arises on account of the risk of prejudicial or wasteful 
exploitation by one or other of the States concerned. " 110 
Second, the preservation of the unity of deposits has, therefore, become, according to 
the International Court, the focal point of the factor of common mineral deposits, and 
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this unity becomes the relevant circumstance. 111 
Commenting on the 1969 ICJ's judgement, Professor Brown said that, 
"[tjhe existence of the deposit would scarcely seem to constitute a "special circumstance, " 
however, entitling a coastal State to demand a deviation from the equidistance line. " 112 
However, relying on the Grisbadarna principle of refraining from modifying a 
settled state of things, and on the historical right doctrine, Professor Brown's above- 
said conclusion was followed by an exception to the effect that mineral deposits could 
be considered a relevant circumstance, only, if 
"... a coastal State had acquired exclusive rights to such resources independently of, and 
prior to, the development of the continental shelf doctrine. "113 
The conclusion reached by Professor Brown was reaffirmed by Professor 
OCönnell who also relied on the Vested Rights doctrine to aid his conclusion. 114 
Contrary to this conclusion, judge Padilla put his view saying, 
"In addition to special situations of a technical nature-..., indivisible deposits of mineral 
oil or natural gas, etc. -... have been regarded as special circumstances. " 115 
More recently, the mineral deposits circumstance was dealt with in two other 
cases. In the Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) Conciliation of 1981, the potential presence 
of hydrocarbon deposits in the Jan Mayen Ridge was one of the prime factors that had 
underlain the choice of the location of the delimitational line. This meaning was 
provided by the Conciliation Commission when it stated its four considerations. One 
of these considerations was that, the bnly area which contains the possibility of finding 
hydrocarbons is considered to be available in the Jan Mayen Ridge situated between Jan 
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Mayen and the Icelandic 200 EEZ. 116 Thus, based on this and the other 
considerations, the Commission recommended the outer limit of the Icelandic EEZ to be 
the boundary line, and concerning Jan Mayen Ridge, it recommended the establishment 
of a common zone for joint development. 117 
Although it was not dealt with directly, mineral deposits factor played an 
important role in the Tunisia/Libya Case in 1982. The granting of petroleum 
concessions by both Parties to their nationals - as forming the parties conduct -, was the 
dominant consideration that had underlain the establishment of a de facto line (angle 26° 
line). This line was taken up by the ICJ and subsequently adopted as the dividing line 
of the first sector of delimitation of the continental shelf concerned. 118 That is to say, 
the conduct of granting concessions by both parties was motivated by a subconsciously 
acceptable division of the petroleum deposits present in the area. Yet one can say that, 
rý 
if there had been no petroleum deposits in the area concerned, there would not have 
been any conduct between the parties, and subsequently the Court would have to rely 
on circumstances other than the conduct of the parties. This finding proves that the 
presence of petroleum deposits was, though indirectly, the decisive factor that affected 
the choice of method of delimitation in the first sector of the area concerned. 
Due to the shortage of the requisite scientific knowledge, the extent of mineral 
deposits fields or structures, as they straddle underneath the continental shelf, are, in 
practice, quite difficult to be identified. In order to bridge this gap, numerous States 
have provided a special conditional provision in the agreements concerning the 
delimitation of their continental shelves. Out of a collection of 80 agreements, 43 
agreements have provided such a conditional provision. The remaining 37 agreements 
have kept silent concerning the problem of common mineral deposits. The principal 
purpose of this conditional provision was to oversee a solution, or a method of 
solution, if a problem would arise out of a subsequent discovery of a mineral deposit 
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extending across the delimitational line. Almost all these conditional provisions had, 
with minor differences, similar or identical contents. A symbolic provision could be 
found in the following selected Article. 
"If any single geological petroleum or natural gas structure extend across the boundary 
line ... and the part of such structure which 
is situated on one side of the line is 
exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of the said line, the two governments 
shall seek to reach agreement as to the manner in which that structure shall be most 
effectively exploited. " 119 
Examining the available State practi' the following remarks can be made. First, 
agreements which provided a conditional provision concerning mineral deposits 
constitute about 54% of the total available agree ments, (43 out of 80). The remaining 
46% have not provided such a conditional provision, (37 out of 80). That is to say, 
although the agreements that adopted the said provision constitute the majority, this 
majority is a small majority with a difference of 4% only. So, it is quite difficult to say 
that there is a widespread State practice concerning the mineral deposits issue. Yet 
studying the said 43 agreements, one can realize that the adopted conditional 
provisions, though similar, have provided a variety of solutions. To begin with 32 
agreements left the matter for a future agreement. However, 22 of these 32 agreements 
provided the agreement solution without clarifying according to what sort of rules and 
principles such an agreement must be reached. 120 The remaining 10 agreements of the 
said 32 agreements, adopted either the agreement solution which would secure an 
equitable share to each party, 121 or the agreement solution that would secure those parts 
of the common deposit that were originally located in its share of the continental 
shelf. 122 
In the second place, five agreements referred to the agreement solution provided 
that in default of agreement the parties would resort to arbitration, (two of these 5 
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agreements provided that the arbitration decision must secure an apportionment of the 
common deposit proportional to the volume of resources on each side of the 
boundary); 123 four agreements have established a protected zone on both sides of the 
boundary line within which no State has the right of exploitation unless by a 
subsequent mutual agreement; 124 one agreement referred to an apportionment of the 
common deposit proportional to the volume of resources on each side of the boundary 
line; 125 and one agreement left the power of decision to a joint commission which was 
established by the agreement itself, provided that the commission's solution should 
secure an equitable share to each party. 126 
Second, in order to find out the underlying reason of States' behaviour, almost all 
attempts to classify those agreements which have, and which have not, provided the 
said conditional provision, have failed, due to the fact that they belong to a wide variety 
of situations. 127 
Third, it is quite difficult, then, to generalize any specific justification, which, (as 
an evidence of the opinio juris) identify why those States did, or did not, provide a 
conditional provision concerning their common mineral deposits. 
Fourth, State practice as such cannot be helpful to establish any customary rule 
relating to the common mineral deposits issue. This conclusion which does not go in 
line with Onorato's conclusion, does not mean, at all, that the mineral deposits issue is 
left in a legal vacuum without any proper solution. 128 It, also, does not mean that a 
solution effected by agreement is not acceptable. The only thing it does mean is that 
State practice to date is not helpful to establish a customary rule to the effect that if a 
mineral deposit field is discovered extending across the dividing line of the continental 
shelf, the parties are under an obligation to resort to negotiations in order to reach an 
agreement. 
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Fifth, as State practice is not sufficient to establish any rule concerning the 
common mineral deposits issue, the matter is to be left to the general rules and 
principles of the continental shelf doctrine and to those of General International Law. 
Searching the latter field one can find that there is a general customary principle to 
submit to negotiations any dispute arising between two or more States concerning any 
international issue; and failing agreement the parties are under an obligation to resort to 
the other possible means, available in International Law, the last of which is to invoke 
an arbitral or judicial settlement. 129 
With regard to the general rules and principles of the continental shelf doctrine, it 
is well established that there is a customary rule to submit any dispute relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States to negotiations; and 
"the parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at 
an agreement, ... , 
"130 [In addition], "... if, ..., the delimitation leaves to the parties 
areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them in agreed proportions or, failing 
agreement, equally, unless they decide on a r6gime of joint jurisdiction, user, or 
exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them; ". 131 
From these, one can deduce the following rules and principles concerning any 
dispute relating to the common mineral deposits issue: 
1- No one State is allowed to exploit a mineral deposit field or structure 
unilaterally if this deposit is discovered to extend on both sides of the dividing 
line of the continental shelf, unless it does so with the consent of the other 
States concerned. If a unilateral exploitation has already taken place by one or 
more of the involved States, these States are responsible towards the other 
concerned States for an adequate and proper compensation. 
2- The parties to a common mineral deposit are under an obligation to enter into 
negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement. 
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3- Failing agreement the dispute must be submitted to an arbitral or judicial 
settlement which will decide the appropriate solution. 
As for rule 1, which prohibits a unilateral exploitation of a common mineral 
deposit it is a logical consequence of the basic rules and principles of the continental 
shelf entitlement. The delimitational line of the continental shelf between States is 
supposed to identify the limits of their national jurisdiction inter se. Now, if a mineral 
deposit field or structure is discovered to extend on both sides of such a line, it means 
that both States are entitled to the part of the deposit which is located within its national 
jurisdiction limits; i. e., both States have the same right concerning such a deposit. As a 
consequence, any unilateral exploitation from one State will constitute an encroachment 
on the national jurisdiction of the other State. Thus a solution by agreement or 
arbitration will be the best solution for both States since it involves the will of them 
both. 
During the course of negotiations, the parties are absolutely free to decide 
whatever suits them including the invocation of arbitration or judicial settlement. As 
will be seen below, State practice offers an interesting variety of solutions that States 
can follow when facing such a problem. The important thing to say here is that, resort 
to negotiations must be meaningful. Each party must try its best to arrive at an 
agreement; and each of them must not insist upon his position without contemplating 
any modification of it. 132 
In default of agreement, the parties are under an obligation to submit to arbitration 
or judicial settlement any dispute relating to the common mineral deposits. The arbitral 
or judicial organ can choose an equal division, or proportional division, or the 
establishment of a common zone for joint development, or any other solution the 
judicial organ may find as appropriate to the dispute concerned. 
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Having discussed the applicable rules and principles of the problem of common 
mineral deposits, the discussion now turns to the available solutions of such a problem. 
State practice offers an interesting variety of examples of solutions that can be followed 
when facing the problem of common mineral deposits. In the first instance, one can 
find those States which have tried to avoid the whole problem of common deposits by 
establishing a common zone for the purpose of joint exploitation or development. 
Examples of this can be found in the Japan/Korea agreement of 5 February, 1974, 
which established a Common Zone for the purpose of joint development of the 
southern part of the continental shelf adjacent to both countries; in the Bahrain/Saudi 
Arabia agreement of 22 February, 1968, the Parties designed a Common Zone in the 
Saafa Hexagon which would be developed as Saudi Arabia saw fit, but the two 
governments would share equally the received revenue; similarly, Abu Dhabi/Qatar 
agreement of 20 March, 1969, established the Al-Bunduq Joint Development Zone, 
which would be exploited by Abu Dhabi and the received revenue would be shared 
equally by the two governments; the France/Spain agreement of 29 January, 1974, 
established a Joint Zone for the purpose of equal opportunities of exploitation for both 
Parties; the Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) agreement of 22 October, 1981, designed a 
Common Zone for joint development in which each Party was entitled to participate in a 
share of 25% of the petroleum activities in the areas which would fall within the part of 
the Zone that belonged to the other Party; and finally, the Sudan/Saudi Arabia 
agreement of 14 May, 1974, established a Common Zone in which each party had an 
equal right of exploration and exploitation. 
Other agreements tried to face the problem of common mineral deposits by 
suggesting the manner which could help them to overcome such a problem. As has 
been seen above, numerous solutions can be found in those agreements. For instance, 
some agreements suggested effecting a solution by agreement; others suggested an 
arbitral solution as an alternative when failing agreement; others established a protected 
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zone within which none of the parties was allowed to initiate any exploitation unless by 
agreement with the other party; others established a joint commission which would 
solve any problem relating to common mineral deposits; others suggested a division 
proportional to the volume of the resources on each side of the delimitational line; and 
finally, one can find those States which although have suggested a solution by 
agreement they preserve for themselves an equitable share of the resources, and others 
preserve for themselves all those resources that are located on their portion of the 
continental shelf-133 
The apportionment of a common mineral deposit can be done in various forms. 
The simplest form is to effect an equal division of the common deposit, or an equal 
share of the received revenue, or equal opportunities of exploitation for the parties 
involved. Another form is to effect a division proportional to the extent of the common 
deposit on each side of the delimitational line. Assuming that 70% of a common 
deposit is located on State A's side of the dividing line and only 30% of the deposit is 
located on the side of State B, the proper proportion of division of the deposit, or share 
of the received revenue, will be 70% to State A and only 30% to State B. Obviously, 
the proportional method of division is the ideal-equitable solution of the problem of the 
common mineral deposits. However, this solution is not always feasible due to the 
lack of the requisite scientific knowledge that is able to identify the exact extent of such 
deposits. 134 
The method of proportional division of a common mineral deposit can be effected 
by relying on various criteria other than the volume of resources on each side of the 
delimitational line. Because States are absolutely free to choose whatever method of 
division, they might base their division of a common mineral deposit on criteria such as 
the economic, political, or legal criteria. This case, for instance, occurred in the 
Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) agreement of 22 October, 1981, in which the economic 
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circumstances of Iceland were the dominant factor during the negotiations and the 
Conciliation. 135 
Conclusion 
Having examined the problem of common mineral deposits, it is found that State 
practice is not sufficient to establish any rule applicable to the problem. The applicable 
rules, therefore, are those of the general doctrine of the continental shelf and those of 
General International Law, namely, the agreement solution or alternatively the arbitral 
or judicial solution. 
Common mineral deposits have been considered a relevant circumstance in some 
cases. This can be found in the Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) Conciliation of 1981, 
Tunisia/Libya case of 1982, and in those agreements which have established a common 
zone for the purpose of joint development. In the first two instances the drawing of the 
boundary line was based on, inter alia, the presence of petroleum deposits in the area 
concerned. In the latter instance - the establishment of a common zone -, the drawing 
of a continental shelf boundary line became a minor issue. Due to the presence of 
mineral deposits, the concerned States abandoned completely the drawing of any 
boundary line, and instead, they designed a common zone and co-ordinated their rights 
of exploitation. 
However, common mineral deposits have been considered a separate problem in 
the majority of cases. This can be found in those agreements which drew their 
boundary lines regardless of the presence of any mineral deposit field or structure. 
Although some of these agreements indicated to the manner according to which they 
would solve any problem relating to common mineral deposits, and others did not, this 
would not change the fact that they all drew final boundary lines and left the problem of 
common mineral deposits to be solved separately in the future. 
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Although the preservation of the unity of deposits is the major issue in the 
common mineral deposits problem, States can agree to the contrary. In practice, the 
unity of common deposits has not been preserved to one of the parties at the exclusion 
of the others. Rather, the unity of common mineral deposits has been, in the majority 
of cases, preserved for the benefit of all States concerned. This can be seen through the 
variety of solutions of the common mineral deposits problem available in State practice. 
Various solutions of the apportionment of common mineral deposits can be found 
in State practice, such as, an equal division of the deposit, equal rights of exploitation, 
equal shares of the received revenue, a division proportional to the volume of resources 
on each side of the delimitation line, and rights of exploitation proportional to the 
volume of resources on each side of the delimitation line. 
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Legal Relevant Circumstances 
The legal circumstances are the most important category of relevant 
circumstances. The reason for this is that once States establish any legal conduct 
between, or towards, each other, this establishes legal rights and duties enforceable 
among themselves, and in face of the other States. The legal power of the legal 
circumstances, therefore, stems not only from the continental shelf doctrine, but also 
from the doctrine of General International Law. 
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This subsection is mainly interested in three legal relevant circumstances, namely, 
Navigation and Fishing Rights, Historic Rights, and the Conduct of the Parties. These 
three circumstances are going to be discussed in order to see whether they constitute 
relevant circumstances or not, and if they do, to what extent they can play such a role. 
However, it is important to note that the discussion will not attempt any historical 
background concerning the evolution of these circumstances during the early 
development of the continental shelf doctrine. For, this background will be the subject 
of the Chapter V, which will deal mainly with the special circumstances and their 
evolution. 
Navigation and Fishing Rights 
The continental shelf doctrine is based on the seabed and its non-living resources; 
and it has nothing to do with the waters that superjacent the continental shelf. 
According to the basic concepts of the Law of the Sea, the waters above the continental 
shelf, and of course beyond the territorial sea, are the subject matter of the doctrine of 
the freedom of the high seas; and its living resources are the subject matter of the 
fishing and conservation of fishing in the high seas doctrine, and the fishing zone 
doctrine. Therefore, it has been quite difficult to see the connection between the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States and the role of navigation and 
fishing rights in such a process, unless it relies on a doctrine different from that of the 
continental shelf. On the contrary, fishing rights concerning non-living resources of 
the continental shelf are more plausible when playing such a role in the delimitation 
question. 
However, the emergence of the EEZ which embraces in a single doctrine the 
living and non-living resources of the seabed and its superjacent waters within the 
limits of 200 nautical miles from the shore, has caused real confusion with regard to the 
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role of navigation and fishing rights in the delimitation question of the EEZ and the 
continental shelf. There are two reasons for this. The first is that, the EEZ doctrine 
comprehends the continental shelf within its limits; and the second is that, the recent 
history of the EEZ and the continental shelf doctrines has shown that the new trend of 
States is to draw one single boundary line for their maritime space instead of a different 
boundary for each maritime zone. 
The question, which remains to be examined, therefore, is, can navigation and 
fishing rights constitute a relevant circumstance when delimiting the continental shelf? 
As the ICJ was obsessed with the geological and geographical structure of the 
continental shelf of the parties to the 1969 cases, its examples of relevant circumstances 
remained within the limits of the geophysical considerations. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the Court did not put any "... legal limit to the considerations which States may take 
account of ... 
', 136 when delimiting their continental shelves, this left the door ajar for 
any relevant consideration to be included therein. The subsequent cases and State 
practice are, therefore, the best fields to search for the answer to the above-said 
question. 
As the British claimed a 12-mile Fishery Zone around the Channel Islands in 
1964, and this was recognized by the French, the Tribunal in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration (1977-78) regarded that as a relevant circumstance. 137 This circumstance 
was backed by some other circumstances resulting in an enclaved method of 
delimitation around the Channel Islands. Obviously, the presence of the said fishery 
zone was not invoked under the entitlement of fishery rights. Rather, it was invoked 
under the conduct of the parties title; for, the Tribunal emphasized that it was an 
"existing fishery zone" claimed by the British, and "... expressly recognized by the 
French.... "138 
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Both France and the UK invoked the navigational defence circumstance to aid 
their contentions. After a considerable examination of this circumstance, the Tribunal 
concluded it to be one of the circumstances which, "... tend to evidence the 
predominant interest of the French Republic in the southern areas of the English 
Channel, ". 139 
In the Tunisia/Libya case, (1982), Tunisia claimed fishery rights under the title of 
historic rights. 140 Distancing itself from any discussion relating to the historic rights 
question, the Court excluded the Tunisian contention from consideration basing its 
decision on the ground that the final boundary line would 
"... undoubtedly leave Tunisia in the full and undisturbed exercise of those rights - 
whatever they may be - over the area claimed to be subject to them, so far as opposable to 
Libya, .... 
"141 
From this, an observation can be made. At first sight, it seems that the Court has not 
regarded the claimed fishery rights of Tunisia as an independent relevant circumstance 
which would have affected the choice of method of delimitation. However, as is 
evident by the rest of the Court's judgement, a deeper examination of this judgement 
proves that the Court has taken the Tunisian claims of fishery rights into account as an 
element of the Tunisian/Libyan conduct towards each other. 142 
Both Canada and the USA, the parties to the Gulf of Maine Case of 1984, 
claimed fishery rights concerning particular areas of the Gulf. 143 The Chamber, 
however, rejected both Parties' contentions saying that, 
"It is, ..., evident that the respective scale of activities connected with fishing - ... - 
cannot be taken into account as a relevant circumstance or, if the term is preferred, as an 
equitable criterion to be applied in determining the delimitation line. " 144 
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Moreover, in order to clarify when the socio-economic factors - including fishery rights 
- can be considered a relevant circumstance, the Chamber noted that such a 
circumstance must be 
"... likely to entail catastrophic repercussion for the livelihood and economic well-being 
of the population of the countries concerned. " 145 
Similarly, the parties to the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Arbitration invoked the fishery 
rights issue under the economic circumstances title. 146 Nevertheless, the Tribunal 
rejected these contentions clarifying that, it had no power to remedy the natural 
inequality. 147 Besides, indicating to the ICJ judgement of 1982 concerning 
Tunisia/Libya Case, the Tribunal said that, in order for the economic factor to be 
considered a relevant circumstance it must be of a permanent nature. 148 
Bearing in mind what has been seen above, 149 as far as State practice is 
concerned, it has been quite difficult to discover the real relevant circumstances that 
have influenced States during the drawing of their continental shelf or their maritime 
boundaries. However, the presence of navigation and fishing rights circumstance 
could be deduced from a few agreements. For instance, in the agreement between 
F. R. Germany and German D. R., of 29 June, 1974, the boundary line was very likely 
to have been affected by the presence of Shipping Rout 3.150 Similarly, the boundary 
line of the Argentina/ Uruguay agreement of 19 November, 1973, was found to 
generally follow the navigation channel. 151 
The presence of Traditional fishery rights induced some States to establish a 
special fishery zone in which such traditional rights would be protected. These can be 
found in the Colombia/Ecuador agreement of 23 August, 1975, according to which the 
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Parties established a Special Zone of 10 Miles on both sides of the boundary line and 
beyond 12 mile from the coast of each country. This Special Zone is, without 
recognition of any fishing rights, designed to protect "... the accidental presence of 
local fishermen of either country ... 
" within it. 152 Being supplementary to the 
Chile/Peru/Ecuador Declaration of 18 August, 1952, the Chile/Ecuador/Peru 
Declaration of 4 December, 1954, established two 10-mile Special Maritime Frontier 
Zones on each side of the boundary line of the respective States and beyond 12 miles 
from their shores, (within these 12 miles, fishery rights were exclusively preserved to 
the nationals of the country concerned). These Special Maritime Frontier Zones were to 
avoid inadvertent violations of the maritime boundaries by national fishermen of the 
States concerned. 153 The Kenya/Tanzania agreement of 9 July, 1976 provided that, ".. 
Indigenous fishermen from both countries engaged in fishing for subsistence, be 
permitted to fish within 12 nautical miles of either side of the territorial sea boundary in 
accordance with existing regulations. "154 Although Australia/Papua New Guinea 
agreement of 18 December, 1978, established a fishing boundary different from that of 
the continental shelf, (it coincided only in some of its parts with the continental shelf 
boundary, ) it created a Protected Zone the main purpose of which was to "... 
acknowledge and protect the traditional way of life and livelihood of the traditional 
inhabitants including their traditional fishing and free movement. " 155 
From the preceding paragraphs one can deduce the following conclusions. First, 
the presence of navigable channels and fishing rights have been invoked as a relevant 
circumstance in numerous cases. However, in the majority of these cases the said 
rights were invoked under the title of other relevant circumstances - such as economic, 
historic and defence circumstances -, rather than under their own title. 
Second, the presence of fishing rights has never, to date, been accepted as an 
independent relevant circumstance. That is to say, the presence of fishing rights is very 
unlikely to be considered a relevant circumstance unless it is backed by the presence of 
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other factors such as the conduct of the parties, or historic rights, or economic or 
political factors. 
Third, that is, of course, not to say that the presence of navigation and fishing 
rights is left unprotected. In fact, in cases where such rights exist, some precautional 
measures have been taken. In some cases the final boundary line secured a free and 
undisturbed exercise of the claimed fishing rights to the claimant State. In others, a 
protected zone, or a buffer zone, or a fishery boundary line different from that of the 
continental shelf was designed. The purpose of these zones was either to protect the 
exercise of the existing traditional fishing rights or to protect inadvertent breaches of the 
boundary line by the local fishermen. 
Finally, it is suggested that two differentiations can be made. The first, which is 
in line with Professor Brown's viewpoint, 156 is concerned with the differentiation 
between sedentary fishery, and any other non-living natural resources fishery rights 
that belong to the continental shelf and its subsoil, on the one hand, and those of the 
living resources, on the other. The second is to differentiate between delimitation of a 
continental shelf boundary, and delimitation of a single maritime boundary. If it was a 
question of a continental shelf delimitation, so living resources fishery rights are very 
unlikely to constitute a relevant circumstance, due to the fact that such rights are not 
related to the continental shelf entitlement. On the contrary, sedentary and non-living 
natural resources fishery rights are very likely to constitute a relevant circumstance 
when delimiting the continental shelf, provided that such rights have been acquired 
prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine. 157 
Nevertheless, in case of a single maritime boundary delimitation, living as well as 
non-living natural resources fishery rights may constitute a relevant circumstance, if 
these rights are concerned with areas that are located within the 200-mile EEZ limits, 
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and if the rights to the living resources have been acquired prior to the establishment of 
the EEZ doctrine. As for the non-living natural resources fishery rights, their title have 
to have been acquired prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine, 
whether they fall within or outside the 200-mile limits of the EEZ, because non-living 
resources rights already belong to the continental shelf doctrine. 
Historic Rights 
Before this subsection embarks on a discussion of the historic rights relevant 
circumstance, it is necessary to give a brief account of the historic rights doctrine. 
Although the historic rights doctrine belongs to General International Law, it mainly 
has been developed through some of the Law of the Sea issues. 158 Historic waters, 
historic bays and historic fishery rights have been the main concern of the said Law of 
the Sea issues. The doctrine of historic rights is not yet a settled question in 
International Law. However, regardless of the controversial views concerning this 
doctrine, this Subsection is basically interested in the prime, and generally accepted, 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for States to be able to invoke an historic title. 
Numerous arbitral and Judicial decisions have dealt with the conditions of historic 
titles. According to these decisions, three principal conditions must be available in 
order to invoke an historic title. These are: 1- there must be an effective and continuous 
display of State authority, with the intention and will to do so, over the area in 
question; 159 2- the acquiescence of the other States in the meaning that no objection or 
protest, concerning the display of the concerned State authority has been made; 160 and 
3- the lapse of a long period of time. 161 
Is it possible for an historic title to play the role of a relevant circumstance? 
\t 
J 
As to the answer to this question Professor O'connell says no; because, 
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"... the continental shelf doctrine of 'inherency' is deliberately aimed against the 
operation of the ordinary rule relating to historic rights, so that what is excluded as a 
matter of doctrine cannot be allowed to re-enter as a matter of exception. - 162 
To this, one can say that, the continental shelf doctrine is not an absolute doctrine 
which has no exceptions at all. Although the entitlement over the continental shelf 
exists ipso facto and ab initio in favour of the coastal States, the inclusion of the natural 
prolongation concept, proportionality and the open-ended list of relevant, (or special), 
circumstances have rendered the continental shelf doctrine riddled with exceptions. 
These exceptions are, in fact, part and parcel of the doctrine itself. As far as the early 
development of the continental shelf doctrine is concerned, historic rights circumstance, 
though an exception, has been one of the component of this doctrine. 163 That is to say, 
according to this contention, historic rights might be able to constitute a relevant 
circumstance, or not, depending on the calculations of each individual case. 
Professor Brown differentiates between historic rights relating to historic bays or 
historic waters, and those relating to sedentary fisheries. As far as sedentary fisheries, 
and any other natural resources of the seabed, are concerned, historic rights can, 
according to Professor Brown, constitute a special (or relevant) circumstance, if the title 
has been acquired prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine. IM As for 
historic bays and historic waters, Professor Brown believes that they "... will very 
seldom be relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf as distinct from 
delimitation of the territorial sea. "165 That is because historic bays and historic waters 
questions affect more the baselines, which in turn will affect the breadth of the 
territorial sea-166 
In the Tunisia/Libya Case, (1982), Tunisia invoked the historic rights 
circumstance concerning areas which belonged either to the continental shelf in the legal 
sense or to its territorial and internal waters. The ICJ did not desire to go into a detailed 
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discussion concerning the historic rights issue. This can be deduced from the Court's 
citation of the failure of international efforts to reach an acceptable-to-all judicial regime 
of historic bays and historic waters. 167 Rather, the Court developed its argument by 
distinguishing between those areas that belonged to the territorial and internal waters 
and those which belonged to the continental shelf. Regarding the latter areas, the Court 
tried, and, in fact, succeeded to delimit the. continental shelf boundary, leaving Tunisia 
"... in the full and undisturbed exercise of those rights - .... 
"168 In so doing, the 
Court avoided any discussion as to whether the Tunisian claims constitute true historic 
rights or not, and whether such historic rights can constitute a relevant circumstance or 
not. However, it seems that, although the Court avoided any such discussion, it 
indicated to an important fording. That is, if the delimitation line was to deprive Tunisia 
from the full and undisturbed exercise of its historic rights, these rights would have 
constituted a relevant circumstance. For, the avoidance of discussing the historic rights 
issue must be understood as an objective avoidance and not to the disadvantage of one 
of the parties. Thus, when the Court argued its reasoning, it could be understood to 
have in mind two requirements for a historic title to be regarded as a relevant 
circumstance. The first is concerned with certain prerequisites of a title to be regarded 
as a true historic right, 169 and the second is concerned with the location of the areas 
within which the historic rights are claimed to be. If the delimitation line did not 
encroach upon the areas of historic rights, these rights would not constitute a relevant 
circumstance, though they would be true historic rights. On the contrary, if the 
delimitation line was to encroach upon such areas, the historic rights would constitute a 
relevant circumstance by means of justifying a deviation from the delimitation line. 
It is, therefore, the test of the disproportionally distorting effect concept that will 
identify whether historic rights constitute a relevant circumstance or not. If such rights 
exist in areas which if they are ignored produce a disproportionally distorting effect, 
these rights are to be considered a relevant circumstance, and vice versa. The 
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disproportionally distorting effect of the presence of historic rights is, therefore, the 
decisive element which has the final say in regarding such rights as a relevant 
circumstance. 
As for those areas which belonged to the territorial sea and internal waters, the 
ICJ began its discussion by excluding them from being contended by Tunisia to be "... 
co-extensive with the area claimed as that of historic rights; .... 
"170 However, as 
Tunisia asked the Court to exclude these areas from the calculation of proportionality, 
the International Court, surprisingly, rejected this demand saying that, 
"... the element of proportionality is related to lengths of the coasts of the States 
concerned, not to straight baselines drawn around those coasts. [And] ...; since it is a 
question of proportionality, the only absolute requirement of equity is that one should 
compare like with like. " 171 
Now, does this mean that the Court disregarded those historic rights, which belong to 
the territorial and internal waters, as not constituting a relevant circumstance? In fact, 
the Court not only disregarded these rights from being a relevant circumstance in favour 
of Tunisia, but also encroached upon the Tunisian seabed areas which were not a 
continental shelf in the true legal sense. This encroachment was done at the expense of, 
and to the disadvantage of Tunisia 172 
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that the question of whether an 
historic title can constitute a relevant circumstance or not is not a settled question. This 
is due to the complexity of the issue and the lack of a judicial regime to cover all the 
aspects of historic titles. However, it seems that historic rights might constitute a 
relevant circumstance if they satisfy the following requirements. First, in order to 
constitute a true historic right, the tide must satisfy three prerequisites, namely, 
effective display of the concerned State authority, the acquiescence of the other States, 
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and the lapse of a long period of time. Second, the entitlement of historic rights have to 
have been acquired prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine. Third, 
historic rights must be aided by the conduct of the concerned parties as indicating their 
acquiescence. And lastly, the areas, where historic rights are claimed to be present, 
must be able to produce a disproportionally distorting effect in the meaning that if the 
boundary line ignores them, the concerned parties will be deprived of the full and 
undisturbed exercise of their historic rights. 
The Conduct of the Parties 
The conduct of the parties denotes the legal attitude of States concerning the 
identification of the limitations of their sphere of jurisdiction vis ä vis each other. This 
conduct can be deduced from any legal document, or measure, produced, or taken by 
States, such as the laws, regulations, decrees, declarations, proclamations, international 
agreements, internal and international judicial decisions, and so on. As such, the 
conduct of the parties stems from General International Law rather than from the Law 
of the Sea or the continental shelf doctrine. 
The conduct of the concerned parties is the most important relevant circumstance 
in the delimitation question of the continental shelf between States. Due to its high legal 
credibility, the conduct of the parties plays, successfully, its role as the most dominant 
relevant circumstance; for it indicates the local traditional limitations of States' spheres 
of jurisdiction according to their own viewpoint and their own legal history. This 
Subsection is interested in examining how far the conduct of the parties can constitute a 
relevant circumstance and how much the weight of such a circumstance is. 
The first case, in which the conduct of the parties circumstance was invoked, was 
the 1969 North Sea Cases. Denmark and the Netherlands invoked Germany's conduct 
concerning the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, as evidence of the obligatory 
character of the Convention on Germany. 173 The Court rejected this contention, 
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because, "... none of the elements invoked is decisive; each is ultimately negative or 
inconclusive; all are capable of varying interpretations or explanations. "174 In another 
instance, the Court also rejected Denmark and the Netherlands invocation of the already 
concluded agreements concerning their respective territorial waters with Germany, as 
indicating the obligatory character of the equidistance principle on Germany. 175 
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, (1977-78), the Tribunal relied on, inter alia, the 
conduct of the party's circumstance in order to identify the method of delimitation in the 
Channel Islands area. 176 Examining the UK conduct, the Tribunal found that, 
although the Channel Islands enjoyed "... a very large measure of political, legislative, 
administrative and economic autonomy; ... ", 
177 they were "... separate islands of the 
United Kingdom, not separate States. "178 
The ICJ in the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Case, relied to a larger extent on the conduct of 
the parties circumstance in order to identify the course of the boundary line in the first 
sector. 179 At least three contentions were discussed in the light of the conduct of the 
concerned parties. The first was the 1910 Convention which established the land 
frontier between the two countries. 180 After discussing the subsequent conduct of 
Tunisia and Libya, and their predecessors, the Court concluded that, it regarded "... the 
1910 Convention as important for the consideration of the present case, .... "181 
As Tunisia invoked the ZV45° line, the Court, after examining the conduct of both 
Parties, rejected the line because Tunisia relied on "... unilateral acts, internal legislative 
measures, which were never the subject of agreement by Libya. "182 Furthermore, the 
line ZV45° "... constitutes a unilateral claim, but was never a line plotted for the 
purpose of lateral maritime delimitation, .... "183 
Eventually, while the Court was examining the conduct of Tunisia and Libya, it 
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realized that a de facto line was present at an angle of 26°. 1M Having been confirmed 
by the conduct of both countries, the line 26° was adopted by the Court as the 
delimitation line of the first sector. 185 
Canada and the USA, the parties to the Gulf of Maine Case, (1984), invoked their 
conduct in order to aid their contentions. 186 The Chamber examined the conduct of 
both States and found that, 
"[t]he submissions formulated by both Canada and the United States at the end of the oral 
proceedings only served to confirm the line which each Party had presented in its initial 
written submissions. " 187 
In the search for a proper method of delimitation, the Chamber made another 
examination of the conduct of the Parties so as to see whether this conduct 
"... constituted an acquiescence by one of them in the application to the delimitation of a 
specific method advanced by the other Party, or precluded it from opposing such action, or 
whether such conduct might have resulted in a modus vivendi, respected in fact, with 
regard to a line corresponding to such an application. " 188 
Briefly, without going into further details, the result of the examination of the conduct 
of the Parties was negative. 189 
In the Libya/Malta Case, (1985), a brief examination of the conduct of the Parties 
was provided. However, This examination proved also to be negative. 190 
Existing Agreements 
One of the most important aspects of the conduct of the parties is the existing 
agreements. The significance of the existing agreements aspects stems from the fact 
that, whereas the other aspects of the conduct of the parties might reveal an implicit 
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agreement or a de facto situation, the existing agreements aspect is interested in the 
existing explicit agreements. That is to say, while the legal credibility of the former 
aspect might, sometimes, be questioned, the legal credibility of the latter is absolute, 
unless in default of its legality. 
4 
Existing agreements, circumstance; was relied on in State practice as well as in 
judicial cases. In State practice one can find examples such as, Bahrain/Iran 
agreements of 17 June, 1971; Brazil/France (French Guinea) agreement of 30 January, 
1981; Brazil/Uruguay agreement of 12 July, 1972; Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) 
agreement of 22 October, 1981; the Chile/Peru/ Ecuador Declaration of 4 December, 
1954; Poland/USSR agreement of 29 August, 1969; and Finland/USSR agreement of 
20 May, 1965.191 
In Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) Conciliation, 1981, the presence of an existing 
agreement played an important role in identifying the course of the boundary line. The 
1980 agreement between Iceland and Norway, which recognized the 200 Icelandic 
EEZ, was one of the factors that caused the final boundary line to coincide with the 
outer limit of the Icelandic 200-mile EEZ. 192 
As the, 19 May, 1910 Convention between the Bey of Tunisia and the Emperor 
of the Ottomans, established the land frontier between Tunisia and Libya; and as the 
implication of the said Convention was consolidated by the practice of both Tunisia and 
Libya during the subsequent history; the ICJ considered the Convention relevant to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf in the Tunisia/Libya Case in 1982.193 
Although the Tribunal In the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case of 1985, decided that 
the 12 May, 1886 Convention, which was held between France and Portugal and 
succeeded by the two Parties to this Case, did not establish the respective maritime 
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boundary, it took the Convention's boundary line into account when it was delimiting 
the maritime boundary in the first sector. 194 
Conclusion 
The conduct of the parties is the most important relevant circumstance of the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States. Any legal conduct - previous to the 
delimitation process - between the parties concerned must be evaluated in order to 
ascertain whether there is an agreement, explicit or implicit; or a de facto situation that 
can be utilized in the delimitation process of the continental shelf. In order for the 
conduct of the parties to be effective, it must satisfy the following conditions: 1- it must 
be decisive, in the meaning that it is not negative or inconclusive; 2- it must not be 
capable of varying interpretations or explanations; and 3- the conduct of the parties 
must be based on the ground of reciprocity, in the meaning that it reveals a mutual 
explicit or implicit agreement or a unilateral conduct which is followed by a subsequent 
acquiescence of the other parties concerned. 
II 
Economic & Political 
Relevant Circumstances 
Economic & Socio-economic Relevant Circumstances 
As a matter of fact, the continental shelf doctrine originally triggered off 
geographical as well as, and more effectively, economic considerations. The discovery 
of huge quantities of crude oil and other mineral deposits on, and underneath, the 
continental shelf attracted the ambition of the coastal States. The' dreamt of having 
powerful economic resources coming from the continental shelf, and to be 
subsequently added to their own. Out of such a dream the continental shelf doctrine 
emerged, and subsequently crystallized into a legal doctrine. Thus, the economic 
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factors occupy a high rank of importance in the governments' minds when they claim 
the extent of their continental shelf, and, as a subsidiary matter, the method of 
delimitation they accept. The economic factors are, therefore, the most likely 
underlying reason of States' differences which leads, and has, in fact, lead to disputes 
over overlapping claims concerning the continental shelf. 
"Economic Circumstances" is a general and wide-ranged term under the title of 
which numerous considerations can be included, such as, the presence of oil, gas or 
any other mineral deposits, the presence of fishery rights or interests, and the presence 
of other maritime interests concerning the continental shelf areas. As some of these 
issues have been dealt with individually in the previous Sections, this Section will be 
interested in the general conditions of the economic factors that might be able to 
constitute a relevant circumstance. 
The prime case to envisage, and to take account of, the economic circumstances 
of the parties concerned, was the Iceland/Norway (Jan Mayen) Conciliation, (1981). 
The economic circumstances of Iceland was one of the principal circumstances that 
affected the choice of the method of delimitation between the two Parties. In its final 
report the Conciliation Commission states that, 
"Special consideration has ... been given to the following factors: 
(a) Iceland is totally dependent on imports of hydrocarbon products. 
(b) The shelf surrounding Iceland is considered by scientists to have a very low 
hydrocarbon potential. 
(c) The Jan Mayen Ridge between Jan Mayen and the 200-mile economic zone of Iceland 
is the only area which is considered to have the possibility of finding hydrocarbons. The 
experts consider, however, the whole area to be a high geological risk. 
(d) The water depths overlying the Jan Mayen Ridge are too great to permit exploration 
using present technology. The distances from the natural markets for hydrocarbons-- 
especially gas--are great. Consequently, very large hydrocarbon discoveries would seem 
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necessary in order to make such finds commercial. " 195 
Obviously, all these considerations, beside being geological, are, in fact, of economic 
nature. 
Both parties to the Tunisia/Libya case of 1982, invoked contentions concerning 
economic factors. Tunisia claimed economic circumstances in two respects, namely, 
"... its relative poverty vis-ä-vis Libya in terms of absence of natural resources like 
agriculture and minerals, ... " and its claim concerning its historic fishing rights. 
196 
Libya rejected the Tunisian contention relating to its poverty and asked the court to 
consider the presence or absence of oil-wells as an indication to the geological natural 
prolongation. 197 In its reply, the Court says that, the economic considerations invoked 
by the Parties 
"... are virtually extraneous factors since they are variables which unpredictable national 
fortune or calamity, as the case may be, might at any time cause to tilt the scale one way 
or the other. " 198 
As Canada and the USA contended, inter alia, their fisheries interests under the 
title of socio-economic impact, the Chamber, in the Gulf of Maine Case, (1984), 
commented that, 
"[w]hat the Chamber would regard as a legitimate scruple lies rather in concern lest the 
overall result, even though achieved through the application of equitable criteria and the 
use of appropriate methods for giving them concrete effect, should unexpectedly be 
revealed as radically inequitable, that is to say, as likely to entail catastrophic repercussion 
for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population of the countries 
concerned. " 199 
Consequently, having carried out a test according to its own criteria, the Chamber 
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rejected the parties contentions concerning the economic circumstances. 200 
Malta invoked its economic circumstances as being poor and not having resources 
in the Libya/Malta case, 1985. In reply, the Court said that, it 
"... does not ... consider that a delimitation should be influenced by the relative economic 
position of the two States in question, in such a way that the area of continental shelf 
regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two States would be somewhat increased in 
order to compensated for its inferiority in economic resources. "201 
In the Guinea/Guinea Bissau case of 1985, both Parties claimed economic 
circumstances relating to their lack of resources, their development plans, marine 
transport, fishing, petroleum resources, and their maritime interests. 202 Having 
indicated to Paragraph 107 of the Tunisian/ Libya case, (1982), cited-above, the 
Tribunal concluded that, as it was 
"... concerned only with a contemporary evaluation, it would be neither just nor equitable 
to base a delimitation on the evaluation of data which changes in relation to factors that 
are sometimes uncertain. "203 
Furthermore, it, later on, said that, 
"[t]he boundaries fixed by man must not be designed to increase the difficulties of States 
or to complicate their economic life. The fact is that the Tribunal does not have the 
power to compensate for the economic inequalities of the States concerned by modifying a 
delimitation which it considers is called for by objective and certain considerations. 
Neither can it take into consideration the fact that economic circumstances may lead to 
one of the Parties being favoured to the detriment of the other where this delimitation is 
concerned. "204 
According to the above-cited paragraphs, in order for any economic factor to play 
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the role of a relevant circumstance, it must satisfy the following requirements: 
1- It must be of a permanent nature in the sense that it is not related to variable 
situations which are subject to change. 
2- It must be likely to entail catastrophic repercussion on the livelihood and 
economic well-being of the population of the concerned States, if it is not 
taken into account. 
3- It must satisfy the equity requirements, namely it must be examined on a 
mutual basis and it must be able to produce a disproportionally distorting 
effect. As equity does not necessarily imply equality; and as equity has not 
concerned itself with remedying the natural inequality; the function of the 
economic relevant circumstances will be restricted to producing a relative 
remedy to the situation involved. This relative remedy must be based on a 
mutual ground in the sense that the economic interests of all the parties 
concerned are taken into account and tested vis ä vis each other. In addition, 
the economic relevant circumstances of all the parties concerned must be 
subject to the weighing process which will identify who is entitled, if any, to 
claim successfully economic circumstances; it will also determine the degree 
of the disproportionally distorting effect of these circumstances, and the 
weight that may be given in the delimitation concerned. 
Political Relevant Circumstances 
The world contains various types of States, big and small, powerful and weak, 
developed and developing, etc.; and each of these States has its own ideology and 
beliefs which dictate its policy towards the other States. It is, therefore, quite hard to 
imagine any international relationship between States without realizing the genuine link 
between such relationship and the political influence of the States' ideologies and 
beliefs. The continental shelf Noundary is no exception. However, because political 
factors are very seldom released by States, this Subsection is going to examine, and to 
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recall some of the previous analysis of the available data in order to see if there is any 
possibility of deducing the general requirements of the said factors. 
As France and Britain asked the Tribunal to take account of their navigational 
defence and security interests present in the English Channel, the Tribunal after the 
proper examination of the available data, concluded that the said interests 
"... cannot be regarded by the Court as exercising a decisive influence on the delimitation 
of the boundary in the present case. They may support and strengthen, but they cannot 
negative, any conclusions that are already indicated by the geographical, political, and 
legal circumstances of the region which the court has identified. "205 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal eventually regarded the navigational defence and security 
interests as 
"... tend to evidence the predominant interests of the French Republic in the southern 
areas of the English Channel, a predominance which is also strongly indicated by its 
position as a riparian State along the whole of the Channel's south coast. " 206 
In the course of commenting on the fact that the Northeast Channel possessed the 
same character of unity and uniformity of the waters and seabed of the Gulf of Maine, 
which meant the absence of any natural boundary, the Tribunal, in the Gulf of Maine 
Case, 1984, stated that, 
"[i]t must, however, be emphasized that a delimitation, whether of maritime boundary or 
of a land boundary, is a legal-political operation, and that it is not the case that where a 
natural boundary is discernible, the political delimitation necessarily has to follow the 
same line. "207 
The Court in the Libya/Malta case, (1985), rejected Malta's contention that the 
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Parties' security and defence interests would favour the equidistance method. "208 
However, in its reply the Court stated that, 
"[s]ecurity considerations are of course not unrelated to the concept of the continental 
shelf. They referred to when this legal concept first emerged, particularly in the Truman 
Proclamation. "209 
Upon the invocation of the security circumstance of the parties to the 
Guinea/Guinea Bissau Case, (1985), the Tribunal commented that, 
"... neither the exclusive economic zone nor the continental shelf are zones of 
sovereignty. However, the implication that this circumstance might have had were 
avoided by the fact that, in its proposed solution, the Tribunal has taken care to insure 
that each State controls the maritime territories situated opposite its coasts and in their 
vicinity..... [The Tribunal's] ... prime objective 
has been to avoid that either Party, for 
one reason or another, should see rights exercised opposite its coast or in the immediate 
vicinity thereof, which could prevent the exercise of its own right to development or 
compromise its security. "210 
Few examples, of the influence of political circumstances on the delimitation 
question of the continental shelf, can be found in State practice. As the strategic 
importance of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf was magnified by the presence of exploitable 
oil deposits and the presence of the Strait of Hormuz, international political influence 
was very likely to have affected the continental shelf boundary making therein 
211 In 
the Caribbean Sea, the two agreements that were concluded between Venezuela and 
each of the USA and the Netherlands in 28 March, 1978, and 31 March, 1978, 
respectively, were said to have been influenced by, inter alia, political factors. The 
need to protect those far Antilles caused the Netherlands to cede additional continental 
shelf areas to Venezuela, whereas the desire to have an access to a democratic regime in 
Latin America caused the USA to draw a negotiated boundary line with Venezuela 
instead of a median line. 212 
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Thus, political factors appear in various forms. Examples of these can be found 
in security, defence, the desire to keep good relationship with other States, strategic 
importance, and other political interests which, for one reason or another, cannot be 
revealed, (such as the political factors of the conflict between Turkey and Greece 
concerning the Aegean Sea). 
In short, it seems that there is no limit to the political factors that may influence 
States during their negotiations concerning the boundary making of the continental 
shelf. However, it also seems that it is very unlikely that a judicial or arbitral organ will 
take into account any political factors which are not related to categories such as 
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security and defence. The reason for this is that, most of the political factors are 
changeable depending on the ambitions of the political regimes of States. On the 
contrary, security and defence factors are more related to the principal conditions of the 
survival and stability of States. 
Nevertheless, that is not to say that security, or defence, or any such like political 
factors, are going to be taken into account unconditionally. In fact, like the other 
relevant circumstances, political factors must satisfy certain conditions in order for them 
to be regarded as relevant circumstances. The most likely conditions are: political 
factors must be of a permanent, or at least of a relatively permanent, nature; they must 
be considered on mutual ground, i. e., the political factors of all the parties concerned 
must be taken into account; and finally, they must be able to produce a 
disproportionally distorting effect in the meaning that if they are not taken into account 
they endanger the survival and stable functioning conditions of the State concerned or 
compromise its security. 
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stcahm 3 
Conclusions 
Having studied the most likely categories of relevant circumstances, the following 
conclusions can be drawn. To begin with, relevant circumstances belong to a wide 
variety of considerations which can be classified into two main categories, namely, 
Physical Circumstances, and Non-Physical Circumstances. The First category contain 
circumstances which are of geographical and geological nature, whereas the Second 
contains circumstances such as legal, economic and political circumstances. 
Geographical relevant circumstances appear in various forms. The most likely 
forms are, the geographical configuration of the coasts, the general direction of the 
coasts, the presence of islands, and the geographical complexity of the area concerned 
as a mixture of two or more of the preceding three forms. These forms may be found 
in two contexts, namely, microgeographical context, and macrogeographical context, 
depending on the continental shelf areas involved, and the location of the States 
concerned. Despite the priority of the geographical relevant circumstances, with respect 
to the other relevant circumstances, (except the conduct of the parties relevant 
circumstanced it is the function of equity to decide the weight that can be given to such 
circumstances in a given case. 
The identification of islands as a relevant circumstance is not dependent on their 
size, or economic or population status, or any criteria other than the satisfaction of the 
equity requirements. Thus rocks of all sizes, reefs, islets, isles, and, of course, islands 
in the true sense, can constitute a relevant circumstance. In practice, islands have been 
given four kinds of effects in the delimitation of the continental shelf between States, 
namely, full effect, partial effect, no effect at all, and minus effect. Some cases have 
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taken into account all the islands present in the area concerned, whereas others have 
disregarded the presence of some, and in some cases all, the islands and drawn their 
continental shelf boundary relying on other relevant circumstances. 
Proportionality is concerned with the ratio between the lengths of the coasts of the 
interested States and the extent of their continental shelf areas. It plays successfully the 
role of being an independent relevant circumstance and, at the same time, as a test 
ground of equity. When the disproportionally distorting effect of the proportionality 
circumstance is irredressable, this circumstance plays the role of being an independent 
relevant circumstance. On the contrary, if its disproportionally distorting effect is 
redressable, proportionality turns to be employed as a test ground of equity. As for the 
relationship between the proportionality and the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effect principles, the two principles are different from each other. As they 
both have co-existed, each has its own sphere of application. Nevertheless, they have 
an interrelation between each other. That is, the irredressable disproportionally 
distorting effect principle constitutes a general concept to which the proportionality 
principle is subject. 
Natural prolongation is the most complicated concept, of the continental shelf 
delimitation between States. However, two main roles can, in principle, be attributed 
to this concept, namely, as a general principle, and as a relevant circumstance. Because 
it is not applicable unless there is a separation between the continental shelves, the 
natural prolongation relevant circumstance is found to belong to the geological structure 
of the continental shelf as is indicated to by the presence of the continental slope and 
rise. As such, the natural prolongation relevant circumstance can be said to belong to 
the question of the outer limit of the continental shelf rather than to the question of 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States. That is, of course, not to say that, 
the natural prolongation relevant circumstance, as it identifies the outer limit of the 
continental shelf, will be applicable once its geological requirements are met. It is, in 
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fact, the function of equity that will decide whether the natural prolongation 
circumstance will be taken into account or not. In practice, natural prolongation is 
found to be a very weak relevant circumstance; for, the presence of other relevant 
circumstances might easily result in dominating the natural prolongation circumstance. 
As far as the common mineral deposits issue is concerned, the unity of a deposit 
is the major issue in the delimitation of the continental shelf between States in the sense 
that, such a unity is preserved for the benefit of all the concerned parties and not for the 
benefit of one of them to the detriment of the others. The presence of mineral deposits 
has been considered a relevant circumstance in some cases. However, in the majority 
of cases, the presence of mineral deposits has been regarded as a separate problem from 
that of the continental shelf delimitation. Some States left the mineral deposits problem 
for a future settlement, whereas others solved the problem by establishing a common 
zone, - with various solutions of apportionment -, for the benefit of all the parties 
concerned. The apportionment of common mineral deposits can be effected by various 
solutions, such as, an equal division of the deposit, or equal rights of exploitation, or 
equal shares of the received revenue, or a division proportional to the volume of 
resources on each side of the delimitation line of the continental shelf. 
Turning to the legal circumstances, it is found that, navigation and fishing rights 
are very unlikely to play the role of a relevant circumstance unless they are backed by 
the presence of other relevant circumstances, such as, the conduct of the parties, or 
historic rights, or economic or political factors. As for the historic rights relevant 
circumstance, it is still not a settled question in the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between States. However, it seems that, historic rights might constitute a relevant 
circumstance if, 1- they belong to the continental shelf as compared with the seabed of 
the territorial sea or the internal waters, 2- the title to such historical rights has been 
acquired prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine, and 3- the location 
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of such historic rights must be able to produce a disproportionally distorting effect, in 
the meaning that, if they are not taken into account, the concerned State will be deprived 
of a free and undisturbed exercise of its rights. 
The conduct of the parties factor is the most important relevant circumstance in the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf. If the conduct of the parties revealed a de 
facto boundary line, or a modus vivendi respected in fact, or an explicit or implicit 
agreed boundary line, this will have an absolute priority with respect to the other 
involved circumstances. In order to be effective, the conduct of the parties must be 
decisive, not capable of varying interpretations or explanations, and reciprocal. 
Economic as well as political considerations may play the role of a relevant 
circumstance. Economic circumstances are such as, fishing, natural resources, marine 
transport, and other maritime interests, whereas political factors are such as, security 
and defence. In order for economic circumstances to be considered relevant to a given 
case, they must be permanent, mutual, and able to have catastrophic repercussion on 
the livelihood and well-being of the population of the countries concerned. Similarly, 
political factors must be permanent, or at least relatively permanent, mutual, and able 
to have catastrophic impact on the survival and stable functioning conditions of the 
State concerned, or compromise its security. 
Finally, as the said classification of relevant circumstances into physical and non- 
physical circumstances, it must be recalled, is based on purely academic reasons, all 
relevant circumstances are, in reality, of a physical nature. For, it is almost impossible 
to find any circumstance, - whether it is legal, or historic, or economic, or political -, 
that are without a physical basis within the limits of which such a right is exercised. In 
fact, it is apparent that all relevant circumstances, except the conduct of the parties, are 
of, or belong to, and only to, geographical or geological considerations. Even if they 
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are fishery rights concerning living resources of the waters superjacent the continental 
shelf, such circumstances are, at the end of the day, going to be considered according 
to their location. This location belongs, in one way or another, to geographical 
considerations especially if fishery rights are seen as belonging to waters that overly 
certain areas of the seabed of the EEZ or the continental shelf. 
Based on the foregoing conclusion, it is found that, the most important 
requirement d¬ any factor to be regarded as a relevant circumstance is to satisfy the 
condition of the disproportionally distorting effect principle. After meeting the 
requirements of its own category, each relevant circumstance must be able to produce a 
disproportionally distorting effect in the meaning that if the circumstance in question is 
not taken into consideration, the concerned State will be deprived of exercising certain 
rights which belong exclusively to th& State. 
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Introduction 
Section 1: General View of the Meaning of the "Special 
Circumstances" Clause 
Section 2: General View of the Scope of the "Special 
Circumstances" Clause. 
Section 3: The Actual Categories of Special Circumstances 
- Physical Special Circumstances 
I- Geographical Configuration of the Coast 
II- Islands as a Special Circumstance 
III- Mineral Deposits as a Special Circumstance 
IV- Other Possible Physical Special Circumstances 
- Non-Physical Special Circumstances 
I- Navigation and Fishing Rights as a Special 
Circumstance 
II- Historic Rights as a Special Circumstance 
III- Other Non-Physical Special Circumstances 
Conclusion 
TDtroducdon 
As has been seen in the Second Chapter, the "Special Circumstances" clause is 
provided in the Conventional rules of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf as to justify deviation from the equidistance method when any special 
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circumstance- is present. It is also necessary to recall that, the "special circumstances" 
clause has been left without sufficient clarification as to the true meaning and scope of 
its implication. This Chapter is suppose" attempt a modest examination of the 
meaning and scope of the said clause in order to identify what sort of circumstances can 
be embraced therein. 
In order to provide the required explanation, this Chapter will function through 
three dimensions. The first Section will be interested in the meaning of the "special 
circumstances" clause; and the second will be concerned with examining the scope of 
the said clause. The purpose of these two sections is to see whether it is possible to 
deduce a general criterion/criteria in accordance with which the true categories of special 
circumstances can be identified. The third Section will endeavour a thorough 
examination of each individual circumstance in order to see whether such a 
circumstance is a true special circumstance or not, and if it is, how it performs its role 
as a special circumstance. 
S"aüm a 
General View of the Meaning 
of the 
"Special Circumstances" Clause 
The Committee of Experts recommended, as was already seen, the equidistance 
principle to effect the delimitation of, inter alia, the continental shelf between States. It, 
also, drew attention to the fact that, due to the presence of some exceptional 
circumstances, the equidistance principle might be inapplicable in some situations. This 
created a general feeling among the ILC's members, especially those who agreed with 
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Professor Sandström, that "[a] general rule was necessary, but it was also necessary to 
provide for exceptions to it. "1 In response, Professor Frangios suggested a formula, 
which was an amendment to Mr. Pal's proposal, that "..., the boundary of the 
continental shelf ... shall, as a general rule and unless otherwise agreed by them, be the 
median line... . "2 This formula 
found a widespread opposition due to the inclusion of 
the "as a general rule" phrase which, as was commented by Professor Lauterpacht, was 
not clear and "... deprived the rule of its legal character. "3 Professor Spiropoulos 
suggested to replace the phrase "as a general rule" by the phrase "unless another 
boundary line is justified by special circumstances" .4 Professor Lauterpacht was also 
not happy with Professor Spiropoulos' suggestion. Although Professor Lauterpacht 
agreed that "... mention should be made of exceptions, but [, he commented, ] ... 
it 
would be better to specify the cases rather than to open the door to difficulties of 
interpretation. "5 In fact, most of Professor Lauterpacht's fear was because the said 
phrase was vague and likely to "... give the arbitrators the power to judge ex aequo et 
bono. "6 "If the Commission had certain specific exceptions in mind, it should say 
so. ", Professor Lauterpacht commented.? Mr. Alfaro went in line with Professor 
Lauterphacht when he said that, "[n]othing would be gained by prescribing a rule 
qualified by a very general exception. "8 In reply Professor Frangios said that, "[t]he 
purpose of inserting an escape clause was to enable arbitrators to deviate from the rule 
in such circumstances. "9 
Professor Lauterpacht suggested a formula, "... which was in his opinion less 
indefinite than [Professor] Spiropoulos' amendment ... ", to the effect that, where 
it 
was "Physically impossible" or could "cause undue hardship" the boundary "... shall 
be determined by arbitration in a manner approximating as closely as possible to the 
principle of equidistance. "10 However, as he was prepared to accept Professor 
Spiropoulos' formula, Professor Lauterpacht withdrew his proposal provided that, "... 
an explicit reference were included in the comments to the extent of the latitude to be 
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given to arbitrators. "11 Subsequently, the ILC debate seemed to have come closer and 
closer to the "unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances" 
formula which was eventually approved by the Commission and embodied in Article 7 
of the 1953 Report. 12 
In its commentary notes on Article 7 of the 1953 Report, the ILC stated that, 
"... while ... the rule of equidistance 
is the general rule, it is subject to modification in 
cases in which another boundary line in justified by special circumstances.,, 
13 
[Emphasis added] 
The ILC, also, referred to the general arbitration clause of Article 8 of the same Report, 
and so as to meet Professor Lauterpacht's demand, added that, 
"Such arbitration, while expected to take into account the special circumstances calling 
for modification of the major principle of equidistance, is not contemplated as arbitration 
ex aequo et bono. " 14 
The formula of Article 7, indicated to above, was reintroduced, with minor 
changes, in Article 72 of the ILC 1956 Report. 15 Commenting on Article 72, the 
Commission repeated the verbatim words of some of its comments on Article 7 of the 
1953 Report. 16 Nevertheless, no reference was made either to the "general arbitration 
clause" or to the "major principle of equidistance" as they were cited in the ILC 
comments on Article 7 of its 1953 Report. 
The formula of Article 72 was taken up to the 1958 UNCLOS I where it was 
formalized, with minor changes, and embodied in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on 
the Continental Shelf. 17 During the Conference, numerous States commented on the 
"special circumstances" clause. Those States which were dissatisfied with the "special 
circumstances" clause were mostly not happy with the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
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clause. For instance, the Colombian delegation stated that, "... the term "special 
circumstances" was vague and could give rise to disagreement. "18 This vagueness was 
also the reason why Yugoslavia rejected Article 72. In his statement, the Yugoslav 
delegate said that, "... a different solution might be justified by special circumstances, 
was unacceptable on legal grounds. It was both vague and arbitrary and likely to give 
rise to misunderstanding and disagreement. " 19 In addition Yugoslavia submitted a 
proposal in which it suggested the deletion of the alternative solution of special 
circumstances 2° Referring to the "... unacceptable criterion of special circumstances", 
the Netherlands also inclined to submit the same Yugoslav proposal. 21 The UK was 
most of the time in favour of a precise method, viz, the equidistance method. Thus, its 
proposals contained no reference to the special circumstances alternative until the end of 
the Fourth Committee's deliberations when the UK eventually accepted the inclusion of 
such an alternative 22 
As for those States which were satisfied with the inclusion of the "special 
circumstances" clause, they were happy with its flexibility which would enable 
interpreters to include predictable as well as unpredictable exceptional circumstances. 
For instance, Tunisia found that, "the considerable flexibility" of Article 72 was 
necessary to take account "of the geographical configuration of the region". 23 Mrs., 
Whiteman, the delegate of the USA, repudiated the deletion of the "special 
circumstances" clause because "... It was impracticable to expect that all special 
circumstances could be dealt with by agreement. "24 Being the most extreme, the 
Venezuelan contention regarded Article 72 as having so insufficient flexibility that 
Venezuela suggested the omission of the special circumstances alternative in favour of a 
solution effected by agreement "or by other means recognized in international law. "25 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the inclusion of the "special circumstances" 
clause in Article 6 can be seen from two different viewpoints, namely, the narrow 
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viewpoint, and the wide-ranged viewpoint. According to the narrow viewpoint, the 
following beliefs control the interpretation of the meaning of the "special 
circumstances" clause. It first of all believes that, the emphasis must be attributed to the 
equidistance principle to the extent that the formula of Article 6 contained only two 
mandatory rules, viz, 1- the agreement solution, and 2- the equidistance/special 
circumstances. And, since the inclusion of the obligation of the agreement solution is 
more likely to be superfluous, so the formula of Article 6 contains only one mandatory 
rule which is the equidistance/special circumstances rule. Secondly, so long as the 
emphasis is on the equidistance principle, the interpretation of the special circumstances 
exception must be restricted to include certain particular exceptional circumstances. 
Judge Tanaka was in favour of this viewpoint of interpretation as he said that the 
"special circumstances" clause 
"... does not constitute an independent which can replace principle equidistance, but it 
means the adaptation of this principle to concrete circumstances. If for the foregoing 
reasons the exceptional nature of this clause is admitted, the logical consequence would be 
its strict interpretation. "26 
Applying this viewpoint to the concrete circumstances of the North Sea, Judge Tanaka 
reached the conclusion that the configuration of the German coastline could not "... be 
recognized as special circumstances within the meaning of Article 6 .... "27 Judge 
Koretsky and Judge Lachs were also in favour of this viewpoint of interpretation. 28 
Yet an extreme viewpoint as that of Judge Morelli would eliminate the existence of any 
kind of exception as indicated by the "special circumstances" clause in favour of an 
absolute mandatory character of the equidistance principle. 29 
The other viewpoint of interpretation, has been more flexible than the first one. 
This flexibility has lead this viewpoint to the following findings. First, it regards the 
inclusion of the special circumstances clause in Article 6 as an alternative solution to the 
300 
equidistance principle. Judge Padilla Nervo points out that he thinks, 
"... it is correct to say that the discussion on the reservation of "special circumstances" 
showed that this clause was understood not so much as a limited exception to a generally 
applicable rule, but more in the sense of an alternative of equal rank to the equidistance 
method. "30 
Second, the emphasis according to this viewpoint does not rest on the equidistance 
principle. Rather, it rests on the desire to achieve an equitable solution. Having 
recommended the equidistance principle for the delimitation of, inter alia, the 
continental shelf, the Committee of Experts commented that, 
"2- In a number of cases this may not lead to an equitable solution, .... "31 
[Emphasis added] 
It was, in fact, according to this comment that the ILC felt the need to find an alternative 
solution to that of the equidistance. Similarly, the UK delegate to the 1958 UNCLOS I 
stated that, 
"... the adoption of the median line as a boundary was the fundamental principle and the 
most equita¢le solution, to be departed from only if special circumstances so 
required. "32 [Emphasis added] 
Judge Padilla Nervo pointed out that, "[i]f the application of the equidistance rule 
would result in harsh inequities in a given specific case, this result may be considered 
as a special circumstance ... "33 
Secondly, the formula of Article 6, therefore, contains three alternatives, namely, 
1- the agreement solution, 2- another boundary justified by special circumstances, and 
3- the equidistance solution. 
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Thirdly, due to the priority of the alternative of "another boundary line justified by 
special circumstances" solution vis ä vis that of the equidistance; and due to the fact that 
the ILC deliberately left the "special circumstances" clause without explanation so as to 
attribute flexibility to the formula of Article 6; the logical consequence would be that the 
"special circumstances" clause must be interpreted as having a considerably wide- 
ranged meaning and scope which can embrace any exceptional circumstance whether 
they are predictable or unpredictable. Judge Ammoun seemed to be in favour of this 
viewpoint as he said, 
"Special circumstances have not been defined by a text of positive law; nor could they be 
listed exhaustively, in view of the extreme variety of legal and material factors which 
may be of account. "34 [Emphasis added] 
However, this wide-ranged meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause is, 
according to the this viewpoint, restricted in one respect. That is, the "special 
circumstances" clause must secure an equitable solution; i. e., it must satisfy the equity 
requirements. 
Fourthly, since the equidistance solution was put as the last alternative, so it is, 
also, logical to agree with Mr. Laing that "... the principle of equidistance was 
attenuated almost to the point of non-existence, ... "35, or, more optimistically, to its 
lowest effect. 
The Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977-78 reached a conclusion very similar to the 
latter viewpoint of interpretation. The Tribunal considered the equidistance principle 
and the "special circumstances" clause, a single and combined rule; 36 and, 
"... the obligation to apply the equidistance principle is always one qualified by the 
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condition "unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances". 37 
As the tribunal found that, the formula of Article 6 and the customary solution had the 
same object, this object was identified by the Tribunal as to carry out the delimitation of 
the continental shelf between States in accordance with equitable principles in order to 
achieve an equitable delimitation 38 Furthermore, applying its own criterion, the 
Tribunal concluded that, the circumstances in both, the Channel Islands area, and in the 
Atlantic Ocean Region, constitute relevant circumstances in the meaning of the 
Customary solution as well as special circumstances in the meaning of the 
Conventional solution of Article 6.39 
Regarding the said two viewpoints of interpretation, it seems that the wide-ranged 
viewpoint is more likely to be the acceptable one due, in addition to what has been said- 
above, to the following reasons. First of all, it is clear, as can be deduced from the 
above discussion, that the instigators of the "special circumstances" clause intended to 
leave it without explanation so that it could, in the subsequent future, bear as wide- 
ranged an interpretation as possible. Secondly, this can also be deduced from the 
wording of the two Paragraphs of Article 6, as they are evidence of: a- the equidistance 
principle was put as the last resort; b- the phrase "another boundary line", as well as the 
location-of the "special circumstances" clause in both Paragraphs, prove that the 
presence of special circumstances in a given case, not only justify deviation from the 
equidistance course of the boundary line but also justify any other boundary line 
whether it is a modified equidistant line or not, i. e., a boundary line justified by the 
special circumstances is an alternative solution to that of the equidistance; and c- this 
wide variety of alternative solutions also proves that resort to the equidistance solution 
is almost attenuated to its lowest effect in the formula of Article 6. 
Accordingly, as the application of the equidistance/special circumstances formula 
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is always one qualified by the achievement of an equitable solution, the consideration of 
any factor as a special circumstance must be examined in the light of the equity 
requirements. As far as the general doctrine of the continental shelf is concerned, the 
meaning of equity can be approached from two angles. The first is that, "equity does 
not necessarily imply equality"; 40 and the second is that equity is the balancing process 
of certain factors in a given case in the light of equitable principles. With reference to 
the equidistance/special circumstances formula, equity is, therefore, the balancing 
process of all the special circumstances in a given case in the light of equitable 
principles taking into account that the final result is not necessarily required to secure an 
equal share to each of the parties concerned. But how are such factors assessed as to 
whether they are special circumstances or not? 
As the applicability of the equidistance principle is based on the absence of any 
special circumstances, so the assessment of whether a particular factor is a special 
circumstance or not must take into account the effect of the presence of such a factor on 
the course of the equidistance line. If the course of the equidistance line was, due to the 
effect of a particular factor, distorted in a manner that might produce an inequitable 
solution, such a factor could be regarded as a special circumstance. The distorting 
effect of the factor on the course of the equidistance line, and not the presence of the 
factor itself is, therefore, the focal point of the test of whether the factor is a special 
circumstance or not. What does it distort? It distorts the proportion of the continental 
shelf areas that, in principle, is attributed to each party if the principle of equidistance is 
applied without taking the circumstance in question into account. Thus equity, 
therefore, becomes the balancing process of the disproportionally distorting effect of all 
the special circumstances of the parties concerned in a given case. If such a balancing 
process resulted in some of those distorting effects of factors which belonged to one 
party redressing the effects of some factors which belonged to the other party, so the 
factors whose distorting effects were redressed cannot constitute special circumstances. 
Accordingly, the test of the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect is the 
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criterion of examining whether certain factors are special circumstances or not. By 
definition equity, therefore, is the balancing process of the irredressable 
disproportionally distorting effects of all the special circumstances of all the parties 
concerned in a given case. 
The wide-viewpoint of interpretation will be more proven as the most acceptable 
one when the discussion will address itself to the scope and the actual categories of the 
"special circumstances" clause. This will be the function of the next two sections. 
sacqü®m 22 
General View of the Scope 
of the 
"Special Circumstances" Clause 
The function of this Section is mainly concerned with identifying the categories of 
special circumstances. In fact, this Section aims at determining the factors and 
considerations that have so far been, or are able to be, regarded as special 
circumstances. 
Having faced some difficulties in establishing proper rules for the delimitation of 
the territorial waters and the continental shelf between States, the ILC, as was already 
seen, consulted the committee of Experts in 1953. In its reply, the Committee after 
suggesting the equidistance principle, stated that, 
"Unless otherwise agreed between the adjacent States, all islands should be taken into 
consideration in drawing the median line. .... There may, however, be special reasons, 
such as navigation and fishing rights, which may divert the boundary from the median 
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line. "41 
During the ILC debate, some examples of special circumstances were also mentioned. 
In the search for a proper formula to embody the equidistance principle, Professor 
Francios commented that, "... the configuration of the coast should be taken into 
account in applying the principle of equidistance. "42 Reference to islands as a special 
circumstance was also made numerous times by various ILC members such as 
Professor Francios43 and Spiropoulos. 44 
Having, eventually, been convinced that the equidistance/special circumstances 
formula was appropriate for the purpose of delimiting, inter alia, the continental shelf, 
the ILC realized that the scope of the special circumstances clause needed some 
explanation. Due to the lack of the requisite knowledge, the ILC could not identify the 
real scope of the special circumstances clause. Instead, it tried to provide some 
examples of circumstances which the ILC was sure of as being special circumstances. 
In its comments on the equidistance/special circumstances formula, the ILC stated that, 
"..., provision must be made for departures necessitated by any exceptional configuration 
of the coast, as well as the presence of islands or of navigable channels. " 45 
As the Fourth Committee of the 1958 UNCLOS I was discussing the 
equidistance/special circumstances formula, some delegates, motivated by the need to 
add more clarification to the "special circumstances" clause, suggested some examples 
of special circumstances. The Tunisian delegate, for instance, was impressed by the 
considerable flexibility of the formula of Article 6, as this flexibility was necessary to 
take account "... of the geographical configuration of the region. "46 After suggesting 
islands, the UK delegate indicated to "... special mineral exploitation rights or fishery 
rights or the presence of a navigable channel; ", as "[o]ther types of special 
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circumstances. 47 The USA delegate was not happy with those proposals which 
preferred the omission of "... the reference to special circumstances, since account 
would have to be taken of great variety of complex geographical situations that 
existed. "48 
However, the result of the Conference was the adoption of Article 6 which 
enshrined the equidistance/special circumstances formula. Article 6 did not provide any 
clarification as to the meaning and scope of the special circumstances clause; and yet it 
did not mention any of the examples of special circumstances that were mentioned 
during the conference or those which were mentioned in the ILC comments on Article 
72 of its final Report of 1956. The logical finding that can be deduced from the 
absence of these examples or any relevant clarification from Article 6 is that, the 
Conference intended, in fact, to establish an unrestricted and "fairly elastic" formula 
which would be able to embrace a wide-variety of predictable and unpredictable 
exceptional circumstances. 
In legal literature, some examples of special circumstances were also mentioned. 
In the ILC meeting of 17 July, 1950, Professor Hudson read out a passage from the 
ILA report on "rights to the sea bed and its subsoil" quoting that, "[c]riteria for the 
division of the sea bed (and subsoil) of a continental shelf shared by two or more States 
should be developed, taking into account factors such as the configuration of the 
coastlines, the economic value of proven deposits of minerals, etc. "49 [Footnote 
omitted]. Commenting on the equidistance/special circumstances formula, Professor 
Mouton mentioned four categories of special circumstances, namely, the exceptional 
configuration of the coast, the presence of islands, navigable channels and the existence 
of common deposits situated across the mathematical boundary. 50 Elaborating on the 
examples of special circumstances, Professor Brown discussed the said four categories 
of special circumstances and added the presence of historical special circumstances to 
them. 51 These five examples of special circumstances, in addition to Proportionality, 
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Proximity and Geomorphological Circumstances, were also discussed by Professor 
O'Cnnell. 52 And finally, commenting on the "special circumstances" clause, Padwa 
stated that, "... it may be observed that the term "special circumstances" can have 
reference to certain legal, political and economic considerations as well as geographic 
ones. "53 In the light of this contention, Padwa discussed some examples of special 
circumstances, such as the presence of islands, common mineral deposits, geographical 
configuration of the coast and historic rights. 
As far as State practice is concerned, 17 agreements are said to have been 
concluded in the light of the equidistance/special circumstances formula. Examining 
these 17 agreements, the following results could be reached. To begin with, the said 
agreements can be classified into two categories, namely, agreements which concluded 
negotiated equidistance boundary lines (6 agreements), and agreements which 
concluded simple equidistance boundary lines (11 agreements-54). The latter category is 
supposed to contain no special circumstances, whereas the former is very likely to 
contain some examples of such circumstances. It is, therefore, important to examine 
the agreements of the former category in order to see what sort of circumstances can be 
said to have been the reason that caused the concerned States to choose a negotiated 
equidistance method. According to the available data, three kinds of special 
circumstances seem to be the likely circumstances that have played a role in the choice 
of the said method. These are, the geographical configuration, 55 the geographical 
complexity (geographical configuration and the presence of islands, 56 and geographical 
configuration and the general direction of the coast57), and existing agreements. 58 
According to the preceding paragraphs, the scope of the "special circumstances" 
clause is very likely to embrace factors that belong to legal, economic and geophysical 
considerations. Examples of these factors can be found in, the geographical 
configuration of the coast, the presence of islands, the geographical complexity of the 
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region, the presence of common mineral deposits, the presence of navigable channels 
and fishing rights, historic rights, and other factors. These examples of circumstances 
will be examined in Section 3 in order to see whether they constitute true special 
circumstances or not, and also to determine the degree of effect that might be attributed 
to each individual circumstance in a given case. 
sic4l®m 3 
The Actual Categories 
of 
Special Circumstances 
The aim of this Section is three fold. The first is to examine the available 
examples of circumstances so as to see whether they are considered special 
circumstances or not. The second is to see if one can deduce certain criterion/criteria in 
the light of which the degree of effect of a particular circumstance in a given case can be 
determined. And the third is to try to find a general criterion with the aid of which the 
real scope of the "special circumstances" clause can be identified. This section, for 
academic reasons only, is going to classify the categories of special circumstances into 
two main categories, namely, Physical Special Circumstances and Non-Physical 
Special Circumstances. 
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I 
Geographical Configuration 
The geographical configuration of the coasts is the oldest and most popular 
special circumstance. The early mention of the geographical configuration circumstance 
by Professor Hudson in 1950, when he was quoting from the ILA Report, and the 
subsequent frequent mention of this circumstance by the ILC members through their 
comments on the equidistance/special circumstances formula, and in legal literature, 
prove that the geographical configuration of the coasts has undoubtedly been meant to 
be counted as a special circumstance. 59 However, more important than this is the 
question, what sort of geographical configuration can constitute a special circumstance? 
In its comments, the ILC referred to "... departures necessitated by any 
exceptional configuration of the coast, .... "60 It is, therefore, not the geographical 
configuration of the coast, but the exceptional geographical configuration of the coast 
that is meant to be the special circumstance. Nevertheless, what does exceptional 
geographical configuration mean? And how exceptional should it be? The ILC 
answered none of these questions. Nor did the 1958 UNCLOS I. 
By the time the 1969 North Sea Cases were examined by the ICJ, the answer to 
the said questions became indispensable. Two viewpoints, concerning the 
geographical configuration special circumstance, were put forwards before the ICJ. 
The first was Germany's viewpoint in which the Germans said, 
"Special circumstances are always present should the situation display not inconsiderable 
divergencies from the normal case. "61 [Emphasis added] 
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In order to explain what they meant by the term "normal case", the Germans went on to 
say, "[t]he normal case, ..., is a more or 
less straight coastline, ... "62 [Emphasis 
added]. According to the Germans, the normality, in the meaning that it is more or less 
a straight line, of the geographical configuration of the coasts, is the criterion in the 
light of which the word "exceptional" can be identified. If the coastline is concave, 
(such as that of the North Sea) or convex, i. e., it is not a more or less straight coastline, 
so it is, according to Germany, an exceptional geographical configuration and 
consequently a special circumstance. 
In their reply, Denmark and the Netherlands rejected the Germans viewpoint 
because, according to them, the application of the "special circumstances" clause must 
be based on mutual account from all the parties concerned, in the sense that, 
"... deviation from the equidistance line is justified towards both States-i. e., the State 
which "gains" and the State which "loses" by the correction. "63 
Applying this criterion to the North Sea, Denmark and the Netherlands went on to say 
that the "special circumstances" clause, 
"... can be invoked against a State whose continental shelf boundary under the 
equidistance principle reflect projecting geographical features (primarily certain islands 
and peninsulas) whereas it cannot be applied against a State whose continental shelf has 
a solid geographical connection with the territory of that State whereby constituting a 
natural continuation of the territory of the State in conformity with the general 
geographical situation. "64 
Thus, Denmark and the Netherlands can be said to have relied on two basic criteria. 
The first is interested in the mutual calculation of the impact of taking into account the 
geographical configuration of the coasts. If the taking into account of the configuration 
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of the coasts results in deviation from the equidistance principle at the expense of one of 
the parties, such a configuration is not regarded as exceptional. The second is 
concerned with a concept very similar to that of the natural prolongation of the 
Customary solution. According to this criterion, the geographical configuration of the 
coasts is not considered exceptional if the application of the equidistance principle 
leaves to each party all those seabed areas which constitute the natural continuation of 
the territory of that party. 
The ICJ did not favour any of these two viewpoints. Instead, it preferred to keep 
silent with respect to the special circumstances clause. As the ICJ discovered the 
inapplicability of Article 6 to the 1969 North Sea cases, it found that it was superfluous 
to go into a detailed discussion concerning the special circumstances clause. However, 
since the ICJ concluded the geographical configuration of the parties concerned as a 
relevant circumstance; and since the ICJ concluded the Customary solution as to 
include the natural prolongation principle, proportionality, and the necessity of the 
mutual calculations of the impact of the inclusion of any relevant circumstances; so the 
logical conclusion is that, the ICJ took a moderate viewpoint which would fall mid- 
course between the Germans' and the Denmark's and the Netherlands' viewpoints, 
above-cited. 
As the application of the equidistance/special circumstances rule is always one 
qualified by the necessity to achieve an equitable solution, the consideration of the 
geographical configuration special circumstance must be subject to the conditions of 
achieving an equitable solution. If, due to certain geographical configuration of the 
coasts, the application of the equidistance principle resulted in inequitable solution, 
such a geographical configuration would constitute a special circumstance. But, what 
is the implication of "equitable solution"? According to the general principles of 
International Law, "equitable solution" can be understood to mean a solution that is 
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based on mutual and equitable calculations of the circumstances of all the parties 
concerned. In this regard, one should refer to the general meaning of equity as was 
indicated to above. 65 That is to say, the consideration of the geographical configuration 
of the coast must be examined in the light of the equity requirements. Equity, as has 
been seen, is the balancing process of the irredressable disproportionally distorting 
effects of the special circumstances of all the parties to a given case. In order for the 
geographical configuration of the coast to be regarded as a special circumstance, it, 
therefore, must be able to produce an irredressable disproportionally distorting effect. 
Consequently, the consideration of the geographical configuration as a special 
circumstance will always depend on the calculation of each individual case. 
The geographical configuration of the coast appears in various forms, such as, a 
concave or convex coastline, or a complex geographical situation which is formed by a 
combination of two or more of the geographical circumstances such as a concave coast 
with some outgrowths and/or islands. 66 There is no doubt that these forms can be 
considered special circumstances when they are in a microgeographical context. But 
would they also appear in a macrogeographical context? The answer is, definitely, yes, 
for the following reasons. The first is that, since the consideration of any factor as a 
special circumstance is only qualified by one condition which is the satisfaction of the 
equity requirements, so there would be no limit as to the forms that the geographical 
configuration might appear in. That is to say, in order to achieve an equitable solution, 
an arbitrator might have to bring into play the geographical configuration circumstance 
whether it is in a microgeographical or macrogeographical context. The second is that, 
since the "special circumstances" clause was deliberately designed so as to attribute 
flexibility to the formula of Article 6, so this formula is able to embrace any factor 
whether it is of a microgeographical or macrogeographical nature if the arbitrator is 
happy with it as affecting the case in front of him, and if the equity requirements are 
satisfied. Thirdly, during the 1958 UNCLOS I, the Tunisian delegate, when 
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commenting on the "special circumstances" clause, stated that the delimitation of the 
continental shelf "... should take account of the geographical configuration of the 
region, ... "67 
[Emphasis added]. This, of course, means to take into account the 
geographical configuration of the whole region and not only the coastal configuration of 
the parties concerned. 
II 
Islands 
as a Special Circumstance 
The role of islands in the continental shelf doctrine can be seen from various 
angles. Islands, as has been seen, can play the role of a relevant circumstance, they can 
generate a continental shelf of their own, and finally, they may play the role of a special 
circumstance. The main concern of this Section will be the latter role, i. e., islands as a 
special circumstance. Two problems are related to islands when they are examined as 
to whether they are a special circumstance or not, namely, the definition of islands, and 
how far an island can play the role of a special circumstance. These two problems are 
going to be examined hereunder respectively. 
There is no doubt about the fact that an island can constitute a special 
circumstance. This can be seen through the above-cited E LC comments on its proposed 
equidistance/special circumstances formula, the Report of the Committee of Experts of 
1953, and the comments of the members of the ILC and those of the 1958 UNCLOS I 
on the said formula. 68 Despite this finding, no agreement could be reached as to 
explicitly include islands as a special circumstance in the formula of Article 6 of the 
final draft of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. There was, however, a 
general feeling that the mention of the special circumstances phrase would be by itself 
sufficient to imply islands within its scope. 
69 
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As has been seen above, islands have been frequently mentioned as being able to 
constitute a special circumstance which justify a deviation from the equidistance course 
of the continental shelf boundary. However, the question is, what sort of coastal 
projection can constitute an island in the sense that it can play the role of a special 
circumstance? 
The result of the ILC in the 1950s, and the 1958 UNCLOS I deliberations, it 
must be recalled, was the adoption of a definition of islands formula which included 
three main qualifications. In order for any coastal projection to constitute an island, it 
must be, 1- a naturally formed area of land, 2-surrounded by water, and 3- above water 
at high tide-70 These three qualifications were, also consolidated and reaffirmed by the 
UNCLOS III, and the 1982 Convention 71 
Accordingly, any coastal projection satisfies the above-said three qualifications 
can constitute an island for the purpose of being a special circumstance. This means 
that, the islands special circumstance may include rocks of all sizes, islets, isles, reefs, 
islands in the actual meaning of the word, and so on. Nevertheless, the satisfaction of 
the said three qualifications is not the only requirement of the definition of islands as a 
special circumstance. In fact this definition is also restricted in one respect. Recalling 
the wording of the Report of the Committee of Experts of 1953, the following can be of 
special importance: 
"..., all islands should be taken into consideration in drawing the median line. Likewise, 
drying rocks and shoals within T miles of only one State should be taken into account, 
but similar elevations of undetermined sovereignty, that are within T miles of both States 
should be disregarded in laying down the median line. "72 [Emphasis added] 
According to this wording, the distance of the coastal projection from the coast is an 
element to be added to the above-said three qualifications. However, the distance 
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criterion seems to be inapplicable to islands in the actual meaning of the word. Rather, 
the distance criterion, as far as the Committee of Experts is concerned, is only 
applicable to rocks and shoals and the like. In addition, it is important to note that the 
distance criterion is applicable when such a rock or shoal is located within a certain 
distance from only one State. Yet, according to the Committee, the definition of islands 
as a special circumstance must exclude those elevations of an undetermined sovereignty 
that are within T miles of both States. 
More importantly is the condition that, since the application of the special 
circumstances clause is qualified by the condition that it must achieve an equitable 
solution, so islands as a special circumstance must satisfy the equity requirements. 
That is to say, in order for an island to be regarded as a special circumstance, it must be 
able to produce an irredressable disproportionally distorting effect, in the sense that if 
the island was not taken into account, this will produce inequity at the expense of one 
of the parties concerned. The distorting effect of islands is, in fact, more related to their 
location and distance from the shore than to any other criterion, for, the further from the 
shore the location of an island, the greater the distorting effect will be. The distance 
criterion, therefore, is not only applicable to rocks and shoals, but also to any other 
object that might fall within the scope of islands as a special circumstance. 
How far can an island play the role of a special circumstance? 
Since the special circumstance of islands must be examined in the light of the 
equity requirements, so it is the function of equity to decide the degree of effect that can 
be given to an island when it is considered a special circumstance in a given case. So 
far, only one case has been judged in the light of, inter alia, the equidistance/special 
circumstances formula, (the Conventional solution), namely, the Anglo-French 
Arbitration of 1977-78. In this Arbitration, three examples of islands were present. 
Due to the location of the Channel Islands on the wrong side of the median line (closer 
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to the French Republic), and their semi economic and political independence, the 
Tribunal considered these islands a special circumstances, ( as well as a relevant 
circumstance), and gave these islands a partial effect using the enclaved method of 
delimitation around them. 73 As for the Eddystone Rock, it was given a full effect in the 
drawing of the median line. 74 And finally, because the Scilly Isles extended the 
English coast twice the distance that the Ushant Island did with respect to the French 
coast, the Scilly Isles were given half effect whereas the Ushant island was given full 
effect in the drawing of the boundary in the Atlantic Region. 75 
Apart from the said Arbitration no other case was judged in the light of the 
Conventional solution as they may indicate to the possible ways of solution of the 
problem of islands as a special circumstance. However, recalling State practice 
concerning islands, four kinds of effect could be attributed to islands when they would 
be taken into account. These were, 1- full effect, 2- partial effect with variation of 
modified equidistant boundary line, and enclaved and semi-enclaved methods, 3- no 
effect at all, and 4- minus effect. 76 
III 
Mineral Deposits 
asa 
Special Circumstance 
The presence of oil or gas or any other mineral deposits was realized, since the 
early stages of the Continental shelf doctrine development, as an important element to 
be taken into account when delimiting the continental shelf between States. However, 
it is still a controversial matter whether the presence of such a deposit can constitute a 
special circumstance which justifies deviation from the equidistance method or not. 
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" As he read out a passage of the ILA Report, Professor Hudson stated that when 
delimiting the continental shelf, account should be taken of, inter alia, "... the economic 
value of proven deposits of minerals, ... ". 
77 In his remarks on the mineral deposits 
issue, Gidstated that, the "... preservation of the unity of the deposit ... " is the 
primary concern. 78 This meaning was confirmed by Professor Mouton who observed 
that, "[a]ccount must be taken of the essential unity of a deposit. "79 Yet Professor 
Mouton believed that "... two concessionnaires should not tap the same pool, or in a 
descriptive parable: never two straws in one glass. "80 During the 1958 UNCLOS I, 
one of the examples that were referred to by Commander Kennedy (UK) was "... the 
possession by one of the two State concerned of special mineral exploitation rights 
... 
". 81 The delegate of Uruguay feared that the continental shelf boundary "... might 
cut across a mineral deposit in the ocean subsoil in a manner prejudicial to one of the 
States concerned. "82 Onorato also was in favour of considering common mineral 
deposits as a special circumstance within the meaning of Article 6.83 
Contrary to this, after quoting, inter alia, the above cited wording of Professor 
Mouton, Padwa stated that, 
"Nevertheless, it is believed that the better view would not include this type of situation 
within the meaning of "special circumstances". The possibility that one party might 
deplete such a divided reserve before the other commenced exploitation is not sufficient 
reason to justify a departure from the principle of equidistance. In such a case the parties 
must arrive at an accommodation between themselves. "84 
In line with this viewpoint, Judge Ammoun was of the opinion that, "... if the 
preservation of the unity of deposit is a matter of concern to the Parties, they must 
provide for this by a voluntary agreement ... ". 
85 
Professor Brown seems to have taken a more moderate viewpoint. Relying on 
the historical rights doctrine as was envisaged in the Grisbadarna case, Professor 
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Brown observed that the only situation which a natural resources deposit would 
constitute a special circumstance would be when "... a coastal State had acquired 
exclusive rights to such resources independently of, and prior to, the development of 
the continental shelf doctrine. "86 Apart from this situation, Professor Brown believes 
that, the presence of such a deposit, 
"... would scarcely seem to constitute a "special circumstance, " however, entitling a 
coastal State to demand a deviation from the equidistance line. " 87 
Professor O'connell agrees with Professor Brown saying that, 
"The only occasion, ..., when the existence of mineral 
deposits could be regarded as a 
'special circumstance' would be when interests in the deposit have been established 
independently of the continental shelf doctrine. -88 
In order to know whether common mineral deposits can constitute a special 
circumstance or not, there must be, it is believed, differentiation between the position in 
theory and that in practice. In theory, it seems that, the presence of mineral deposits 
can constitute a special circumstance for the following reasons. To begin with, the ILC 
recognized the economic and social importance of the exploitation of the continental 
shelf resources since the early stages of the development of the continental shelf 
doctrine. 89 The ILC, accordingly believed that, "[l]egal concepts should not impede 
this development. "90 This fact proves that the economic value of a proven deposit was 
always present in the ILC's mind whenever it discussed any legal concept relating to 
the definition or delimitation of the continental shelf. It is highly logical consequence, 
therefore, to assume that the ILC has meant to regard the presence of mineral deposits 
as a special circumstance, though it has not explicitly mentioned it in its commentary 
notes on the equidistance/special circumstances formula in 1953 and 1956. 
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In practice, the mineral deposits issue has been dealt with in various ways. 91 In 
order to solve the problem of the presence, or the possibility of the presence, of mineral 
deposits some States disregarded the drawing of a boundary line; and instead they 
designed a common zone for the purpose of joint development. The Choice of using 
the common zone method of delimitation proves that due to the presence of mineral 
deposits, States excluded the use of any other method of delimitation including that of 
the equidistance; i. e., the presence of such deposits was regarded as a special 
circumstance justifying deviation from, or may be exclusion of, the equidistance 
method. In some other instances States established a boundary line as well as a 
common zone for joint development where they were sure of, or suspected, the 
presence of mineral deposits. It is noteworthy to say that, the apportionment of the 
common zone has been effected by a variety of solutions such as equal apportionment, 
equal rights of exploitation, equal rights of the received revenue, a division proportional 
to the volume of the resources on each side of the boundary line and rights of 
exploitation, or rights of the received revenue, proportional to the volume of resources 
on each side of the boundary line. 92 
Other States preferred to deal with the problem of mineral deposits independently 
of the delimitation question of the continental shelf. Accordingly, such States 
negotiated and designed their continental shelf boundary line regardless of the presence 
of mineral deposits. However, these States preserved for themselves the rights of re- 
negotiating with their partners whenever a new survey would prove the presence of a 
common mineral field or deposit extending across the continental shelf boundary line. 
It seems that, even in this case States have been aware of the fact that the presence of 
mineral deposits is very likely to constitute a circumstance which will justify another 
method of delimitation in the area concerned. That is why these States have provided 
their precautionary conditional provision of renegotiation so as to abolish the 
established boundary line, when necessary due to new discoveries in the area 
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concerned, and design a new boundary line or at least a common zone for the purpose 
of joint venture 93 
In what sense can the presence of mineral deposits constitute a special 
circumstance? According to the above-cited literature, the unity, or the essential unity, 
of a mineral deposit has been considered to have the prime importance. This unity, as 
expressed by one extreme viewpoint, must be preserved for the benefit of only one 
party, for, "two concessionaires should not tap the same pool. " This viewpoint has 
proved to be refutable. Since the matter of the continental shelf delimitation has been 
left to be subject to agreement between States, so States can follow whatever method of 
delimitation they feel suits them. In practice, as has been seen above, numerous 
agreements have established a common zone for the purpose of joint development in the 
areas within which they were sure, or suspected, the presence of mineral deposits. 
Some of the concerned States have been given equal or proportional rights of 
exploitation in such common zones. That is to say, two concessionaires can, and 
indeed they do, tap the same deposit. In fact, if the unity of deposit is the prime 
element of the mineral deposit special circumstance, this unity is, and must be, 
preserved for the benefit of all the parties concerned and not for the benefit of one of 
them to the detriment of the others. 
IV 
Other Possible 
Physical Special Circumstances 
Two other special circumstances are very likely to be taken into account when 
delimiting the continental shelf in the light of the equidistance/special circumstances 
formula. These are, the natural prolongation special circumstance and proportionality. 
321 
Natural Prolongation 
In order to prove the possibility of applying the natural prolongation concept as a 
special circumstance, the following discussion is necessary. To begin with, natural 
prolongation is one of the foremost pioneer concepts of the continental shelf doctrine. 
This fact has been indicated to by the Truman Proclamation of 1945 and other 
numerous subsequent proclamations. 94 Secondly, as the 1958 Convention adopted the 
exploitability/200 meter depth criterion for the purpose of defining the outer limit of the 
continental shelf, this left the door open for a variety of interpretations ranging from a 
limited to a somewhat limitless continental shelf. However, there was a general feeling 
that the continental shelf should terminate at a certain point so as to distinguish it from 
the seabed of the ocean floor. This can be seen through the development of the law of 
the sea during the 1960s which resulted in declaring the resources of the deep seabed as 
a common heritage of mankind and subsequently resulted in calling for the UNCLOS 
III. During the UNCLOS III, the definition of the continental shelf was revised and 
eventually replaced by the distance/geological description criterion. Thus the 
continental shelf which exceeded the 200 nautical miles limit was defined, generally 
speaking, as the geological continuation of the land territory of the coastal State up to 
the outer limit of the continental margin, (the continental slope and the rise). Thirdly, 
the concept of natural prolongation was considered by the ICJ "... the most 
fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 
2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, .... 
"95 Similarly, indicating to the said wording of 
the ICJ, the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration of 1977-78 regarded natural 
prolongation as one of the concepts which "... were, ..., evidently of a general 
character and applicable to a delimitation under Article 6 no less than under customary 
law. "96 Fourthly, bearing in mind the definition of the natural prolongation 
circumstance, 97 the geological natural prolongation is by its very nature a special 
circumstance, for, once a geological feature indicates to a natural disruption of the 
continental shelf, this will be creative of inequities if it is not taken into account. 
Fifthly, if the foregoing justifications were able to prove the applicability of natural 
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prolongation as a special circumstance, then such applicability would be subject to the 
conditions which were said in respect of the natural prolongation relevant 
circumstance. 98 
Proportionality 
The concept of proportionality was first enshrined in the customary rules of the 
1969 North Sea Cases. However, this does not mean that the concept of 
proportionality is an elien elemen. to the Conventional rules of Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention. To begin with, by definition proportionality is the ratio between the 
lengths of the coasts of the parties concerned and the extent of their continental shelf 
areas. The extent of the configuration of the coasts and the extent of the continental 
shelf areas are, accordingly, the main elements of the proportionality concept. These 
two elements are, in fact, part and parcel of the geographical configuration special 
circumstance and the natural prolongation special circumstance. Secondly, as the final 
aim of the equidistance/special circumstances formula is to achieve an equitable 
solution, proportionality becomes not only an important element in the delimitation 
question of the continental shelf, but also a test ground in the light of which the 
equitableness or inequitableness of the final boundary can be judged. These facts were 
the main reasons why, as was seen above, the Tribunal in the Anglo-French case 
(1977-78) elaborated the principle of proportionality into two concepts, namely, 
proportionality as a special, or relevant, circumstance, and the disproportionally 
distorting effect of the geographical special, or relevant circumstances. 99 Thirdly, 
based on the "land dominates the sea" principle, the relation, or the ratio, between the 
lengths of the coasts and the extent of the continental shelf areas is a significant factor in 
the delimitation question of the continental shelf between States. Should the preceding 
evidences prove that proportionality can play the role of a special circumstance, such a 
circumstance is subject to the main requirements which has been previously said with 
respect to the proportionality relevant circumstance. 100 
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Navigation and Fishing Rights 
as a 
Special Circumstance 
The continental shelf doctrine has emerged from certain legal, geophysical and 
economic realities which are concerned with the seabed and its non-living natural 
resources. It seems, therefore, that it is quite foreign to the core of the continental shelf 
doctrine to take account of any other factors which are not related to the seabed and 
subsoil thereof, and to their non-living natural resources. Consequently, it is quite 
difficult to see any link between the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 
navigation and fishing rights factors, unless they are concerned with the said resources. 
However, it is still important to examine the history of the development of the doctrine 
so as to see whether navigation and fishing rights managed to be included in the scope 
of the "special circumstances" clause or not. 
Three viewpoints have been developed concerning navigation and fishing rights. 
When the Committee of Experts was asked to lay down a proper method to effect, inter 
alia, the delimitation of the continental shelf, it mentioned navigation and fishing rights 
as "special reasons" "which may divert the boundary from the median line. "101 In the 
light of this recommendation the ILC, while commenting on the equidistance/special 
circumstances formula stated that, "... provision must be made for departures 
necessitated by ... the presence of... navigable channels. "102 During the debate of the 
Fourth Committee in the 1958 UNCLOS I, Commander Kennedy (UK) included the 
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presence of a navigable channel and the possession of fishery rights as "types of special 
circumstances". 103 Professor Mouton, also considered navigable channels as a special 
circumstance which would necessitate departure from the equidistance principle. 104 
And finally, adding them to his long list of special circumstances, Judge Padilla Nervo 
mentioned navigable channels and "the protection of fisheries (fish banks)". 105 Yet, he 
also added safety and defence requirements. 106 
On the contrary, Professor Francios did not agree with Cordova to extend the 
territorial sea boundary for the purpose of delimiting the continental shelf because "... 
many of the special considerations, which were involved in delimiting the territorial 
sea, particularly questions of navigation and fishing interests, were irrelevant in 
delimiting the continental shelf. "107 Furthermore, Professor Franrios believed that "... 
navigation and fishing rights were protected by Article 5 of the Commission's 
draft. "108 
Recalling the situation where exclusive rights to sedentary fisheries had been 
acquired prior to the establishment of the continental shelf doctrine as a situation to be 
regarded as a special circumstance, Professor Brown believed that, "... references to 
navigation and fishing rights ... [were] the result of rather automatic repetition of 
propositions first stated in relation to the somewhat different problem of delimiting the 
territorial sea. "109 
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, 1977-78, although the presence of the English 
fishery zone around the Channel Islands was taken into account, this was not 
considered a circumstance under the title of fishing rights but under the conduct of the 
parties title. 110 As the navigational defence circumstance was invoked by both France 
and Britain, the Tribunal concluded this circumstance to be in favour of the French 
Republic in the southern areas of the English Channel. This latter circumstance was 
more likely to belong to security circumstance than to the presence of navigable channel 
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circumstance. 111 
For the purpose of clarification, as far as fishing rights is concerned, one should 
distinguish between fishing rights relating to sedentary fisheries and other non-living 
organs of the seabed of the continental shelf and those relating to the living resources of 
the Shelfs superjacent waters. The former rights are very likely to constitute a special 
circumstance if title to them have been acquired prior to the establishment of the 
continental shelf doctrine, whereas the latter are very unlikely to constitute a special 
circumstance. That is because living resources of the superjacent waters of the 
continental shelf do not belong to the continental shelf doctrine. As for Article 5 of the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, it referred to the protection of navigation, 
fishing, or conservation of the living resources of the sea, and not for considering the 
said objectives as special circumstances when delimiting the continental shelf. This can 
be understood from the wording of the said Article 5, particularly the phrase "... must 
not result in any unjustifiable interference.... "112 
In practice, fishing rights have been dealt with independently and without 
affecting the delimitation of the continental shelf by establishing either a fishery 
boundary line different from that of the continental shelf or a special zone within which 
such rights are protected, or trying to establish a continental shelf boundary which leave 
the concerned States with undisturbed exercise of its fishery rights. 113 
II 
Historic Rights 
as a 
Special Circumstance 
As has been already indicated above, the doctrine of historic rights is a 
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controversial one. However, it is found that, in order for any title to constitute a 
historic right, three elements are the most generally acceptable prerequisites. These are, 
the effective display of State authority, the acquiescence of the other States, and the 
lapse of time. 114 This Section is basically concerned with whether historic rights can 
constitute a special circumstance in the delimitation question of the continental shelf or 
not, and if the answer is affirmative, in what sense such historic rights can be regarded 
as a special circumstance. 
The question whether historic rights can be regarded as a special circumstance or 
not has been dealt with in various ways. According to Padwa "... it might reasonably 
be alleged that prior use of an area of the continental shelf is by its very nature a special 
circumstance; .... " 
115 Professor Brown is of the opinion that, historic rights, though 
in reality "... will very seldom be relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf as 
distinct from delimitation of the territorial sea. "116, they are in fact embraced in the 
"special circumstances" clause. 117 At sharp contrast, Professor OQnell excludes the 
possibility that historic rights can constitute a special circumstance because, "... the 
continental shelf doctrine of 'inherency' is deliberately aimed against the operation of 
the ordinary rule relating to historic rights, so that what is excluded as a matter of 
doctrine cannot be allowed to re-enter as a matter of exception. "118 Judge Oda reached 
a conclusion similar to that of Professor O'Connell, though by providing different 
evidence. In his dissenting opinion in the Tunisia/Libya Case of 1982, Judge Oda 
commented that. historic rights may constitute a special circumstance if the delimitation 
question was concerned with the territorial sea, but they "... would not have any impact 
on delimitation of the continental shelf. "119 
Nevertheless, despite the foregoing controversial viewpoints, and despite the fact 
that historic rights were not mentioned as a special circumstance by the ILC comments 
on the equidistance/special circumstances formula, historic rights, it seems, are able to 
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constitute a special circumstance due to the following reasons. To begin with, the 
historic rights question, as a matter of fact, belongs to thi: bulk of General International 
Law as distinct from that of the continental shelf doctrine. It also belongs to the 
Grisbadarna principle of "stable state of things" which is, in fact, one of the most 
important principles of General International Law. These facts prove that the historic 
rights question has a priority in application over any other concept of the continental 
shelf doctrine if title to such historic rights has been acquired prior to the establishment 
of the said doctrine. Judge Jessup put it rightly as he quoted from the Grisbadarna 
case the following paragraph: 
"... in the law of nations, it is a well established principle that it is necessary to refrain as 
far as possible from modifying the state of things existing in fact and for a long time; ... 
that principle has a very particular application when private interests are in question, 
which, once disregarded, cannot be preserved in an effective manner even by any sacrifices 
of the State to which those interested belong ... "(wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases, 
1915, PP. 111-129)" 120 
In what sense can historic rights constitute a special circumstance? 
Historic rights might, in principle, belong to historic waters or internal waters or 
historic bays, or historic rights relating to the resources of the continental shelf or 
historic rights relating to the resources of waters that overly the continental shelf. It is 
important first to exclude the possibility of those historic rights relating to the resources 
of waters that superjacent the continental shelf, because they are not related to the 
continental shelf doctrine. As for historic and internal waters and historic bays, they 
are more related to the question of baselines than to the delimitation question of the 
continental shelf. However, since the baselines question is, according to the provisions 
of Article 6 (especially the conditions of the applicability of the equidistance principle), 
related to the delimitation question of the continental shelf, so the determination of 
whether historic waters, or internal waters, or historic bays are true historic rights or 
not, will at the end of the day affect the extent of the continental shelf areas that may be 
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attributed to each party. That is to say, the determination of such issues as true historic 
rights will push the baselines forwards and consequently give the concerned State the 
chance of getting extra areas of continental shelf. Historic rights relating to historic and 
internal waters and historic bays, are therefore, by their very nature a special 
circumstance especially if such circumstances are recognized by the other concerned 
parties. 
And finally, historic rights concerning sedentary fisheries and any other mineral 
or non-living natural resources of the seabed of the continental shelf are undoubtedly 
regarded as a special circumstance if title to such rights has been acquired prior to the 
establishment of the continental shelf doctrine. As for these rights, the location of the 
resources in question is very important in determining whether they are a special 
circumstance or not. In order for such rights to constitute a special circumstance they 
must be located in areas where, if the continental shelf boundary does take them into 
account, the concerned State will be deprived of free and undisturbed exercise of them. 
It is, then, again the principle of irredressable disproportionally distorting effect that 
will have the last say as to whether historic rights relating to sedentary fisheries and any 
other mineral or non-living natural resources can constitute a special circumstance or 
not. 
HI 
Other Non-Physical 
Special Circumstances 
Other Legal Special Circumstances 
Some of the legal circumstances, such as the conduct of the parties and the 
existing agreements, in fact, belong to the doctrine of General International Law, rather 
than to the continental shelf doctrine. This fact indicates the applicability of such legal 
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circumstances to any question relating to the continental shelf doctrine unless such 
applicability is explicitly prohibited, or is patently foreign to the core of the doctrine 
itself. Regarding the conduct of the parties and the existing agreements circumstances, 
it seems that, their applicability is not only in harmony with, but also part and parcel of, 
the core of the continental shelf doctrine. That is to say, the conduct of the parties and 
the existing agreement circumstances can constitute, and, indeed they are, special 
circumstances. The conditions of these circumstances are the same conditions which 
were said with respect to them as relevant circumstances. 121 
Economic and Political Circumstances 
Economic and political factors are, due to their nature, very likely to be regarded 
as special circumstances. As the continental shelf doctrine emerged out of geophysical 
and, more importantly, economic considerations; and as the ILC recognized that, due to 
the economic, social and juridical importance of the exploitation of the continental shelf, 
"[1]egal concepts should not impede this development. "; 122 economic factors should a 
fortiori be recognized as special circumstances. 
Economic circumstances is a broad term under the category of which numerous 
factors can be embraced, such as fishing rights or interests, mineral deposits, maritime 
transport and other maritime interests. Because not all economic circumstances can 
constitute special circumstances, so it is quite important to determine the general 
requirements of the economic factors which can be regarded as special circumstances. 
These requirements are, in fact, the same requirements of the economic relevant 
circumstance as was indicated to in the Fourth Chapter. 123 
As for political factors, numerous factors can fall within the meaning of such 
category, such as security, defence, the need to establish good relationship with the 
neighbouring States and other political interests. Political factors are by their very 
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nature special circumstances, especially if they are related to categories such as security 
and defence. The ICJ indicated in the Libya/Malta Case of 1985 that "[s]ecurity 
considerations are not unrelated to the concept of the continental shelf. They were 
referred to when this legal concept first emerged, particularly in the Truman 
Proclamation. "124 Furthermore, as both parties to the Anglo-French Arbitration of 
1977-78 invoked their navigational defence and security interests present in the English 
Channel, the Tribunal was of the opinion that these circumstances "... tend to evidence 
the predominant interest of the French Republic in the southern area of the English 
Channel, ... ". 
125 Of course, it is necessary to identify the requirements that political 
factors must obtain in order to be regarded as special circumstances, for not all political 
factors can constitute special circumstances. For these requirements, reference must be 
made to those requirements of the political relevant circumstances since they are the 
same. 126 
Condusion 
Having examined the meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause, it 
is found that the clause could be interpreted in two ways. The narrow viewpoint 
interprets the clause in a restrictive way which embraces those circumstances that are in 
line with the interpretation that the "special circumstances" clause is provided in Article 
6 as a narrow exception of the equidistance principle. On the contrary, the broader 
viewpoint believes that the "special circumstances" clause has a broad meaning and 
scope which can embrace a wide variety of circumstances that pleases the requirements 
of equity and goes in line with the interpretation that the clause is provided in Article 6 
as an alternative solution to that of the equidistance. The latter viewpoint has proved to 
be more plausible. The "special circumstances" clause can, accordingly, embrace a 
variety of legal, economic and political as well as geophysical circumstances. These 
varieties are found to belong to factors such as, the geographical configuration of the 
coast, the geographical complexity of the region, the presence of islands, the presence 
of common mineral deposits, natural prolongation, proportionality, sedentary fishery 
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rights, historic rights, the conduct of the parties and the existing agreements, security 
and defence. 
More importantly, having said that the broad viewpoint of interpretation is more 
likely to be the correct one; and that the "special circumstances" clause is restricted only 
in respect of the equity requirements; it is found that the relevant criterion in the light of 
which the real meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause can be revealed 
is the irredressable disproportionally distorting effect (IDDE) principle. Any factor is 
alleged to be a circumstance in a given case must be subject to the test of IDDE 
principle. If such a factor is proven to have the ability of producing an irredressable 
disproportionally distorting effect, in the meaning that if the factor is not taken into 
account, it deprives the interested party from exercising his rights, so this factor is a 
special circumstance. 
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General 
The continental shelf doctrine originated as"'egal concept,, defining unknown 
facts, and developed into legal concept defining somewhat well known geophysical, 
judicial, economic and political realities. The lack of the requisite scientific knowledge 
in the 1940s and 1950s caused the continental shelf doctrine to stumble its way through 
the darkness resulting in a vague and broad definition of the unknown physical realities 
of the continental shelf as was enshrined in the exploitability/depth criterion. However, 
no sooner had the speed of technological development increased, than the defects of the 
said legal concepts were realised. As the vague legal concepts of the continental shelf 
enabled interpreters to claim limitless continental shelf areas, some States cried out for a 
more precise definition of the continental shelf as distinct from that of the seabed of the 
ocean floor As a result, the UNCLOS III was held, and eventually resulted in, inter 
alia, a precise descriptive definition of the continental shelf based on clearly identified 
geological realities. 
The delimitation question of the continental shelf between States was deeply 
affected by the lack of the requisite knowledge, the 1958 vague definition of the 
continental shelf, and the economic and political ambitions of States. These three 
factors were the main reason why the Conventional solution of Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention adopted the equidistance/special circumstances formula to effect the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between States. The equidistance/special 
circumstances formula was not only vague and ambiguous, but was also deliberately 
left without sufficient clarification. Besides, the equidistance/special circumstances 
formula has suffered from two weaknesses. The first concerned the real implication of 
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the equidistance role, whereas the second is »t==* jn the actual meaning and scope 
of the special circumstances clause. These two weaknesses are, in fact, interconnected, 
interrelated, and interdependent on each other. For, any precise solution to one of them 
will, automatically, result in a precise solution to the other. Any identification of the 
real meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause will, undoubtedly, result 
in identifying the role of the equidistance principle as is provided in Article 6; and a 
precise identification of the role of the equidistance principle will automatically result in 
a precise determination of the meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause. 
Furthermore, the wider and broader the meaning and scope of the "special 
circumstances" clause is, the less the emphasis on the equidistance principle will be; 
and the more the emphasis on the equidistance principle proves to be, the more 
restrictive the meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" clause. 
Although the ILC, explicitly, commented that it considered the equidistance 
principle a general rule and the "special circumstance" clause an exception, this did not 
end the debate on the real role of the said principle and clause in Article 6. Two 
viewpoints have tried to explain the real role of the principle and the clause. The first 
believes that, since the equidistance principle is provided as a general rule and the 
"special circumstances" clause an exception, this gives greater emphasis to the 
equidistance principle to the extent that the "special circumstances" clause is a narrow 
exception with a narrow scope of exceptional circumstances. The other viewpoint 
assesses the role of the equidistance principle and the "special circumstances" clause not 
only in the light of the said ILC comments, but also in the light of the entire 
deliberations concerning the equidistance/special circumstances formula, and in the light 
of the wording of Article 6. This viewpoint realised that the instigators of the 
equidistance/special circumstances formula, indeed, intended to provide a formula that 
would be able to guarantee and produce an equitable solution. And since the equitable 
solution is the final aim of Article 6, so the interpretation of the role of the equidistance 
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principle and the "special circumstances" clause must be carried out in the light of the 
equity requirements. This has lead them to the conclusion that, the "special 
circumstances" clause is not an exception but an alternative solution to that of the 
equidistance, which is intended to be the last resort, and accordingly is attenuated to its 
lowest effect. As far as this thesis is concerned, the latter viewpoint is found to be 
more credible because of reasons relating to the instigators deliberations on the 
equidistance/special circumstances formula, the wording of Article 6, and the 
discussion on the "special circumstances" clause. 1 
As the ICJ found the Conventional solution not applicable to the North Sea Cases 
of 1969, (because Germany was not a party to the said Convention), it searched for 
other rules and principles that could be applicable to the delimitation question of the 
continental shelf. The ICJ's efforts were concluded by adopting the equitable 
principles/relevant circumstances formula as the Customary solution of the delimitation 
of the continental shelf between States. 
Although the equitable principles/relevant circumstances formula was left without 
adequate clarification, there was an explicit mention of the Customary solution stand 
concerning the equidistance principle. It regarded it as 
ä mere method existing in 
International Law. The applicability of the equidistance method, therefore, was made 
subject to the satisfaction of the equity requirements. However, the weaknesses of the 
customary solution stems from its lack of sufficient clarification as to the real meaning 
and scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause. In fact, because the "relevant 
circumstances" clause was left without sufficient clarification, this affected the 
implication of the Customary solution stana relating to the equidistance principle. As 
the applicability of the equidistance principle has been made subject to the satisfaction 
of the equity requirements, and as equity has been defined as the balancing process of 
the relevant circumstances in a given case, it is logical to conclude that the broader the 
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meaning and scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause, the less possible the 
applicability of the equidistance principle will be. This leads to two conclusions. The 
first is that, since the meaning and scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause has not 
been clearly identified, so the real stand of the Customary solution concerning the 
equidistance principle is not yet known. The second is that, the real stand of the 
Customary solution concerning the equidistance principle is dependent upon the 
identification of the meaning and scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause. 
The failure of the Conventional solution as well as the Customary solution to 
clarify their stand relating to the equidistance principle, pushed the Conferees during the 
UNCLOS III towards uncertainty and confusion regarding the role of the said principle 
in the delimitation question of the continental shelf. The Conferees, therefore, inclined 
to circle around two views: the first, the equity group, preferred to grant the 
equidistance principle the minimum effect leaving the major effect to the equity 
requirements, whereas the second, the equidistance group, was in favour of embodying 
the said principle as an obligatory rule in the 1982 Convention. Unfortunately, none of 
these two views won. Rather, the 1982 Convention adopted a formula of general 
terminology, the implication of which could be interpreted as indicating to the said- 
above Conventional and Customary solutions. Accordingly, one can safely say that the 
Conventional solution - the equidistance/special circumstances formula -, and the 
Customary solution - equitable principles/relevant circumstances formula -, are the only 
available solutions of the continental shelf delimitation in International Law. 
Recalling what has already been said, both, the Conventional and Customary, 
solutions could not determine their real and precise stand concerning the equidistance 
principle, the "special circumstances" clause and the "relevant circumstances" clause. 
The main reason for this appears to be due to the lack of a reliable criterion in the light 
of which such a stand can be identified. As both solutions seem to have left the 
identification of the role of the equidistance principle to the equity requirements, so the 
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reliable criterion very likely belongs to the equity principle. Having examined this 
problem in the light of the facts, rules and principles and the continental shelf doctrine, 
it is found that the most relevant and reliable criterion is the irredressable 
disproportidnally distorting effect (IDDE) principle to which the discussion will now 
turn. 
Equity In A New Perspective 
Equity and Objectivity 
Equity, as has been seen above, is an objective balancing of the relevant 
circumstances in a given case. The emphasis on the objectivity of the balancing process 
can be found in almost all the judicial and arbitral cases that were concerned with the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf. However, none of these cases provided 
even a single piece of information that identified how the objectivity of the said process 
could be attained, or what the parameters to effect such an objectivity were. Of course, 
that is not at all to suspect the objective character of the equity principle, but in fact to 
draw attention to the real need for more clarification of the criterion/criteria that control 
equity in order to keep it within the scope of objectivity. 
Equity and the Equidistance Principle 
Despite the inapplicability of the equidistance principle to numerous cases, there is 
no doubt, whatsoever, about the objectivity of this principle. If the equidistance 
principle is understood to indicate to the method of delimitation which produces an 
equidistant line from certain points of the baselines, there would be no room for any 
subjective element to play a role therein. 
According to the available cases, the applicability of the equidistance method is 
always said to be dependent on the satisfaction of the equity principle requirements. 
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The question, therefore, is, what is the relationship between equity and the equidistance 
principle? More importantly, is it true that the applicability of the equidistance principle 
is dependent upon the satisfaction of the equity requirements? Yet a more courageous 
question would be, which principle controls the other? Does equity control the 
equidistance principle or does the equidistance principle control equity? To answer 
these questions, some discussion is necessary. 
Let us first recall the principal features of the equity principle. Equity, in the first 
place, is a relative concept. The relativity of equity is always dependent upon the 
balancing of the relevant, or special circumstances of each individual case, which are, 
in principle, different from those of the other cases. In the second place, equity is not 
necessarily supposed to produce equality. It, in fact, aims at achieving an equitable 
solution which is not interested in completely remedying the natural inequality. It was, 
therefore, on these bases that equity was defined as an objective balancing process of 
the relevant, or special circumstances. 
Since equity depends solely on the circumstances of each individual case, so the 
question is, how are these circumstances evaluated so that they become a sufficient 
basis for an objective outcome? Before answering this question another question needs 
to be asked. That is, is it the presence of relevant or special circumstances or the impact 
of the presence of such circumstances that is the subject of evaluation? As a matter of 
fact, it is the impact of the presence of such circumstances and not the circumstances 
themselves that are evaluated. Then, what is the implication of this impact? The 
answer is, it is the distorting effects that are produced by the presence of the relevant, 
or special circumstances in a given case. What do they distort? They distort the 
proportion between the continental shelf areas that each State, in principle, is entitled to. 
The relevant, or special circumstances are, accordingly, not the focal point of equity; 
rather, equity focuses on the disproportions 11* distorting effect of the presence of such 
343 
circumstances. Consequently, equity, in reality, is an objective balancing of the 
disproportionh I Iv }distorting effects of the relevant, or special, circumstances in a given 
case. 
Then, how are the disproportionilly) distorting effects of the relevant, or special 
circumstances evaluated objectively? In order for the evaluation to be objective, there 
must be a reliable criterion/criteria in the light of which an objective assessment of the 
said effects can be achieved. 
Although equity does not believe that the equidistance method is the proper 
method to effect all delimitations of the continental shelf, it is still of cardinal 
importance that the most ideal equitable solution is the equal division of the continental 
shelf areas, where the presence or the absence of certain circumstances justify such a 
division between the parties concerned. However, so long as the equal division 
solution is not feasible in all cases, the proper solution of some cases deviates from 
being an equal division to being an unequal division of the areas in question. Such a 
deviation is always justified by the presence of certain circumstances, the 
disproportionLllv)distorting effects of which renders the equal division to become an 
inequitable solution, and the unequal division to become an equitable solution. The 
equal division can, therefore, be considered the underlying parameter that serves as a 
guide for an objective balancing process of the disproportionally distorting effects of 
the relevant, or special, circumstances. 
To prove the foregoing conclusion, two sources of evidence can be cited. The 
first is the evidence of logic. Since the most ideal equitable solution is the equal 
division solution; and so long as not all delimitations are able to produce such an equal 
division; so it is logical to say that those delimitations which fail to produce this 
solution will try to aim, as far as possible, to achieve the equal division solution. For, 
the final aim of equity is not to achieve an equitable solution, but, in fact, to achieve 
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the most equitable solution. It is, equally, logical to say that, in order to approach, as 
far as possible, the equal division solution, the equal division solution must be taken 
into account as a guide, in the light of which any other solution can be assessed. 
The other evidence can be deduced from the judgements of the judicial and arbitral 
cases. The expression of "the distorting effect of the equidistance line" was mentioned 
on numerous occasions in most of these cases. The question is: is it the equidistance 
line or the presence of the circumstances concerned that produces the said distorting 
effect? According to the said cases, the answer must surely favour the understanding 
that it is the distorting effect of the presence of the effective circumstances. Such a 
distorting effect plays the decisive role in deviating the equidistance line from its normal 
position as it is supposed to produce an equal division of the continental shelf areas 
concerned. That is why it is usually, mistakenly, called the distorting effect of the 
equidistance line. 
Besides, when the ICJ, in the 1969 North Sea Cases, was discussing the position 
of opposite States, it stated that, 
".... and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and other minor coastal projections, the 
disproportionruy? distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other means, such a line 
must effect an equal division of the particular area involved: "2 
According to this paragraph, the disproportionally distorting effect of the stated relevant 
circumstances, is the decisive criterion, in the light of which such circumstances are 
assessed as to whether they can cause the boundary line to deviate from the equal 
division of the continental shelf areas or not. 
The most important geophysical circumstances in the opposite States situation are 
the presence of islands, islets and other coastal projections, whereas it is the 
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geographical configuration of the coast in the lateral States situation. The 
disproportionally distorting effect, therefore, not only can be said to be attributable to 
the presence of islands, islets and other coastal projections, but also to the presence of 
any irregular coastal configuration. 3 Yet, the Tribunal, in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration, went a further step when it regarded all geographical circumstances as 
being able to produce a disproportionally distorting effect. 4 In fact, since equity is 
more interested in the distorting effect of certain circumstances than in the presence of 
the circumstances themselves; and since all geophysical circumstances are, by their very 
nature, able to produce a distorting effect; so the disproportionally distorting effect 
principle can function as a criterion in the light of which all geophysical circumstances 
can be evaluated. 
More importantly, in the course of examining the individual categories of 
"special" and "relevant" circumstances, it is found that all such categories, whether they 
are of a geophysical, legal, economic, or political nature belong, directly or indirectly, 
to a geophysical objective. 5 This finding is proven by the fact that any legal, or 
economic, or political right or interest, relating to the continental shelf is, undoubtedly 
and indispensably, concerned with a geophysical objective. For instance, historic 
rights, sedentary fishing rights or interests and security and defence rights are 
undoubtedly and sin qua non related to certain areas of the continental shelf within 
which the concerned State claims its exclusive rights or interests. This leads to the 
conclusion that, the disproportionally distorting effect principle can be attributable to 
any special or relevant circumstance, and, accordingly, constitute a criterion in the light 
of which all such circumstances, regardless of their nature, can be evaluated. 
In the light of the IDDE principle, the evaluation process of the circumstances in a 
given case may proceed in three stages. In the first stage, each circumstance is 
evaluated as to whether it is able to produce a distorting effect or not. If the 
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circumstance at stake is proven to be able to produce a considerable distorting effect, so 
it can be regarded as an effective circumstance. On the contrary, if the circumstance is 
proven to have a negligible distorting effect, or a minor distorting effect that can be 
remedied by other means, (such as giving additional weight to some other 
circumstances - e. g. Filfla Islet in the Libya/Malta case of 1985 -, 
6) this circumstance is 
susceptible to be totally disregarded. That is why, in order for any circumstance to be 
taken into account, it must be able to produce an irredressable distorting effect. 
In the second stage of the evaluation process, the resultant circumstances of the 
first stage, are evaluated and their distorting effect is assessed. Because this is an 
important stage of the delimitation process; and because it must result in an objective 
evaluation of the involved circumstances; so it is equally important that it should 
function in accordance with a solid technique which guarantees objective results. 
Having searched for such a solid technique, it has been found that the best 
technique, which provides the best assessment of the distorting effect of a particular 
circumstance, is the one that concerns itself with the comparison between two 
situations. These two situations are, an equal division delimitation, and a delimitation 
using the equidistance principle that takes into account the presence of the circumstance 
in question. To explain this technique, it would be better if an example is provided. If 
a geographical configuration is considered an effective circumstance in a given case, the 
degree of its distorting effect can be measured by identifying the difference between an 
equal division of the continental shelf areas concerned and an equidistance line 
delimitation that takes into account the said configuration. However, because the 
presence of the effective circumstances in a given case is, in reality, more complicated 
than the above-said example, and because some continental shelf areas are affected by 
the presence of more than one circumstance at the same time, (such as the geographical 
complexity circumstance), so, the identification of the degree of the distorting effect can 
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be concerned with a set of effective circumstances, instead of only one, due to their 
interplay effect. The identification of the degree of the distorting effect of a given 
circumstance is the first step in evaluating this circumstance in order to find out its due 
weight. 
The second step is to determine how much the proportionality of the concerned 
continental shelf areas of the parties concerned is affected by the distorting effect of the 
circumstance/set of circumstances in question. In fact, this step is interested in 
identifying the gains and losses of the concerned parties. These gains and losses can 
be identified by two ways, viz, either by a ratio representing the proportion between the 
degree of the distorting effect of an effective circumstance and the party's ideal portion - 
by equal division - of the continental shelf area, or a ratio representing the proportion 
between the degrees of the distorting effect of the circumstances relating to one party 
and those relating to the other. So long as equity is not completely refashioning nature; 
and because the "equitable principles" concept is said to necessarily imply the notion of 
mutual calculations of the circumstances of all the parties concerned, and that one 
should compare like with like; so the first of the said two ways cannot be acceptable. 
Rather, the second way, which is concerned with the ratio between the degrees of the 
distorting effects of circumstances relating to one of the parties concerned and those of 
the other, is more plausible as falling within the meaning of the equity principle. In 
es of the disproportionally order to i4eally)Operate this step, the calculation of the degre 
distorting effect of the effective circumstances must be proceeded by the help of a 
criterion. This criterion is usually deduced from the common features of the involved 
circumstances such as the distance criterion with respect to the Scilly Isles and Ushant 
Island in the Anglo-French Arbitration. This kind of evaluation results in a set of ratios 
representing the degrees of the disproportionally distorting effects of the effective 
circumstances of all the parties in a given case. 
In the third and final stage, the balancing process is proceeded. During this stage, 
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the resultant degrees of the disproportionally distorting effects of the effective 
circumstances of all the parties concerned are evaluated, compared, and, subsequently, 
given due weights. The due weight of each circumstance is identified in the light of the 
degree of the disproportionally distorting effect of, 1- the circumstance is question; 2- 
the other circumstances relating to the same party concerned, and 3- the corresponding 
circumstance/circumstances of the other party. Finally, the balancing process proceeds 
by evaluating the resultant various weights that are given to the involved circumstances. 
In the light of this evaluation the method of delimitation is eventually chosen. If the 
gains and losses of the distorting effects of the involved circumstances from each side 
of the concerned parties redress each other, so an equal division of the continental shelf 
areas becomes the indispensable equitable solution. That is to say, all the involved 
circumstances were given equal weights, or may be completely disregarded - for in this 
case the result is the same whether the circumstances are given equal weights or 
completely disregarded. On the contrary, should the said effects not redress each other, 
the various weights that are given to the involved circumstances will be the responsible 
criterion that identifies the course of boundary line which is definitely not going to be 
an equal division of the areas concerned. 
To illustrate the preceding discussion, a simple example is selected from the 
Anglo-French Arbitration. This example is concerned with the Scilly Isles (UK) and 
the Ushant Island (France). So as to avoid repetition, it is advisable to refer to a 
previous discussion concerning this example bearing in mind the following 
observations: a- both, the Scilly Isles and the Ushant Island, managed to produce an 
irredressable distorting effect; b- the degree of the disproportiopally distorting effect of 
the Scillies was 2 and that of the Ushant Island was 1; and c- accordingly the Scillies 
were given half effect and the Ushant full effect.? 
Applying the IDDE principle to the equidistance principle, "special circumstances" 
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clause and the "relevant circumstances" clause, the following conclusions could be 
found. As the determination of the meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" 
clause and the "relevant circumstances" clause will automatically result in identifying 
the role of the equidistance principle in both, the Conventional and Customary, 
solutions, and as the identification of the said two clauses has become easier by the help 
of the IDDE principle, it is suggested that the meaning and scope of the said two 
clauses is, first, identified, and, subsequently, the role of the equidistance principle is 
deduced. 
Thus, as far as the "special circumstances" clause is concerned, its scope is, so 
far, found to be able to embrace factors belonging to geophysical, legal, economic and 
political considerations, within the scope of which the following categories could be 
found: the geographical configuration of the coast, the geographical complexity of the 
area concerned, the presence of islands, the presence of common mineral deposits, 
historic rights, sedentary fishing rights, the conduct of the parties and the existing 
agreements, natural prolongation, and proportionality. Yet, it is found that the "special 
circumstances" clause is more likely to be regarded as an alternative solution to that of 
the equidistance. Accordingly, since the meaning and scope of the "special 
circumstances" clause is as broad as this, so the role of the equidistance principle in the 
Conventional solution, is attenuated to its lowest effect. 
As for the. "relevant circumstances" clause, it is also an alternative solution to that 
of the equidistance principle, since it has been explicitly regarded as such by the 
Customary solution. The scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause can include 
considerations of geophysical, legal, economic and political nature, embracing 
categories such as, the geographical configuration of the coast, the geographical 
complexity of the area concerned, the presence of islands, the presence of common 
mineral deposits, historic rights, sedentary fishing rights, the conduct of the parties and 
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the existing agreements, natural prolongation, and proportionality. Subsequently, such 
a wide-ranged meaning and scope of the "relevant circumstances" clause results in 
mitigating the role of the equidistance principle to its lowest effect. 
The question is, since the meaning and scope of the "special circumstances" 
clause and the "relevant circumstances" clause has, so far, enabled both clauses to 
embrace identical categories of considerations, so does that mean that the meaning and 
scope of the two clauses are the same? Professor O'Connell observed that there its 
two views concerning this problem. The first is that the "special circumstances" clause 
possesses 
"... only a minor corrective role in the use of the equidistance principle because of its 
apparent subordinate position in the arrangement of the concepts in Article 6, and may 
play either no role at all, or a greater or a lesser role, in customary law because of the 
mandatory character which equidistance has in Article 6 but may not have in customary 
law. "8 
The other view believes that, 
".., there is no difference in practice between the role played by special circumstances in 
Article 6 and in customary law because in both it is the obverse of equidistance. "9 
As far as this thesis is concerned, and according to the available facts so far, the 
latter viewpoint is more credible than the former. That is, the meaning and scope of the 
"special circumstances" clause and the "relevant circumstances" clause are more likely 
to be the same 
0 
Does that mean that the role of the equidistance principle is the same 
whether under the Conventional solution or Customary solution? So far, the answer is 
yes, the role of the equidistance principle is the same in both solutions. Furthermore, 
this leads to the conclusion that both, the Conventional and Customary, solutions are, 
so far, identical. In fact, this finding consolidates the conclusion of the Second 
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Chapter, that the Customary solution of the 1969 cases has not been an alternative 
solution to that of Article 6, but an explanatory solution in the light of which the real 
meaning of the Conventional solution can be clarified. 
As the implication of both, the Conventional and Customary, solutions is, so far, 
the same, there is, therefore, only one solution regarding the delimitation question of 
the continental shelf. That is, the delimitation of the continental shelf between States 
shall be effected by a proper method of delimitation so as to achieve an equitable 
solution, taking into account the presence of all the effective circumstances that may 
produce an irredressable disproportionally distorting effect, in the meaning that if the 
circumstance is disregarded the concerned State will be deprived, wholly or in part, of 
the exercise of its legal rights. 
Yet, this conclusion is very likely to dominate the future development of the 
delimitation question of the continental shelf (and single maritime boundaries) due to 
the fact that any judicial organ will find itself obliged to give priority to the equity 
requirements when delimiting certain continental shelf areas, whether it applies the 
Conventional solution of Article 6, or the Customary solution, or the Conventional 
solution of the 1982 Convention. 
Notes- 
1- See above, Chap. V, Section 1 and 2; see also below, this Chapter, P. 349-352. 
2- The ICJ (1969), Report, Para. 57. 
3- Ibid., Para. 59. 
4- The Anglo-French Arbitration (1977-78), Para. 99-101. 
5- See above, Chapter IV and V. 
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6- The ICJ (1985), Report, Para. 64. 
7- See above, Chapter III, Section 2. 
8- O'connell, D. P., The International Law Of The Sea, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, Vol. II, P. 
705-706. 
9- Ibid., P. 706. 
10- Cf. Evans, M. D., Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1989, P. 78-83. Evans has provided a short discussion relating to the difference between the 
special circumstances and relevant circumstances clauses; and concludes that the two clauses 
"... tend to be seen as interchangeable. " Although he attributes an ameliorative function to the 
special circumstances clause and an indicative function to that of relevant circumstances, Evans 
comments that the two functions "... are not clearly distinguished as separate aspects by the 
judicial reasoning. This, it is suggested, is at least in part due to the use of the same term to 
describe both, and their separation would be an aid to clarity. " (P. 83. ) 
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AIPIPXNDIIA' 
Since completing the writing of this thesis I have become aware of the work 
"Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation" by M. D. Evans (Oxford 
University Press, 1989). The conclusions reached in that work are not dissimilar to 
those which I have reached independently. So as to take account of Mr. Evans work I 
have gone through my thesis and I have drawn attention to the references in Evans' 
work where it is relevant to what I have said. My understanding is that it is not unusual 
for two scholars to work on similar unresolved issues while being unaware of each 
other's interests. However, this does not affect the originality of the work of either. In 
my own particular case the fact that Mr. Evans has written on the same subject indicates 
the novelty of the issue to scholars. 
Nevertheless, because the fourth Chapter, and consequently the sixth Chapter, of 
the present thesis have dealt with the relevant circumstances concept in the context of 
continental shelf delimitation, and regardless of any discussion relating to the difference 
between maritime boundary delimitation and that of the continental shelf, l the 
following remarks are necessary. 
Evans referred to the expression "distorting effect", and this might create 
confusion regarding the said expression and the "Irredressable Disproportionally 
Distorting Effect (IDDE)" principle which I have arrived at in the thesis. So as to 
clarify the difference between his use of the expression and the principle I arrive at, the 
following observations are of significance. To begin with, Evans mentioned examples 
of the "distorting effect" concept in the context of "a particular coastal 
configuration", 2 in the context of islands, 3 and in the context of proportionality as 
l- Regarding the difference between maritime boundary delimitation and that of the continental 
shelf. we my opinion at 82-83 above; and cf. Evans. P. 44-63. 
2- Evans, P. 89. 
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"... 'assessing the distorting effect of a particular feature', ... ". 
4 Obviously, all these 
examples indicate that Mr. Evans attributes the distorting effect concept solely to 
geographical circumstances. For, even the broad idea of'assessing the distorting effect 
of a particular feature" denotes by the use of the word "feature" that a geographical 
feature is being considered. 5 Besides, Mr. Evans put the said statement in inverted 
comas as an indication that he adopted this expression from one of the decided cases, 
which is most likely to be the Anglo-French Arbitration .6 
As for the IDDE principle, the thesis suggests that it can be attributed to all 
circumstances, whether they are of geographical, geophysical, economic, political or 
even legal nature.? 
As the expression "distorting effect" is used in Evans', (P. 89), during the 
discussion relating to his suggested framework of analysis, this might indicate that 
Evans means it to be used as a component of his framework. Having studied the 
relevant text carefully, however, I realised that he used the said expression in the 
context of an example simply to advance his discussion. In sharp contrast, the IDDE 
concept, as I see it, can be used as a main principle. Yet the IDDE principle, unlike Mr. 
Evans' framework which "is presented as a tool of analysis", 8 is suggested in the 
thesis as a lexferenda principle aiming at bridging the gaps relating to what should be 
the objective character of the delimitation process, and providing an objective criterion 
in the light of which the relevance or special character of a given circumstance can be 
3- Ibid., p. 147, and 156, as quoted from the ICJ (1969) Report, Para. 13, and 57. 
4- Ibid., P. 231. 
5- See the use of the word "feature" by Evans, in Chapters 6,7 & 8, Evans, P. 119-151; it is 
necessary to say that the term "distorting effect" was also used in the same sense by the Anglo- 
French Arbitration (1977-78), see Para. 99-101. 
6- Evans, P. 225-226; see also the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977-78), ibid. 
7- The thesis, P. 345-346; see also generally Chapter IV, esp. the Conclusions. 
8- Evans, P. 88. 
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identified: 9 this aims at the solution of problem which Evans admits to being unable 
to solve. 10 
A source of confusion may lie in the various roles attributed to the 
"proportionality" principle and the confusion between the concept of proportionality 
and the IDDE principle as I use it. Evans identifies "two broad forms of 
proportionality: first, as a means of assessing the impact of factors upon a delimitation 
line, second, as a test of equitability. "11 The first of these two uses might lead to 
confusion. 
As far as the present thesis is concerned, the proportionality concept is found to 
have also played two roles in the decided cases, namely, as an independent relevant 
circumstance, and as a test of equity. 12 So, both, Evans and I, agree that 
proportionality plays the role of assessing the equitability of the resultant solution; but 
we differ as to the second function of the proportionality concept: it is a means of 
assessing the impact of the geographical features in Evans' opinion, whereas it is an 
independent relevant circumstance in mine. 
In fact, a closer study of the Evans' two uses of the proportionality concept 
shows that Evans, like the decision in the Anglo-French Arbitration, has mixed together 
two variant concepts and put them under the title of proportionality. These two 
concepts are, proportionality in the true sense and the disproportionally distorting effect 
9- The thesis, P. 341-344, and 346-349. 
10 Evans could not avoid stating that the weighing up process "... will always remain a somewhat 
subjective operation. ". (P. 91). the statement which was denied by all the judicial and arbitral 
cases which insisted on the necessity of the objective character of the delimitation process, (see 
the thesis at 342); see also his statement "you know one when you see one", (P. 90). In 
another instance, Mr. Evans pointed out that his suggested framework "... does not help 
determine what is to be a relevant circumstance. ", (P. 88). 
11 
_ Evans, P. 230. 
12. The them:,. P. 222-231. esp. 230. 
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of the geographical circumstances, from which the thesis has developed the IDDE 
principle. 13 As the thesis has already dealt with this issue in Chapter IV, and so as to 
avoid repetition, the reader is asked to refer to the relevant passage. 14 
Difficulty may also result from confusing the word "disproportionally" as used in 
the IDDE principle and the proportionality concept itself. As Evans refers to the 
expression "distorting effect" in the context of proportionality, so the word 
"disproportionally" seems to be, according to Evans, a component of the 
proportionality concept in the same fashion as it is referred to in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration. 15 The present thesis distinguishes between the two words and attributes a 
different meaning to each. Proportionality, according to the thesis, appears exclusively 
as the relation between the length of the coasts of the concerned states and the extent of 
their continental shelf areas. 16 When the word "disproportionally" is presented as a 
component of the IDDE principle in the thesis I understood the need to clarify the 
implication of this word. Since the presence of the effective circumstances must be able 
to produce an irredressable distorting effect, so the question is, what do they distort? 
They distort the proportion of the continental shelf areas of the States concerned. 
Which proportion is it? It is the ideal proportion of the continental shelf areas. What 
does ideal proportion mean? It means the equal division of the continental shelf areas 
between the concerned States. Accordingly, as far as the IDDE principle is concerned, 
the word "disproportionally" is presented as meaning the distortion of the hypothetical 
ideal proportion - equal division - of the continental shelf areas of the States concerned. 
It is on this ground that in my view the IDDE principle should function in the second 
stage of the delimitation process. 17 
13- Ibid., P. 345-346. 
14- See ibid., P. 225-231. 
15. See previous page. 
16- The thesis, P. 230. 
17- Ibid., P. 348-349. 
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Annex I 
Uni lateral State Pract ice (Definition Aspects) 
States Name 
945 
to 
950 
951 
to 
1958 
959 
to 
973 
According to the 
Conv., or 200 mtJ 
Exploitability 
Criterion. 
Exploit- 
ability 
Criterion 
Contlnenta Margi 
or 200 n. ml. or 
any other definit 
limit 
Infinit 
Limit. 
or No 
Definition 
Conti- 
nental 
Shelf 
Seabed a 
Subsoil of 
Submarin 
Aron 
Designate 
or 
Controled 
Areas 
1- Abu Dhabi 1949, No Def. 
2- Ajman 194 No Der. 
3- Argentina 946 No Der. 
4- Argentina 1966 @ Q 
5- Ar entina 
[1973, 
Q Q 
6- Australia 953 
Q 100 lath. isoba 
As it was identifi 
h 
in a subs 
Q 
equent act 
7- Australia 968 
Q 
It has the same m anin of a 1958 Convents Q 
8- Bahamas 948 Alter tion f Boundaries No Def. Q 
9- Bahamas 970 . Q 
10- Bahrain 949 No Def. 
11- Brazil 195 No Def. 0J , Insular Sh t 
12- British Honduras 194 No Def. 0 
13- British Solomon 
Islands 970 
14- Canada 
11970 
15- Cayman Islands a69 It has the same m aning of a 1958 Convents Q 
16- Chile 194 @ 200 nml. 
17- Costa Rica 
948 
949 Q 200 nml. 
Q Co 
m 
I. a Insular 
ne Ptatlor 
Sub- 
18- Costa Rica 967 
19- Cyprus 197 
Q 
& Natural Prolon albn Q 
20- Denmark 196 
Q 
As Defined in the 1958 C vention Q 
21- Dominican R. 
95 
196 
Q 
0 
5151. nI 1hal 1949 No Def. 
950 Q 200 mt depth 0 
5q. El Savador 950 
Q 200 marine 
miles Q 
25- F. R. Germany 964 Q Q 
26- Figi. 1970 0 0 Q 
27- Finland 965 AccordiQn to the 958 Con ention Q 
28- France 888 
Q In co 
1958 Convention 
formity wi 
ith three 
the 
reservations 0 
29. German D. R. 964 No DO. 
30- German D. R. 968 
State's Name 
1945 
to 
1950 
1951: 
to 
1950 
959 
to 
973 
According to the 
Cony., or 200 mt. / 
Expiollability 
Criterion. 
Exploit. 
Critreion 
Continenta Margi 
or 200 n. ml, or 
any other definit 
limit 
Infinit 
Limit, 
or No 
Definition 
Conti- 
nental 
Shelf 
Seabed a 
Subsoll of 
Submars 
Areas 
esignat 
or 
Controled 
Ames 
31- Ghana 963 9 200 mt. isobath tID 
32- Ghana 973 4p 
n. 14- Guatemala 949 No Del. Platform 
34- Honduras 950 No Del 
®o Insular 1a 
35- Honduras 
1 
057 
" Insular T 
or Subm 
race a 
One Area 
36- Iceland OAR CCori cenrill ia Fisheries Re ula one No Del. 4p 
37- India 
38- India 959 a 
19- Ira 957 
1 
No Dot. 
. q 
30. lrsqu 
968 Official Spokesma 
to the rules and 
:' to emp 
rinciples 
seize its full adh 
f International La 
once 
41_ Iran 955 
42- Ireland 
43- Israel 952 9D 
44- Italy 
45- Jamaica 948 Altor lion of boundaries No Def. 
46- Korea R. 
1 
952 
1 identified by 
co-ordinates 
C She 
auto 
1 Adjacent 
and Ins 
to the pan 
r Ceosts 
47- Kuwait 949 
48- Madagascar 
1 
970 
C 
In conformity wit 
1 
the 195 Convention 
49- Malaysia . 968 
10 
50- Malta 966 
51- Mauritania 962 200 ml isobath 
52- Mexico 945 
200 mt. isobat Platform 
53- New Guinea (An ® 100 fathom as tl'n Ad. 
It was ide Iliad 40 a subsea t 
54- New Zealand 
55- Nicaragua 95 No Dot. 
56- Ni eria . 969 
10 1 
57- Norway 
58- Oman 972 
9- P ana 948 
No Del. 
60- Panama 1967 . 0 200 nml. 
Insular 6 id and 
61- PAN 
947 
952 
a ® 200 nml. Insular S hisiff 
62- Phili inese 1949 No 001. 
9o its analog 
chipolago, 
in an 
63- Portugal 1956 db 200 mt. hioball 
State's Name 
945 
to 
950 
951 
to 
958 
959 
to 
973 
According to the 
Conv., or 200 mt. / 
Exploltability 
Criterion. 
Exploit- 
ability 
Criterion 
Continents Margin 
or 200 n. ml, or 
any other definlt 
limit 
Infinit 
Limit, 
or No 
Deffnitlo 
Conti 
nenta 
Shelf 
Seabed & 
Subsoil of 
Submarine 
Areas 
esignate 
or 
Controted 
Areas 
64- Qatar 949 
65- Ras Al Khaimah 94 
66- Sarawak 954 Alter tion of Boundaries No Def. " 
67- Saudi Arabia 949 No Def. 
68- Saudi Arabia 968 Related to the red ea No Def. 
4) Seabed 
the saudi 
adjacent t 
Cont. Shel 
60- Seychelles 196 
70- Sharjah 949 
71- South Africa 196 
® As dell 
Acc 
d In the 
table to S 
958 Conv. or any 
uth Africa 
her Conv. 
0 
72- Spain 196 _ 0 
73- Sri Lanca (Ceylon), r Insular S elf 
74- Sudan 970 
75- Sweden 196 In accordance wit the 195 Convention 
76- Tonaa 970 
77- Trinidad & Tobago 94 a 
78- Turkey 
968 -t Is normally slip 
provisions of the 
laced that 
Conventiot 
those undertaking 
on the Continents 
he drilling 
Shelf' 
shout conform % ith the 
79- Umm Al Daiwain 94 1J 
n offne ion of its Mission t e(-u. 
80- U. K. 4 @ " 
81- U. S. A. 94 
0 Accompanying 
i. e., up to 200 
rosa Iden 
t isobath. 
'lied it in a geolog I sense, 
" The W 
IJO. Q 
t Is very 
)nvention 
imilar to Article 6 the 
83- Venezuela 956 
84- P. D. R. Yemen 1 11970 
& 960 Mt dept /ex loitabi i according to .4 
85- Yugoslavia 965 4P 0 
d 
The Informations cited above have been dlected from the following references: UN Legislative 
and Administrative Series, Vol. 1, Seconded., 1974, Vol. 6 Second Ed., 1974, and Vol. 8 
Second Ed., 1974; UN Legislative Series, (ST/LEG/SER. B/... ) No 15,16 And 18; Churchill R., 
Nordquist, M., and Lay, S. H., New Directions In the Law of the Sea. Oceana Pub. INC, Dobbs Ferry, 
New York , 1977, Vol. I, IV, and V; Auguste, Barry B. L., The Continental Shelf, Ubrairle Minard, 
Paris, 1960. 
Annex II 
Multilateral State Practice & the Delimitation Question 
States That Applied the Equidistance Method 
State's Name 
1- Colombia & Haiti 
Date Continen- Maritime Reference 
tal Shelf Boundary 
Boundary 
18 Feb., 
1978 
2- Colombia & Panama 20 Nov., 
1976 
3- Denmark & Netherlands 31 March @ 
1965 
4- Denmark & Norway 8 Dec., @ 
1965 
5- Denmark & UK. 3 March 
1966 
6- Dominican R. & Colombia 13 Jan., 
1978 
7- Finland & USSR 5 May 
1967 
8- France & Saint Lucia 4 March 
1981 
9- Italy & Spain 19 Feb., 
1974 
10- Netherlands & UK. 6 Oct., 
1965 
11- Norway & UK. 
12- Poland & USSR 
10 March 
1965 
29 Aug., 
1969 
13- Sri Lanka & India & Maldives 23 July 
1976 
14- Sri Lanka & India 23 March 
1976 
15- Sweden & Norway 24 July 
1968 
16- Turkey & USSR 23 June 
1978 
17- UK (Pictarine) & France 25 Oct., 
(Polynensia) 1983 
Q 
I 
@ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 76 
@ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 88 
New Directions, Vol. 1, P. 128 
New Directions, Vol. 1, P. 123 
New Directions, Vol. 1, P. 125 
@ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 78 
UN Leg. Ser., No 15, P. 784 
&7 ILM., 1968, P. 560 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN, 
1987, P. 129. 
New Directions, Vol. V. P. 261 
New Directions, Vol. 1, P. 126 
New Directions, Vol. 1. P. 120 
9 ILM., 1970, P. 697 
New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 
102 
New Directions. Vol. VIII, P. 
99-101 
UN Leg. Ser., No 16, P. 413 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN. 
1987, P. 194. 
UKTS, No 56,1984. ' 
18- USA & Cook Islands 11 June 
1980 
19- USA & Mexico 4 May 
1978 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 100 
@ 17 ILM. 1978, P. 1073 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 100 20- USA & New Zealand (Tokelau) 2 Dec., 
1980 
States That Aoolied A Modified Equidistance Boundary line 
State's Name 
1- Abu Dhabi & Qatar 
Date Continen- Maritime Reference 
tal Shelf Boundary 
Boundary 
20 March 
1969 
2- Argentina & Uruguay 19 Nov., 
1973 
3- Australia & Indonesia 18 May 
1971 
4- Australia & Indonesia 9 Oct., 
1972 
5- Australia & Indonesia 26 Jan., 
1973 
6- Australia & Papua New Guinea 18 Dec., 
1978 
7. Bahrain & Saudi Arabia 22 Feb., 
1958 
8- Bahrain & Iran 17 June 
1971 
9- Costa Rica & Panama 2 Feb., 
1980 
10- Cuba & USA 16 Dec., 
1977 
11- Denmark & Canada 17 Dec., 
1973 
20 May 
1965 
12- Finland & Sweden 29 Sep., @ 
1972 
13- Finland & USSR 
14- German D. R. & Poland 29 Oct., 
1968 
15- Greece & Italy 
16- Haiti & Cuba 
24 May 
1977 
Q 
Q 
New Directions, Vol. V, P. 223 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 64 
New Directions, Vol. IV, P. 91 
ibid. 
UN Leg. Ser., No 18, P. 444 
18 ILM., 1979, P. 291 
New Directions, Vol. V. P. 207 
New Directions, Vol. V, P. 230 
Limits in the Seas, No 97 
17 ILM. 1978, P. 110 
New Directions, Vol. IV, P. 105 
UN Leg. Ser., No 18, P. 439 
6 ILM. 1968, P. 727 
Limits in the Seas, No 65 
Limits in the Seas, No 96 
New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 69 27 Oct., 
1977 
Q 
2 
17- India & Indonesia 
18- India & Indonesia 
19- India & Maldives 
20- India & Sri Lanka 
21- India & Thailand 
8 Aug., 
1974 
14 Jan., 
1977 
28 Dec., 
1976 
26 June 
1974 
22 June 
1978 
22- India & Indonesia & Thailand 22 June 
1978 
23- Indonesia & Malaysia 
24- Iran & Qatar 
25- Iran & U. A. Emirates 
26- Iran & Oman 
27- Iran & Saudi Arabia 
28- Italy & Yugoslavia 
29- Italy & Tunisia 
30- Japan & Korea 
31- Japan & Korea 
32- Kenya & Tanzania 
33- Norway & USSR 
34- Mexico & Cuba 
27 Oct., 
1969 
20 Sep., 
1969 
13 Aug., 
1974 
25 July, 
1974 
24 Oct., 
1968 
8 Jan., 
1968 
20 Aug., 
1971 
5 Feb., 
1974 
5 Feb., 
1974 
9 July 
1976 
29 Nov., 
1957 
26 July, 
1976 
35- Sweden & Denmark 9 Nov., 
1984 
36- Thailand & Indonesia 17 Dec., 
1971 
37- Thailand & Indonesia 11 Dec., 
1975 
38- Venezuela & Dominican R. 3 March 
1979 
New Directions, Vol. V, P. 265 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 93 
@ Limits in the Seas, No. 78 
13 ILM., 1974, P. 1442 
@ Limits in the Seas, No. 93 
Limits in the Seas, No 93 
9 ILM. 1970, P. 1173 
UN Leg. Ser., No 16, P. 416 
New Directions, Vol. V. P. 242 
New Directions, Vol. V, P. 235 
New Directions, Vol. V. P. 216 
New Directions, Vol. 1, P. 112 
New Directions, Vol. V. P. 247 
New Directions, Vol. IV, P. 113 
New Directions, Vol. IV, P. 117 
Limits in the Seas, No 92 
312 UNTS., P. 289; see also 
Limits in the Seas, No 17 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN, 
1987, P168-169. 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN, 
1987, P 20. 
@ UN Leg. Ser., No 18, P. 437 
@ Limits in the Seas, No. 93 
@ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 80 
3 
States That AQ ie°Iý dA Negotiated Boundary Lin 
State's Name 
1- Brazil & France 
2- Colombia & Costa Rica 
3- F. R. Germany & Denmark 
4- F. R. Germany & German D. R. 
5- F. R. Germany & UK. 
6- France & Spain 
7- France & Venezuela 
8- Iceland & Norway 
Date Continen- Maritime Reference 
tal Shelf Boundary 
Boundary 
30 Jan. 
1981 
17 March 
1977 
28 Jan., 
1971 
29 June 
1974 
25 Nov., 
1971 
29 Jan., 
1974 
17 July. 
1980 
22 Oct., 
1981 
9- Indonesia & Malaysia 17-21 Dec., 
1971 
10- Indonesia & Thailand 17-21 Dec., 
1971 
11- Malaysia & Thailand 21 Dec., 
1971 
12- Netherlands & F. R. Germany 28 Jan., 
1971 
13- Sudan & Saudi Arabia 16 May 
1974 
14- Thailand & Indonesia & 17-21 Dec., 
Malaysia 1971 
15- USA & Venezuela 28 March 
1978 
16- Venezuela & The Netherlands 31 March, 
1978 
17- U. K. & Ireland 2 Nov., 
1988 
4 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN, 
1987, P. 87-89. 
@ New Direction, Vol. VIII, P. 93 
10 ILM. 1971, P. 603. 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 74 
11 ILM. 1972, P. 731; see 
also Limits in the Seas, No 10 
New Directions, Vol. V, P. 251 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984), UN, 
1987, P. 132. 
21 ILM. 1982, P. 1222 
@ Limits in the Seas. No 81 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 81 
@ Limits in the Seas, No 81 
10 ILM. 1971, P. 607 
UN Leg. Ser., No 18. P. 452 
@ UN Leg. Ser., No 18. P. 429 
@ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 84 
Maritime Boundaries Agree- 
ments (1970-1984). UN, 
1987, P139-145. 
Press released. 
States That ADQlied Another Method: Parallel of Latitude 
State's Name Date Continen- Maritime Reference 
tal Shelf Boundary 
Boundary 
1- Brazil & Uruguay 21 July @ Limits in the Seas, No 73 
1972 
2- Chile & Peru 28 Aug., 1952 @ Limits in the Sea, No 86 
&4 Oct., 1954 
3- Colombia & Ecuador 23 Aug., @ New Directions, Vol. V, P. 12 
1975 
4- Ecuador & Peru 28 Aug., 1952 @ Limits in the Seas, No 88 
&4 Dec., 1954 
5- Gambia & Senegal 4 June, @ New Directions, Vol. VIII, P. 104 
1975 
5 
Annex III 
Multilateral State Practice: Method of Delimitation Aspects 
Simple Modified Negotiated Other Methods Party to the 
State's Name Equidistance Equidistance Boundary e. g. Parallel 1958 Conv. on 
Line Line Line of Latitude the Cont. Shelf 
1- Abu Dhabi 
2- Argentina 
3- Australia 
4- Bahrain 
& Qatar, 1969 
& Uruguay, 1973 
& Indonesia, 3 Agr. 
1971,72,73. 
dc Papua New 
Guinea, 1978 
& Iran, 1971 
& Saudi Arabia 
1958 
5- Brazil & France, 1981 
6- Canada & Denmark, 1973 
7- Chile & Peru, 1952, & 
1954 
14.5.1963 
6.2.1970 
8- Colombia & Dominican R., 1978 & Costa Rica, & Ecuador, 1975 8.6.1962 
& Panama, 1976 1977 
& Haiti, 1978 
9- Cook Islands & USA, 1980 
10- Costa Rica 
11- Cuba 
& Panama, 1980 & Colombia, 1977 16.2.1972 
& Haiti, 1977 
& USA, 1977 
& Mexico, 1976 
12- Denmark & Netherlands, & Canada, 1973 & F. R. Gcnnany, 
1965 & Sweden, 1984 1971 
do Norway, 1965 
do UK., 1966 
12.6.1963 
13- Dominican R. & Colombia, 1978 & Venezuela, 1979 11. B. 1964 
14- Ecuador 
15- F. R. Germany 
16- Finland dt USSR, 1967 & Sweden, 1972 
& USSR, 1965 
& Uruguay, 1972 
(Perpendicular) 
& Colombia, 1975 
& Peru, 1952, & 
1954 
& Denmark, 1971 
& Netherlands, 1971 
& UK., 1971 
& German D. R., 1974 
17- France & Saint Lucia, 1981 & Spain, 1974 
& U. K., 1983 & Brazil, 1981 
& Venezuela, 1980 
18- Gambia & Senegal, 1975 
19- German D. R. & Poland, 1968 & F. R. Gemºany, 1974 
20- Greece & Italy, 1977 
16.2.1965 
14,6.1965 
27.12.1973 
6.11.1972 
i 
21- Haiti & Colombia, 1978 & Cuba, 1977 
22- Iceland 
23- India & Sri Lanka, 1976. & Indonesia, 1974 
& Sri Lanka && Sri Lanka, 1974. 
Maldives, 1976 & Indonesia, 1977 
& Thailand, 1978 
& Maldives, 1976 
& Indonesia, & 
Thailand, 1978 
24- Indonesia 
25- Iran 
& Norway, 1981 
& Australia, 3 Agr. & Thailand & Malay- 
1971,72,73. sia, 1971 
& India, 1974. & Thailand, 1971 
& Malaysia, 1969. & Malaysia, 1971 
& Thailand, 1971 
& Thailand, 1975 
& India, 1977 
& India & Thailand 
1978 
& Bahrain, 1971 
& Oman, 1974 
& Saudi Arabia, 1968 
& Qatar, 1969 
& U. A. Emirates, 
1974 
26- Ireland & U. K., 1988 
27- Italy & Spain, 1974 & Greece, 1977 
& Yugoslavia, 1968 
& Tunisia, 1971 
28- Japan & Korea, 2 Agr. 
1974 
29- Kenya & Tanzania, 1976 
30- Korea R. & Japan, 2 Agr. 
1974 
31- Malaysia & Indonesia, 1969 & Thailand & Indo- 
nesia, 1971 
& Indnesia, 1971 
& Thailand, 1971 
32- Maldives & India & Sri- & India, 1976 
Lanka, 1976 
33- Mexico & U. S. A., 1978 & Cuba, 1976 
34- The Nether- & Denmark, 1965 & F. R. Germany, 1971 
lands & UK., 1965 & Venezuela, 1978 
29.3.1960 
20.6.1969 
21.12.1960 
18.2.1966 
35- New Zealand & USA., 1980 18.1.1965 
36- Norway & Denmark, 1965 & USSR., 1957 & Iceland, 1981 
& UK., 1965 
& Sweden, 1968 
37- Oman & Iran, 1974 
38- Panama & Colombia, 1976 & Costa Rica, 1980 
39- Papua New & Australia, 1978 
Guinea 
2 
9.9.1971 
40- Peru 
41- Poland 
42- Qatar 
43- Saint Lucia & France, 1981 
44- Saudi Arabia 
45- Senegal 
46- Spain & Italy, 1974 
47- Sri Lanka 
48- Sudan 
49- Sweden 
50- Tanzania 
51- Thailand 
& USSR., 1969 & German D. R., 1968 
& India & Mal- & India, 1974 
dives, 1976 
& India, 1976 
& Norway, 1968 & Finland, 1972 
& Denmark, 1984 
& Kenya. 1976 
52- Tunisia 
53- Turkey & U. S. S. R., 1978 
54- U. A. Emirates 
55- UK. & Denmark, 1966 
& Netherlands, 1965 
& Norway, 1965 
& France, 1983 
56- Uruguay 
dt Abu Dhabi, 1969 
& Iran, 1969 
& Iran, 1968 & Sudan, 1974 
& Bahrain, 1958 
& France, 1974 
& Saudi Arabia, 
1974 
& Chile, 1952, & 
1954 
& Ecuador, 1952 & 
1954 
29.6.1962 
& Gambia, 1975 25.4.1961, & 
Denunciation in 
1.3.1976 
& India, 1978 & Indonesia & Mal- 
& Indonesia, 1971 aysia, 1971 
& Indonesia, 1975 & Indonesia, 1971 
& India & Indo- & Malaysia, 1971 
nesia. 1978 
ý Italy, 1971 
& Ican, 1974 
& Argentina, 1973 
57- USA. & Cook Islands, & Cuba, 1977 & Venezuela, 1978 
1980 
& New Zealand, 
1980 
& Mexico, 1978 
58- USSR. & Finland, 1967 & Norway, 1957 
" Poland, 1969 & Finland, 1965 
& Turkey, 1978 
59- Venezuela 
60- Yugoslavia 
& Dominican R., & USA., 1978 
1979 & France, 1980 
& Tice Netherlands, 
1978. 
do Italy, 1968 
& F. R. Germany, 1971 
& Irelan3,1988 
& Brazil, 1972 
25.2.1971 
1.6.1966 
2.7.1968 
22.11.1960 
12.4.1961 
22.11.1960 
13.8.1961 
28.1.1966 
3 
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